The Dialogues of Plato — Translation by David Horan

Minos
1
––––– OR CONCERNING LAW –––––
persons in the dialogue: SOCRATES of Alopece, son of Sophroniscus
A COMPANION from Locri Epizephyrii, Italy
scene: no setting
_____
SOCRATES: What, for us, is law?
COMPANION: What kind of laws are you asking about?
SOCRATES: What’s this? Does law differ from law on the particular basis of being law? Consider
what I’m actually asking you. It’s as if I had asked you what gold is, and you, as you have
just done, were to ask me what kind of gold I meant. I believe you would not be questioning
me in the correct manner. For gold, presumably, does not differ at all from gold, nor does
stone from stone, on the basis of stone being stone or on the basis of gold being gold. And
so, neither does law, I presume, differ at all from law. They are, rather, all the same thing,
for each of them is a law, none is more so and none is less so. So this is my specific question:
what, in general, is law? If you have a ready answer, let’s hear it.
COMPANION: What else could law be, Socrates, except whatever is conventional?
SOCRATES: And do you think that speech is whatever is spoken, or sight is whatever is seen, or that
hearing is whatever is heard? Or is speech other than what is spoken, sight other than what
is seen, and is hearing one thing while whatever is heard is something else? And is law, in
that case, one thing, while whatever is conventional is something else? Is this so, or how
does it seem to you?
COMPANION: To me, at the moment, they seem different.
SOCRATES: So law, then, is not whatever is conventional.
COMPANION: I don’t think so.
SOCRATES: What, then, would law be? Let’s investigate this as follows. If someone asked us about
what has been said just now, “Since you say that whatever is seen is seen by sight, what is
this sight by which they are seen?”, we would reply that it is the sense perception that reveals
things through the eyes. Suppose he were to go on and ask us, “Well then, since whatever is
heard is heard by hearing, what is this hearing?”, we would reply that it is the sense perception
by which sounds are revealed to us through the ears. Well, what if he were also to question us
in this way, “Since it is by law that whatever is conventional is conventional, what is this law
by which they are conventional? Is it some sense perception, or an explanation, just as what-
ever is learned is learned by being explained by knowledge? Or is it discovery, just as whatever
is discovered is discovered in the way that, for instance, what is healthy or unhealthy is dis-
covered by medicine, and the intentions of the gods are, according to the soothsayers, dis-
covered by prophecy, since skill, for us, is presumably the discovery of things? Is this so?”
313 a
313 b
313 c
314 a
314 b
1,044 | MINOS 313a–314b
Minos, David Horan translation, 16 Nov 25
COMPANION: Entirely so.
SOCRATES: So, which of these might we best assume law to be?
COMPANION: The various decisions and decrees, in my opinion at any rate. What else could anyone
declare law to be? So it is most likely, to respond to your question, that law in general is a
decision of a city.
SOCRATES: You seem to be saying that law is political opinion.
COMPANION: I am.
SOCRATES: And you may perhaps be right, but we may know better, as follows. Do you say that
some people are wise?
COMPANION: I do.
SOCRATES: Aren’t the wise people wise by wisdom?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what about the just people? Aren’t they just by justice?
COMPANION: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Are not the lawful people lawful by law?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Are the lawless people lawless by lawlessness?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Are the lawful people just?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Are the lawless people unjust?
COMPANION: Unjust.
SOCRATES: Are not justice and law most noble?
COMPANION: Quite so.
SOCRATES: And injustice and lawlessness are most base?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And one preserves the city and everything else, while the other destroys and overturns
them?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, we should regard law as something noble and seek it as something good.
COMPANION: Of course.
SOCRATES: Didn’t we say that law is a decision of a city?
COMPANION: We said so, indeed.
SOCRATES: Well then, are some decisions good while others are evil?
COMPANION: Indeed so.
SOCRATES: And yet, law was not evil.
COMPANION: Indeed not.
SOCRATES: In that case, it is not correct to reply so simply that law is a decision of a city.
COMPANION: No, I don’t think so.
SOCRATES: So it would not be appropriate for an evil decision to be law.
COMPANION: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: And yet it is quite apparent to me, for my part, that law is an opinion. But since it is not
evil opinion, it is obvious by now, is it not, that it is good opinion, if law is indeed opinion?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: But what is good opinion? Is it not true opinion?
COMPANION: Yes.
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315 a
MINOS 314c–315a | 1,045
–––––
1
Most scholars doubt that Plato was the author of this work.
SOCRATES: And true opinion is discovery of what is?
COMPANION: It is, indeed.
SOCRATES: So law purports to be discovery of what is?
COMPANION: How then is it, Socrates, if law is discovery of what is, that we do not always have recourse
to the same laws in relation to the same issues if things that are have been discovered by us?
SOCRATES: Law, nonetheless, purports to be the discovery of what is. So those people who apparently
do not have recourse to the same laws are not always able to discover what the laws purport
to discover, namely, what is. Come on, let’s see whether it may become clear to us, from here
on, whether we always have recourse to the same laws or use different laws at different times,
and also whether we all have recourse to the same laws, or different people use different laws.
COMPANION: Socrates, it is not difficult to recognise that the same people do not always have recourse
to the same laws, and also that different people use different laws. Since, among ourselves
here, at the moment, the law forbids human sacrifice; it is unholy, whereas the Carthaginians
perform such sacrifices, as for them these are holy and conventional, and some of them even
sacrifice their own sons to Cronus, as you may perhaps have heard. And it is not just non-
Greeks who have recourse to different laws from ours, but even the people of Lycia and the
descendants of Athamas perform such sacrifices, even though they are Greeks. And you
know, I presume, about ourselves too, having heard about the kinds of laws we had recourse
to in the past concerning the dead, laws whereby we first slaughtered sacrificial victims
before the corpse was carried out, and engaged women to gather the bones into an urn. Then
again, still earlier generations than these used to bury their dead in the house, but we do not
follow any of these practices. And it would be possible to give lots of similar examples.
Indeed, there is much scope for demonstrating that we ourselves do not always legislate on
the same basis among ourselves, nor do people in general do so with one another.
SOCRATES: I would not be at all surprised, best of men, if you were right in what you are saying
and this is something I had overlooked. But as long as you state your opinions in your own
way in a lengthy speech, and I do likewise, I don’t think we will come to any conclusions.
But if the enquiry were common to us both, we might perhaps come to agreement. So,
engage with me in a common enquiry by putting questions to me if you wish, or by answer-
ing my questions if you prefer.
COMPANION: I am willing, Socrates, to answer any questions you like.
SOCRATES: Come on then, are you accustomed to thinking that whatever is just is unjust, and whatever
is unjust is just, or alternatively that whatever is just is just, while whatever is unjust is unjust.
COMPANION: I am accustomed to thinking that whatever is just is just, and whatever is unjust is unjust.
SOCRATES: And aren’t they conventionally thought of in this way by everyone, in the same way as
they are thought of here?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Among the Persians too?
COMPANION: Even among the Persians.
SOCRATES: Always, I presume?
COMPANION: Always.
SOCRATES: Are things that offer more resistance conventionally regarded as heavier here, and those
that offer less resistance as lighter, or is it the other way around?
COMPANION: No, whatever offers more resistance is heavier, whatever offers less is lighter.
SOCRATES: Is this also the case in Carthage and Lycia?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And people everywhere conventionally think of whatever is good as good and whatever
is base as base, and not that what’s base is good and what’s good is base.
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1,046 | MINOS 315b–316b
Minos, David Horan translation, 16 Nov 25
COMPANION: Quite so.
SOCRATES: So, is it not the case, generally speaking, that we ourselves, and all other people too,
conventionally think that things that are, are what they are, and not what they are not?
COMPANION: I think so.
SOCRATES: So, whoever is in error about what is, is in error about what is conventional.
COMPANION: Socrates, according to your formulation these all appear conventional, both for our-
selves and anyone else. But as long as I bear in mind that we never stop changing our laws
this way and that, I cannot be persuaded.
SOCRATES: Indeed, perhaps you are not bearing in mind that when moving the pieces on a draughts
board, the pieces are the same. But look at this closely with me. Have you ever come across
writings concerning the health of sick people?
COMPANION: I have.
SOCRATES: Well, do you know what skill the treatise belongs to?
COMPANION: I do, it belongs to the skill of medicine.
SOCRATES: Don’t you refer to those who are knowledgeable about these matters as physicians?
COMPANION: I agree.
SOCRATES: Now, do those who are knowledgeable conventionally think the same things about the
same matters, or do they differ?
COMPANION: The same things, in my opinion.
SOCRATES: Is it only Greeks who conventionally think the same things as their fellow Greeks con-
cerning issues they know about, or does this also apply to non-Greeks, both with themselves
and with Greeks?
COMPANION: There is a strong necessity, I presume, that those who know, be they Greeks or non-
Greeks, should agree in thinking the same things.
SOCRATES: A good answer. And isn’t this always the case?
COMPANION: Yes, indeed, always.
SOCRATES: Don’t the physicians commit to writing whatever views they conventionally hold in
relation to health?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, these writings of the physicians are medical writings and are medical laws.
COMPANION: Yes, medical.
SOCRATES: So, the agricultural writings are agricultural laws?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: What about writings and conventions of horticultural work? To whom do these belong?
COMPANION: To the gardeners.
SOCRATES: So, these are our horticultural laws?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Belonging to those who know how to take charge of gardens?
COMPANION: Of course.
SOCRATES: And it is gardeners who know this.
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: To whom do the writings and conventions about the preparation of food belong?
COMPANION: To the cooks.
SOCRATES: So, these are culinary laws?
COMPANION: Culinary.
SOCRATES: Belonging, it seems, to those who know how to take charge of food preparation?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And it is cooks, they say, who know this?
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MINOS 316c–317a | 1,047
COMPANION: Yes, they know.
SOCRATES: Very well. To whom then do the writings and conventions concerning the administration
of the city belong? Don’t they belong to those with knowledge of taking charge of cities?
COMPANION: I think so.
SOCRATES: And who else besides the political people and the kingly people know this?
COMPANION: These are the people.
SOCRATES: So, these writings are political writings which people refer to as laws. They are the
writings of kings and of good men.
COMPANION: True.
SOCRATES: Now, those who are knowledgeable do not write different things at different times about
the same matters, do they?
COMPANION: No.
SOCRATES: Nor will they ever change their conventions from one to another on the same matters.
COMPANION: Indeed not.
SOCRATES: So, if we see any people anywhere doing this, should we declare that those who are
doing so are knowledgeable or not knowledgeable?
COMPANION: Not knowledgeable.
SOCRATES: And wouldn’t we say that whatever is correct is the convention on each subject, be it
medicine, cookery or gardening?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And we shall never declare that what is not correct is the conventional thinking?
COMPANION: Never.
SOCRATES: So, it happens to be unlawful.
COMPANION: Necessarily.
SOCRATES: Isn’t it also the case in the writings dealing with what’s just and what’s unjust, and the
general administration of the city, and how the city should be managed, that what is correct
is the kingly law, and what’s not correct is not this, even though it seems so to those who
do not know. In fact, it is unlawful.
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, we were right when we agreed that law is the discovery of what is.
COMPANION: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Let’s also examine the following point about this matter. Who is it who knowledgeably
distributes seeds on the land?
COMPANION: A farmer?
SOCRATES: Does he distribute the seeds that are appropriate for each type of land?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, the farmer is good at distributing these, and his laws and distributions for these pur-
poses are correct?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And who is good at distributing notes to melodies and distributes them appropriately,
and to whom do the correct laws here belong?
COMPANION: They belong to the flautist and the citharist.
SOCRATES: So, in these distributions the person who is most skilled in the laws is the most skilled
flautist.
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And who is best at distributing nutriment to people’s bodies? Isn’t it the person who
distributes the appropriate nutriment?
COMPANION: Yes.
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1,048 | MINOS 317b–317e
Minos, David Horan translation, 16 Nov 25
SOCRATES: So, his distributions and his laws are best, and whoever is most skilled in the laws con-
cerning these matters is best at making the distribution.
COMPANION: Indeed so.
SOCRATES: Who is this person?
COMPANION: A trainer.
SOCRATES: And he is the one who is best at pasturing the human herd of the body?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And who is best at pasturing a herd of sheep? What is his name?
COMPANION: A shepherd.
SOCRATES: So, the laws of the shepherd are best for the sheep.
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the laws of the cowherd are best for the cows.
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: And whose laws are best for the souls of humans? Aren’t they the laws of the king? Do
you agree?
COMPANION: I agree.
SOCRATES: You are answering well. Now, can you say who among the ancients proved to be a good
lawgiver in the laws of flute-playing? Perhaps you don’t recall; would you like me to remind
you?
COMPANION: Very much so.
SOCRATES: Was it not said to be Marsyas and his beloved, Olympus of Phrygia?
2
COMPANION: That’s true.
SOCRATES: And their compositions for the flute are indeed most divine, being the only ones that
stir and reveal the people who are in need of the gods. And still, to this day, they remain the
only compositions that do this, because they are divine.
COMPANION: This is so.
SOCRATES: And among the ancient kings, who is said to have been a good lawgiver whose con-
ventions still remain to this day because they are divine?
COMPANION: I can’t think of anyone.
SOCRATES: Don’t you know which Greek peoples make use of the most ancient laws?
COMPANION: Are you referring to the Spartans and Lycurgus, their lawgiver?
SOCRATES: But these are, perhaps, not yet three hundred years old, or a little older. Do you know,
rather, where the best of the conventions come from?
COMPANION: From Crete they say.
SOCRATES: So, among the Greeks, these people make use of the most ancient laws?
COMPANION: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now, among these people, do you know who the good kings were? They were the off-
spring of Zeus and Europa, Minos and Rhadamanthus, whose laws these were.
COMPANION: They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus, at any rate, was a just man, but that Minos
was wild, harsh and unjust.
SOCRATES: Best of men, you are reporting a story from Attic tragedy.
COMPANION: What? Isn’t this what is said about Minos?
SOCRATES: Not by Homer and Hesiod at any rate. Yet these two are more credible than all those
tragedians put together, from whom you have heard what you are now saying.
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MINOS 318a–318e | 1,049
–––––
2
Marsyas was a legendary musician who was credited with having developed the skill of playing wind instruments by
picking up and playing an aulos (a kind of double oboe, which is translated here as ‘flute’) that was left behind by
Athena. Olympus was credited with having introduced instrumental music to Greece from Phrygia in the East.
COMPANION: Well, what do they say about Minos?
SOCRATES: I’ll tell you then, so that you don’t commit an impiety as most people do. For there is
nothing more impious and nothing we should be more careful to avoid than error in word and
deed in relation to the gods, or secondly, in relation to divine humans. You must, rather, employ
great foresight whenever you are about to criticise or praise anyone, in case you speak incor-
rectly. That is why we should learn to distinguish between good and evil people. For the god
gets angry whenever anyone criticises someone who is like himself, or when anyone praises
someone of the opposite sort, the former being a good person. Indeed, you should not think
that there are sacred stones, pieces of wood, birds and serpents, but no sacred humans. A good
human being is, rather, more sacred than all these, while an evil one is more wretched.
And that is why I shall now speak about Minos, as Homer and Hesiod praised him,
lest you, a human being of human birth, fall into error in speaking of a hero and a son of
Zeus. For Homer, telling us that Crete had a large population and ninety cities, says that
“Among them is Cnossus, a great city where Minos was king in the ninth season holding
converse with mighty Zeus.”
3
So this is Homers praise of Minos, briefly stated, but unlike
anything Homer wrote about any of the heroes. That Zeus is a sophist, and that this skill is
entirely noble he makes clear in various places, and especially here. For he means to say
that Minos converses with Zeus every ninth year, visiting him regularly for educational pur-
poses, as if Zeus were a sophist. So, the fact that the privilege of being educated by Zeus is
assigned to none of the heroes apart from Minos is wondrous praise indeed. And in the
Odyssey, in the ‘Book of the Dead’, he describes Minos, but not Rhadamanthus, passing
judgement, holding a golden sceptre.
4
But here he does not describe Rhadamanthus passing
judgement, nor anywhere meeting with Zeus. That’s why I maintain that Minos has been
praised by Homer more than all the others. For being a child of Zeus, and the only one edu-
cated by Zeus, is unsurpassed praise. Indeed, this is the meaning of the verse that says “in
the ninth season holding converse with mighty Zeus”.
Minos is a companion of Zeus, since conversations are discourses and a conversation
partner is a companion in discourse. So Minos visited the Cave of Zeus every nine years in
order to learn and in order to demonstrate what he had learned from Zeus over the previous
nine-year period. There are those who understand ‘holding converse’ as being a drinking
companion or playmate of Zeus, but you may use the following as evidence that those who
understand the words in this way are talking nonsense. For of all the peoples there are, Greeks
and non-Greeks, there are none who refrain from drinking parties and the playfulness born
of wine except the Cretans, and the Spartans too, who learned this from the Cretans. In Crete,
among the various laws that Minos instituted, there is one whereby they are not to drink
together to the point of drunkenness. And it is evident that whatever he thought noble, he
instituted as conventions for his fellow citizens. For Minos did not, of course, behave like
some ordinary fellow and think one thing while enacting something else contrary to what he
thought. No, his meeting was, as I say, through discourse for the purposes of education in
excellence. That’s why, for his fellow citizens, he instituted these laws through which Crete
is happy for all time, and Sparta too, once it began to make use of them, since they are divine.
But Rhadamanthus was a good man, for he had been educated by Minos. He had not,
however, been educated in the entire skill of kingship, but in a skill subservient to kingship
sufficient to preside in courts of law, and that’s why he was said to be a good judge. Indeed,
Minos used him as a guardian of the law in the city, and used Talos for the same purpose in
the rest of Crete. For Talos went around the villages three times a year as guardian of the law,
having the laws inscribed on brass tablets, hence he was called ‘brazen’. And Hesiod too says
something similar to this about Minos. For having mentioned his name, he says: “Who proved
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1,050 | MINOS 319a–320d
Minos, David Horan translation, 16 Nov 25
to be the most kingly of mortal kings, lord over most of the neighbouring peoples, holding
the sceptre of Zeus by which he also exercised kingship over the cities.
5
And by ‘the sceptre
of Zeus’ he simply means the education he received from Zeus, by which he governed Crete.
COMPANION: In that case, Socrates, how on earth has the report been spread abroad that he was an
uneducated, harsh person?
SOCRATES: Because of something, best of men, that you, if you are sound-minded, will be careful
about, as will anyone who is going to preserve his reputation. Never cross any of the poetical
folk, for the poets have enormous influence on reputations depending on whether they eulo-
gise or demonise their subjects. And this was the mistake Minos made in waging war on
this city of ours in which there is, in general, much wisdom and a great variety of poets of
every sort, and tragedians too. For tragedy is of ancient date here, beginning not as people
think with Thespis, nor with Phrynichus.
6
Rather, if you care to think about it, you will find
that this is a most ancient discovery made in this very city. And tragedy is the most popular
and appealing form of poetry in which we attack Minos in revenge for those tributes he
compelled us to pay.
7
So, this was the mistake Minos made, being angry with us. Hence, to
answer your question, he has come to have an increasingly bad reputation. He was good
and lawful and, as we said previously, good at distributing, and the strongest indication of
this is the fact that his laws are unchanging, since they belong to someone who, in relation
to the management of the city, well discovered the truth of what is.
COMPANION: The argument you have presented sounds probable to me, Socrates.
SOCRATES: In that case, if I am speaking the truth, do you think that the Cretan citizens of Minos
and Rhadamanthus made use of the most ancient laws?
COMPANION: Apparently.
SOCRATES: So, these two proved to be the best lawgivers of the ancients, shepherding and distrib-
uting to the people, just as Homer said that a good general is a shepherd of the multitude.
8
COMPANION: Very much so.
SOCRATES: Come on then, in the name of Zeus, god of friendship, what if someone were to ask us,
“What is it that the good lawgiver, who is good at distributing to the body, distributes to the
body to make it better?” We would reply, rightly and briefly, that it is nutriment and exertion
to develop the body itself on the one hand, and to exercise and establish it on the other.
COMPANION: Correct.
SOCRATES: What if he were then to ask us, “What precisely is it that the good lawgiver, who is
good at distributing, distributes to the soul to make it better?” How might we respond if we
were to avoid shame to ourselves at our age?
COMPANION: At this stage, I can no longer say.
SOCRATES: Well, it is a shame then, on the soul of each of us, that it is so plainly ignorant of that
within it which is good or bad for it, even though it has considered what’s good and bad for
the body and much else.
_____
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MINOS 320e–321d | 1,051
–––––
3
Odyssey xix.178-179.
4
The ‘Book of the Dead’ refers to the Odyssey, Book xi. For the account of Minos passing judgement with his
golden sceptre see Odyssey, xi.568-571.
5
Hesiod, Fragment 144.
6
Thespis is variously credited with having been the first actor in a play, having introduced the principal actor and the
chorus, and having been the inventor of tragedy. Phrynichus was a student of Thespis and one of the first tragedians.
7
According to legend, after defeating the Athenians, Minos demanded that a tribute of seven young men and seven
young women be sent by Athens to Crete every nine years as food for the Minotaur.
8
Iliad i.263, Odyssey iv.532.
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