Book 2 - Platonic Foundation

Laws

––––– BOOK II –––––

ATHENIAN: It seems, then, that the next question we need to consider is whether discerning one

another’s natures is the only good that comes from the correct use of wine parties, or

whether they involve some important benefit that deserves to be taken very seriously. Well,

what do we say? The argument, it seems, wishes to indicate that such a benefit is involved,

but we should hear how and in what sense, paying close attention in case we get tangled up

in the argument.

CLINIAS: Speak on.

ATHENIAN: Well then, I wish to recall once more what exactly we say right education is, in our

view. For my guess now is that the salvation of education lies in this activity being organised

in the right way.

CLINIAS: That is a bold claim.

ATHENIAN: Well, I am saying that the first, primitive sensation in children is pleasure and pain,

and it is in these that excellence and vice first come to the soul. As for understanding, and

confident true opinions, fortunate is the man to whom they come even in old age, and perfect

is the person who has acquired these, and all the goods that are in them. And I call education

the excellence that comes to children first, when pleasure, affection, pain and hate are engen-

dered in the right way, in the souls of those who are not yet able to understand the reason.

And when they do come to understand, they will concur with reason, and accept that they

have become accustomed to acting in the correct manner because the habits of their child-

hood are so fitting. Now, this total concurrence is excellence, but there is a part of this that

may be isolated in the argument and may be referred to as education, and in my opinion it

would be right to do so. This part is the correct upbringing in relation to pleasure and pain,

so as to hate what one should hate, from the very beginning right until the end, and love

what one should love. If our argument were to separate this off and refer to it as education,

we would in my opinion be naming it correctly.

CLINIAS: Yes, indeed, stranger. What you said earlier about education, and what you are saying

now, sounds right to us.

ATHENIAN: Good. Now, although this correct training in pleasures and pains constitutes education,

it slackens and diminishes to a considerable extent over the course of one’s life, and the

gods, taking pity on the natural hardship suffered by the human race, have instituted festival

days as respites from our labours. And they have provided the Muses, and Apollo their

leader, and Dionysus too, as our festival companions to regulate the festivals. And they pro-

vided sustenance there in the company of the gods.

There is an argument that is repeated constantly nowadays, and we should see

whether or not it is true, and accords with nature. It maintains that the young, all of them,

are more or less incapable of keeping their bodies or their mouths quiet. Their constant

652 a

652 b

653 a

653 b

653 c

653 d

LAWS II – 652a–653d | 1,071

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

endeavour is to move and make sounds, leaping and jumping, dancing with delight and

playing around, and making all sorts of noises. Now, the other animals have no awareness

of the kinds of order or disorder in their various movements, order that we call rhythm and

harmony. But to us humans, who as we said were given the gods as our companions in

dance, these very gods have given us an awareness of rhythm and harmony, accompanied

by pleasure. By this awareness they move us and act as our chorus leaders, connecting us

to one another with songs and dances. And they gave the chorus its name ‘chorus’ because

of its natural charm.

First, then, do we accept this, and may we propose that education is,

initially, through the Muses and Apollo? Or what should we say?

CLINIAS: Just that.

ATHENIAN: So, for us, the uneducated person will be someone who has not participated in the cho-

rus, and we should propose that the educated person has participated enough.

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: Now, a choral performance involves dancing and singing combined together.

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: So the person who has been well educated would be capable of singing and dancing well.

CLINIAS: So it seems.

ATHENIAN: Let us look at what exactly it is that we are saying now.

CLINIAS: What are you referring to?

ATHENIAN: We say that ‘he sings well’ or ‘he dances well’, but should we add ‘provided that what

he sings is good and what he dances is good’. Or should we not add this?

CLINIAS: We should add this.

ATHENIAN: What about someone who regards what is good as good, and what is base as base, and

makes use of them accordingly? Will such a person, in our view, be better educated in choral

performance and music when he is consistently able to be faithful enough, physically and

verbally, to his concept of what is proper, but takes no delight in anything good, and has no

aversion to whatever is not? Would he be better educated than someone who was not really

able, verbally or physically, to successfully accomplish anything good, or to conceive of it

mentally, but is right when it comes to pleasure and pain, because he embraces whatever is

good, and detests whatever is not?

CLINIAS: These two cases, stranger, are vastly different in terms of education.

ATHENIAN: Well then, if the three of us recognise what is good in relation to singing and dancing,

we shall also know correctly who has been educated and who is uneducated. But if we do

not recognise this, we would never be able to recognise clearly whether a guardian of edu-

cation exists, and where it is. Isn’t this so?

CLINIAS: It is so, indeed.

ATHENIAN: So what we have to track down next, like hounds following a trail, is what is good

bearing, melody, song and dance. But if these escape us and get away, vain would be our

subsequent argument about correct education, either of Greek or of non-Greek.

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: So be it. What exactly then is good bearing and melody? What should we say? Come

on then. Consider a courageous soul in difficult circumstances, and a cowardly soul under

the very same circumstances. Will their bearing and their utterances turn out to be much

the same?

CLINIAS: No, how could they when their very complexions differ?

ATHENIAN: Well said, my friend. But bearing and melody are present in music, which is concerned

with rhythm and harmony, and so we may rightly speak of good rhythm and harmony in

melody and bearing, but it is not right to use the analogous term ‘good colour’, as the choral

653 e

654 a

654 b

654 c

654 d

654 e

655 a

1,072 | LAWS II – 653e–655a

teachers do. And yet, it is right to speak this way about the bearing and the melody of the

coward and of the brave, and in the case of the brave these may correctly be referred to as

good, and in the case of the cowards as base. Indeed then, to avoid an excessively lengthy

speech, let’s just say that altogether the bearings and melodies associated with excellence

itself, or some image of this, are good, while those associated with badness are bad. This

applies to excellence and badness of soul or body.

CLINIAS: You are right to propose this, and for now our response is that this is how things are.

ATHENIAN: There is a further question. Do all of us take a similar delight in all choral performances,

or is this far from being the case?

CLINIAS: Far from it, totally.

ATHENIAN: Well then, what precisely is it that has sent us astray? Is it that what is good is not the

same for all of us, or is it the same but does not seem to be the same? For I presume no one

will ever say that choral performances of badness are better than those of excellence, or

that he himself delights in the bearing that belongs to degeneracy while others prefer a Muse

of the opposite sort. And yet most people say that the ability of music to provide pleasure

to souls is the correct standard to judge it by. But this is unacceptable, and it is irreverent

in the extreme even to say so. But what sends us astray is, more likely, something else.

CLINIAS: What?

ATHENIAN: Since choral performances involve imitations of characteristics arising in activities

and situations of all sorts, each of the performers goes through the process using habit and

imitation. Now, in cases where anything that is said, sung or performed accords with their

character, by nature, by habit or by both, they are delighted, and cannot help but praise

these performances and pronounce them good. But in cases where the performances go

against their nature, character or some habit, they are unable to take any delight in them or

to praise them, so they pronounce them bad. Those whose nature is correct but whose habit

is not, or those whose habit is correct but whose nature is not, are people who praise what

does not please them. For they declare that each of these performances is pleasant but degen-

erate, and in the presence of others whom they regard as wise, they are ashamed to adopt

bodily movements of the sort that feature in these performances, and ashamed also to sing

songs of this sort and imply that they seriously approve of them. But, in private, they enjoy

all this.

CLINIAS: You are quite right.

ATHENIAN: Now, does any harm come to someone who takes delight in bearing or melodies that

are degenerate, or do any benefits come to those who take pleasure in the opposites of these?

CLINIAS: Quite likely.

ATHENIAN: Likely? Is he not, necessarily, in the same predicament as someone who keeps company

with bad people of degenerate behaviour, and is delighted rather than repelled? He censures

them, half joking, barely dreaming of just how vile this is. Then, of course, this happy man

inevitably becomes like whatever company he delights in, even though he would be

ashamed to be heard praising it. And, indeed, what greater good or evil could befall us than

a totally inevitable process of this sort: a process of becoming like the company we keep?

Can we say?

CLINIAS: I do not think there is one.

ATHENIAN: Now, where laws dealing with education about music in general, and entertainment,

are established in the right way, or will be so in future, do we think the poets will be allowed

in their poetry to adhere to whatever rhythm, melody or utterance pleases the poet himself

655 b

655 c

655 d

655 e

656 a

656 b

656 c

LAWS II – 655b–656c | 1,073

–––––

Wordplay based on an alleged connection, likely fanciful, between the Greek words for ‘chorus’ and ‘joy’.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

and teach this to the children of citizens who have such good laws, and to the young people

in the choruses, regardless of the effect this has in terms of excellence or vice?

CLINIAS: No, that does not make sense. How could it?

ATHENIAN: And yet, nowadays, this is what is permitted, more or less, in all cities except in Egypt.

CLINIAS: Tell us then. What laws about such matters have been put in place in Egypt?

ATHENIAN: It is an amazing story to hear. For the very argument that we are now stating was, it

seems, recognised by them long ago, the argument that the young people in the cities should

practise good bearing and good melody in familiar actions. They codified all the rules, indi-

cating what they are and what they are like, and they displayed these in their temples. They

did not allow either painters or anyone else who represents bearing and that sort of thing to

innovate or contrive contrary to these, either in these areas or in music generally, except

along traditional lines. Nor do they allow this today. And you will find, if you take a look,

that the ten-thousand-year-old paintings and sculptures there – and they are literally ten

thousand years old – are neither more beautiful nor less so than what is being produced

today, because the same skill is being applied.

CLINIAS: Amazing.

ATHENIAN: Yes indeed, it is a triumph of legislation and statesmanship, but you will find problems

there in other areas. But in the case of music this is the truth, and it is worthy of consider-

ation. It was possible to be firm about such matters, and enact laws encouraging melodies

that possess a natural correctness. This would be a task for a god or some divine man, and

in fact there in Egypt, they say that the melodies that have been preserved for such a lengthy

period of time are actually compositions of Isis.

So, as I said, if someone is able to grasp

the correctness of these in any way at all, he should be bold enough to arrange them into a

legal framework, since the yearning, driven by pleasure and pain, to indulge continually in

new music does not really possess any great power to corrupt the sacred choral performance

merely by referring to it as outdated. In Egypt, at any rate, it seems to have had no such

corrupting influence at all – quite the opposite in fact.

CLINIAS: Yes, that appears to be how matters stand, based on what you are now saying.

ATHENIAN: In that case, may we be so bold as to describe the correct use of music and entertainment

with choral performances somewhat as follows? We are delighted whenever we think we

are doing well, and conversely whenever we are delighted we think we are doing well. Isn’t

this so?

CLINIAS: It is so, indeed.

ATHENIAN: And indeed, in a situation like this where we are delighted, we are unable to come to rest.

CLINIAS: True.

ATHENIAN: Now, aren’t our young folk ready and willing to perform in the chorus themselves,

while we, their elders, think it more appropriate to spend our time watching them, delighting

in their play and festive celebrations. Indeed, our own liveliness is forsaking us now, and

because we yearn for this and cherish it, we set up contests for those who are able, as best

they can, to rouse us through memory into youthfulness.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: So, we should not presume that what is commonly said nowadays about people who

celebrate festivals is completely unfounded. It is said that whoever does the best job of

cheering us up and delighting us should be regarded as the wisest, and judged to be the

winner. In fact, since we are allowed to enjoy ourselves on such occasions, whoever brings

most delight to the most people should be honoured most, and as I said just now he should

carry off the victory prizes. So, consider what has been said. Isn’t it right, and wouldn’t this

be the right course of action if it were to happen like this?

656 d

656 e

657 a

657 b

657 c

657 d

657 e

658 a

1,074 | LAWS II – 656d–658a

CLINIAS: Perhaps.

ATHENIAN: But, blessed man, let us not judge such an issue in haste. Let us rather take it part by

part and consider it somewhat as follows. What if someone, sometime, were to set up a

contest in some very simple way, without even defining whether it was a contest in gym-

nastics, music or horse-riding. Suppose he were to bring everyone in the city together, set

up some victory prizes, and proclaim that anyone who wishes may come along and compete

in a contest that is concerned only with pleasure. Whoever provides most entertainment to

the spectators, without any restriction on how he does so, and who is better than everyone

else at doing just this, and is judged to be the most pleasing competitor of all, will win.

What do you think would come of a proclamation like this?

CLINIAS: In what sense?

ATHENIAN: It is likely, I suppose, that someone would present an epic poem, just like Homer; some-

one else a harp song or a tragedy or a comedy; and I would not be surprised if someone

were to imagine that he really should be victorious because he put on a puppet show. So

when people like this, and thousands of others too, enter the contest, can we say who

deserves to win?

CLINIAS: What a strange question. Indeed, who could ever answer you knowledgeably until he had

heard each of the contestants, and listened to them himself?

ATHENIAN: Well then, would you like me to give you this equally strange response?

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: If very little children are to be the judges, they will opt for the puppet show, won’t they?

CLINIAS: How could they do otherwise?

ATHENIAN: And if the bigger children decide, they will opt for the comedy, while educated women,

young adolescents, and the vast majority of the population will probably choose a tragedy.

CLINIAS: Probably indeed.

ATHENIAN: And perhaps old men like us would be most pleased at hearing a rhapsode reciting the

Iliad or the Odyssey or something from Hesiod in a glorious manner, and would declare

that he is the outright winner. So, who would be the rightful winner? This is the next ques-

tion, isn’t it?

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: Obviously, myself and yourselves will inevitably declare that whoever is chosen by

people of our own age are the rightful winners, for of all the customs prevailing nowadays,

in all of the cities, this seems best to us.

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: I agree with the majority viewpoint, to this extent at least: we should judge music by

the pleasure it gives, but not to any random person. Rather, music that gives pleasure to the

best and most adequately educated people is almost the very finest music of all, especially

the music that pleases the one person who excels in excellence and education. That’s why

we maintain that those who judge such matters need excellence. They have to possess under-

standing in general, and courage in particular. Nor should the true judge arrive at his judge-

ment by learning from the audience, and be overpowered by the commotion of the crowd

and his own lack of education. Nor again, even though he knows better, should he deliver

his judgement without due care because he is a coward who lacks courage, thus speaking

lies from the very same mouth out of which he invoked the gods when becoming a judge.

For a judge, rightly speaking, does not sit as the pupil of the spectators, but rather as their

658 b

658 c

658 d

658 e

659 a

659 b

LAWS II – 658b–659b | 1,075

–––––

Isis was a goddess in the Egyptian pantheon. She was the sister of Osiris, and it was believed that she assisted the dead

in their transition to the afterlife.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

teacher, and he opposes those who ply them with pleasure in a way that is neither appropriate

nor correct. Indeed, the ancient Greek law allowed the judges to do this. But nowadays, in

Sicily and Italy, the law hands the decision over to the majority of the spectators to decide

the winner by a show of hands. This process corrupts the poets themselves, who then com-

pose for the degenerate pleasure of their judges – the audience – thus corrupting the tastes

of the actual audience members. Consequently, the audience itself is instructing the judges.

For although they need to adopt more elevated pleasures by constantly hearing of behaviour

that is superior to their own, the very opposite now happens to them, and they do it to them-

selves. What precisely do these various considerations in our argument wish to indicate to

us? Think about it. Is it as follows?

CLINIAS: What?

ATHENIAN: It seems to me that the argument has come back full circle to the same place for the

third or fourth time, and it says that education consists in drawing or leading children

towards the argument that is said by the law to be correct, and is confirmed as indeed correct

by the experience of the most reasonable and mature people. The soul of the child should

not get into the habit of being delighted or pained in a manner that is opposed to the law,

and to those who obey it. The child’s soul should follow along and be delighted and pained

by the very same things as the elder folk. That is why we have songs, as we call them, which

are really charms for souls, seriously intended to produce the sort of concord we are speak-

ing of. But because the souls of the young are unable to bear the seriousness, we refer to

these as entertainments and songs, and we act accordingly. It is just like the situation in

which those who care for sick people with weak bodies try to give them the wholesome

nourishment in some pleasant food and drink, and the unwholesome substances in unpleas-

ant food and drink, so that they develop the good habit of being fond of one and detesting

the other. In the same way, then, the good lawgiver will persuade, or, failing that, compel,

the poetical type, in beautiful and encouraging language, to portray the bearing and the

melodies of sound-minded, courageous and entirely good men, in his rhythms and melodies,

by composing them correctly.

CLINIAS: By Zeus, stranger, do you really think that that is how they compose in other cities these

days? For as far as I can see, apart from ourselves and Sparta, I do not know of any cities

doing what you are describing. Innovations are constantly being introduced in dance, and

in the entire realm of music in general, and the changes are not based upon the law but on

certain disordered pleasures, which are very far from being the same and unchanging, as

they are in Egypt, according to your description. In fact, they are never the same.

ATHENIAN: That is excellent, Clinias. But if you think I am saying that what you are referring to is

current practice, in that case then I would not be surprised if this happened because I am

not expressing my thoughts clearly enough. I was describing what I would like to see hap-

pening in relation to music, and perhaps I gave you the impression that I was describing

current practice. Now, it is not at all pleasant to criticise practices that are beyond remedy

and well advanced in error, but sometimes it is necessary to do so. But since you agree with

me on these matters, tell me, do you maintain that such practices are more prevalent among

yourselves in Crete, and among the Spartans, than they are among other Greeks?

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: And what if they were to be adopted by the other Greeks too? Should we maintain that

these practices would be an improvement over the current situation?

CLINIAS: I expect it would make a big difference if the Spartan practices, or ours, or even the ones

you prescribed just now, were adopted.

ATHENIAN: Come on then, let us agree on the immediate issues. In your cities, isn’t this what is

1,076 | LAWS II – 659c–660e

659 c

659 d

659 e

660 a

660 b

660 c

660 d

660 e

said on the entire subject of education and music? You compel the poets to say that the good

man, being sound-minded and just, is also happy and blessed, and it makes no difference

whether he is big and strong or small and weak, or whether he is rich or poor. In fact, even

if he is richer than Cinyras or Midas,

but is unjust, he is a wretched man living a miserable

life. And your poet says – if he is right about this – “I would not even mention a man, or

write his name down” unless he enacted and acquired everything that is said to be good,

but did so in consort with justice. And, indeed, he shows a man like this “lunging at the

enemy in close combat”, while the unjust man doesn’t even dare “to look upon the face of

bloody slaughter”; nor does he outrun the “Thracian North Wind”; nor does he ever achieve

anything else that is attributed to good people.

Indeed, the things that are said to be good by most people are not being described

correctly. For it is said that what is best is health, beauty is second, wealth third. And count-

less other goods are listed, including acuteness of sight and hearing, and keen perception

of sense objects generally, and even becoming a tyrant and doing whatever you like. And

the very pinnacle of all happiness is, they say, to acquire all these and become immortal,

there and then. But I presume that you and I say that these are all excellent possessions for

men who are just and holy, but to the unjust they are all of them thoroughly bad, beginning

with health. And, indeed, we would say that seeing, hearing, perceiving and being alive at

all, are evil in the extreme when someone is immortal forever, and possesses all these so-

called goods in the absence of justice and total excellence, but the evil is less when such a

person has a shorter span of life. Now, I think you will compel your own poets to say all

that I say, and to educate your young people in this way by giving them rhythms and har-

monies that accord with what is said. Is this so? Look at it this way, for I am saying in plain

terms that the things that are said to be bad are good for the unjust people, but for the just

people they are actually bad, while the good things really are good for the good people, but

for the bad people they are bad. So, I repeat my question. Are the two of you and I in agree-

ment, or not?

CLINIAS: Well, in some respects I think we are, but in other respects certainly not.

ATHENIAN: Suppose someone is possessed of health, wealth and endless tyrannical power – and

for the two of you let me add exceptional strength and courage accompanied by immortality

– and that none of the other so-called evils befall him. But suppose that all he has within

himself is injustice and arrogance. Perhaps you two are not convinced that someone who

lives in this way is not really happy, but is obviously wretched?

CLINIAS: That’s perfectly true.

ATHENIAN: So be it. What should I say to you next? Well, suppose someone is courageous and

strong, handsome and wealthy, and does whatever he likes throughout his entire life. Don’t

you agree that if he is unjust and arrogant, he would necessarily be living in a shameful

manner? Will you perhaps accept this word ‘shamefully’ at least?

CLINIAS: Yes, indeed.

ATHENIAN: What about the word ‘badly’?

CLINIAS: No, that’s different.

ATHENIAN: What about saying that he lives an unpleasant life that is not profitable to himself?

CLINIAS: How could we possibly agree with that?

ATHENIAN: How? Only if God, it seems, were to grant us some degree of concord, my friend, since

for the moment at least there is a fair amount of discord among us. Yes, to me it appears

LAWS II – 661a–662b | 1,077

661 a

661 b

661 c

661 d

661 e

662 a

662 b

–––––

Cinyras and Midas were legendary kings of ancient kingdoms in Cyprus and Phrygia, respectively.

The lines quoted here are from the elegiac poet Tyrtaeus.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

that this is necessarily the case. It is even more obvious, my dear Clinias, than the fact that

Crete is an island. And as a legislator, I would try to compel the poets, and everyone else in

the city, to speak in this way. And I would impose perhaps the heaviest of penalties in cases

where anyone in the land would say that there are some people who are degenerate and yet

live pleasant lives, or who say that some things are profitable or advantageous while others

are more just. And there is much else I would persuade my citizens to say that contradicts

the prevailing views of Crete and Sparta, it seems, and indeed of humanity in general.

Come on then, best of men, by Zeus and Apollo. What if we were to ask these very

gods who gave you your laws, “Is the most just life the most pleasant life? Or are there two

lives, one that happens to be the most pleasant while the other is the most just?” If they

were to declare that there are two, we would, if we were questioning them correctly, prob-

ably ask them again, “Which should we say are the happier people, those who live the most

just life or those who live the most pleasant one?” Now, if they were to reply, “Those who

live the most pleasant one”, their argument would be bizarre. But I don’t want to attribute

such a response to the gods, but rather to our forefathers and lawgivers. So let my former

question be put now to a forefather and lawgiver, and let him reply that whoever lives the

most pleasant life is most blessed. I would then say, “Father, did you not want me to live as

happily as possible? Yet you were always calling upon me unceasingly to live as justly as

possible.” Now, whoever suggests this, be he a forefather or a lawgiver, would I think look

most odd, and be at a loss about how to speak in a manner that is consistent with himself.

But if, on the other hand, he declares that the most just life is happiest, anyone who hears

this would, I believe, want to know what the law is praising in the just life. What does the

just life contain that is good and noble, and superior to pleasure? Indeed, what good, apart

from pleasure, could a just man have? Come on then, is fame and the acclaim of humanity

and the gods pleasant, while the opposite applies to infamy? “Dear legislator,” we’ll say,

“not at all”. If we neither do nor suffer injustice, is that unpleasant, even though it is good

or noble? And is doing injustice pleasant, even though it is disgraceful and bad?

CLINIAS: No, how could this be so?

ATHENIAN: Now, although the argument does not separate pleasant, on the one hand, from just and

good and noble, on the other, even if it does nothing else it still persuades a person to prefer

to live a life that is holy and just. And for a legislator, the most disgraceful argument, directly

opposed to his purposes, is the one that denies that this is the case. For no one would wish,

willingly, to be persuaded to do anything that did not result in more pleasure than pain. But

looking at things from afar produces a sort of dizziness in everyone, especially in young

children, unless a lawgiver introduces a perspective that is the opposite of this; unless, hav-

ing banished the darkness, he persuades people, somehow or other, by habits, praise or argu-

ments, that their notions of justice and injustice are a play of shadows. When seen from the

personal viewpoint of an unjust bad person who is opposed to justice, what’s unjust appears

pleasant and what’s just appears most unpleasant. But from the perspective of the just per-

son, the view of justice and injustice is the complete opposite in every way.

CLINIAS: Apparently so.

ATHENIAN: And which of these two judgements is more authoritative in terms of truth, the judge-

ment of the worse soul or of the better one?

CLINIAS: It must be the judgement of the superior one, I presume.

ATHENIAN: So, it must be the case that the unjust life is not only more shameful and degenerate

than the just and holy life, but is in truth more unpleasant too.

CLINIAS: That, my friends, is quite likely, according to the present argument at least.

ATHENIAN: But even if what the argument has just established proved not to be the case, could a

1,078 | LAWS II – 662c–663d

662 c

662 d

662 e

663 a

663 b

663 c

663 d

lawgiver, who was in any way useful, and who dared tell a lie to the young folk for some

good purpose, ever tell a more profitable lie than this, or one with more power to make

everyone do what’s just in everything, willingly and without compulsion?

CLINIAS: Truth is noble and enduring, stranger, but it seems to be difficult to persuade people.

ATHENIAN: So be it. But it proved easy to persuade people of the myth about the Sidonian,

incred-

ible though it was, and the same applies to countless other stories.

CLINIAS: Of what sort?

ATHENIAN: The story about the teeth being sown in the ground, and armed men growing from

them.

In fact, this is a great example for the lawgiver of persuading the souls of the young

folk about anything at all, if one tries. Accordingly, in considering this, all he needs to do

is find out what story would, once they believed it, lead to the greatest good for the city.

And in this regard, he should seek out any means whatsoever whereby an entire community

of this sort, and their discourse, would hold always to this theme with one and the same

voice, as much as they can in their songs and in their stories. But if anything else occurs to

anyone besides this way of looking at these matters, he should feel free to present a contrary

argument.

CLINIAS: No, I don’t think either of us would be capable of presenting a counter argument, not on

these matters at any rate.

ATHENIAN: The next point is up to me then. So, I say that all the choruses, three in number, should

sing to the still young and tender souls of the children, stating all the noble principles we

have recounted, and will, indeed, recount hereafter. Let’s summarise them as follows. When

we maintain that the most pleasant life, and the best life, are said by the gods to be the same,

we shall be stating the very truth. And, at the same time, we shall persuade those who need

persuading, more effectively than we would by saying anything else.

CLINIAS: We have to agree with what you are saying.

ATHENIAN: To begin with, it is only right that the children’s chorus, dedicated to the Muses, should

come in first to sing such songs, in all seriousness, before the entire city. Second should

come the chorus of those who are under thirty, invoking Apollo Paean

as witness of the

truth of what is being said, and praying that he be gracious to the young, and convince them.

A third chorus, consisting of those who are aged between thirty and sixty, should be next

to sing. And that leaves the older group, who are no longer up to the task of singing, to

present stories about the same characters through divine utterance.

CLINIAS: What is this third chorus you refer to, stranger? For we don’t really understand clearly

what you wish to say about these people.

ATHENIAN: And yet most of the argument we have discussed so far was more or less concerned

with these.

CLINIAS: We don’t understand yet. Please try to explain even more clearly.

ATHENIAN: We said, if you recall, at the beginning of our discussions, that the nature of all young

creatures is fiery, and unable to keep either the body or the voice quiet. The nature is con-

stantly making disordered sounds and leaping about. We also said that none of the other

creatures ever develops any sense of order in body or voice. Human nature alone has this

ability. The order associated with movement is called rhythm, and in the case of the human

voice, the blending together of high- and low-pitched sounds is called harmony, and the

two of these combined is called a choral performance. And we said that the gods, out of

LAWS II – 663e–665a | 1,079

663 e

664 a

664 b

664 c

664 d

664 e

665 a

–––––

This is a reference to the story of Cadmus.

Cadmus was said to have slain a sacred dragon whose teeth, when planted, grew into a group of fully armed fierce

warriors known as the Spartoi.

The god of healing.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

pity for us, gave us two fellow chorus members and chorus leaders, Apollo and the Muses,

and in fact, you may recall, we said there was a third, Dionysus.

CLINIAS: How could we fail to remember?

ATHENIAN: Well, we have described the chorus of Apollo and of the Muses, so the third chorus,

the remaining one, must be called the chorus of Dionysus.

CLINIAS: How so? Please explain. A chorus of old men, dedicated to Dionysus, sounds most unusual

on first hearing. Are men who are over thirty or over fifty, or even as old as sixty, really

going to be involved in a chorus dedicated to Dionysus?

ATHENIAN: That is perfectly true. An argument is needed here, I believe, to show that if this were

to happen, it would be a reasonable development.

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: Now, are we in agreement about the previous matters?

CLINIAS: Specifically?

ATHENIAN: About the need for every man and child, free born or slave, female or male, and indeed

the whole city, to sing to themselves unceasingly the very charms we have described, chang-

ing them this way and that to provide all sorts of variety so that the singers develop an insa-

tiable desire for the songs, and take pleasure in them.

CLINIAS: How could anyone disagree? Yes, this is what should be done.

ATHENIAN: Where then should the very best people in our city sing their magnificent and exalted

songs so as to do the most good? These are the people who are more persuasive than anyone

else in the city because of their age and level of understanding. Shall we be so foolish as to

set this group aside when they are masters of the most exalted and beneficial songs?

CLINIAS: No, setting them aside is out of the question, based on what is now being said.

ATHENIAN: How shall we address this properly? See whether this will do.

CLINIAS: What then?

ATHENIAN: Everyone I believe, as he gets older, becomes reluctant to sing songs, and takes less

and less delight in doing so, and when compelled to do so is embarrassed. And the older

and more sound-minded he becomes the more embarrassed he becomes. Isn’t this so?

CLINIAS: It is so indeed.

ATHENIAN: Wouldn’t he be even more embarrassed to stand before people of all sorts, in the theatre,

and sing? And if old people like this were compelled to sing, thin and fasting, just like

chorus members training their voices for a competition, they would presumably take no

pleasure in the task, and sing in embarrassment and without any enthusiasm?

CLINIAS: Yes, that’s inevitable.

ATHENIAN: How, then, shall we encourage them to be enthusiastic about singing? Shouldn’t we

first pass a law that children may not partake of wine at all until they are eighteen years

old, explaining that fire must not be poured upon the fire that is already in their body and

their soul before they turn their hand to life’s labours. Here we are being cautious about the

excitable disposition of the young. But after this they may partake of wine, in measure,

until they are thirty, but drinking too much and getting drunk are totally prohibited to the

young man.

As he approaches forty years of age, he may enjoy the common meals and call upon

the other gods, and he should invoke Dionysus in particular at the ritual for the older men,

which is also their recreation. The god gave this to humanity as a healing draught to cure

the crabbedness of old age so that we may grow young again, and our soul, by forgetting

its dispiritedness, may become softer rather than harder in character, and become more mal-

leable, just like iron when placed in the fire. First, wouldn’t each of them, when this is the

state of their soul, be willing to sing, or chant as we have often called it, more eagerly and

1,080 | LAWS II – 665b–666c

665 b

665 c

665 d

665 e

666 a

666 b

666 c

with less embarrassment, not in front of lots of strangers, but before a select group of

friends?

CLINIAS: Yes, much more.

ATHENIAN: So, as a means of getting them involved in our singing, this approach would not be

entirely objectionable.

CLINIAS: No, not at all.

ATHENIAN: What sort of sound will the men send forth? Or is it obvious that there must be some

music appropriate to them?

CLINIAS: There must be.

ATHENIAN: So what music would be appropriate to divine men? Would it be the music of the cho-

ruses?

CLINIAS: Well, stranger, we in Crete, and these Spartans, would be incapable of singing any other

song besides the one we learned and became familiar with in the choruses.

ATHENIAN: That is reasonable enough, since you have not actually attained the most exalted level

of singing. Indeed, you have the civic constitution of a military camp but you have never

settled in cities, and you keep your young people in a flock like a collection of grazing colts.

None of you takes his own animal and drags it away from the grazing herd, as it gets wildly

distressed. You don’t appoint a private horse trainer to train him by rubbing him down and

taming him and giving him everything that is appropriate for his upbringing so that he may

be not just a good soldier, but able to manage a city or a town – someone who, as we said

at the outset, is more of a warrior than Tyrtaeus’ warriors, because he respects courage,

always and everywhere, in private individuals and in entire cities, not as the foremost excel-

lence, but as fourth in the scale of excellence.

CLINIAS: I don’t know, stranger, whether or not you are somehow disparaging our lawgivers yet again.

ATHENIAN: My good man, if I am doing this at all, I am not doing it intentionally. But if you please,

let’s follow the argument wherever it may lead. For if we have music that is more exalted

than the music of the choruses, or the popular theatres, we should try to make this available

to these men, who we say are ashamed of that music and are eager for involvement with

this most exalted music.

CLINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Isn’t it the case, first and foremost, with anything accompanied by some grace, that

what is most significant is either the grace just by itself or else a certain correctness, or,

thirdly, the benefit? For instance, food, drink and nutriment in general have an associated

grace which we call pleasure. As for their correctness and benefit, we consistently refer to

the healthiness of whatever is consumed, and this very healthiness is what’s most correct

about them.

CLINIAS: Yes, certainly.

ATHENIAN: And there is indeed a grace that accompanies learning, namely pleasure, but that which

produces its correctness – benefit, goodness and nobility – is the truth.

CLINIAS: Quite so.

ATHENIAN: What about skills that involve imitation and which produce likenesses? If they succeed

in producing a likeness, may we rightly refer to the associated pleasure as grace?

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: But the extent and the degree of equality with the original is what would, presumably,

constitute the correctness of such likenesses, generally speaking, rather than the pleasure.

CLINIAS: That’s right.

ATHENIAN: In that case, using the criterion of pleasure, the only thing that we may judge correctly

is something that is produced in order to provide neither benefit nor truth, nor likeness, nor

LAWS II – 666d–667e | 1,081

666 d

666 e

667 a

667 b

667 c

667 d

667 e

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

indeed to do any harm – something that would exist only for the sake of that which accom-

panies these other factors, the grace which, when none of these other factors accompany it,

is best called pleasure.

CLINIAS: You are referring only to harmless pleasure.

ATHENIAN: Yes. And I am saying that this very pleasure is indeed amusement, whenever it does no

harm or good worth mentioning seriously.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: In that case, based on what we are now saying, we would maintain that it is entirely

inappropriate to judge any imitation, or indeed its equality, by the criterion of pleasure or

by untrue opinion. What is equal or symmetrical is not equal or symmetrical because it

seems so to someone or because it does not please someone, but most of all because of the

truth, and least of all because of any other consideration.

CLINIAS: Entirely so.

ATHENIAN: Now, don’t we maintain that all music is based upon likeness and imitation?

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: So whenever someone asserts that music is to be judged by the criterion of pleasure,

this argument should be rejected, and if this music does somehow exist, we should not take

it at all seriously in our search. We should seek rather the music that contains the likeness

to the imitation of the beautiful.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: And those seeking the most exalted song and music should not, it seems, seek what’s

pleasant but what’s correct, for correctness of imitation, according to us, consists in repro-

ducing the original, in quantity and in quality.

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: And, indeed, everyone would agree on this at least, that in the case of music everything

that is produced involves imitation and representation. Wouldn’t the composers, the audi-

ence and the actors all agree on this at any rate?

CLINIAS: Very much so.

ATHENIAN: Then anyone who is to avoid falling into error in a particular case should, it seems,

recognise what precisely each of the compositions is. For if he does not recognise its being,

what precisely the composition intends, and what it is a likeness of, he will hardly discern

the correctness or error of the intention.

CLINIAS: Hardly indeed.

ATHENIAN: And would someone who does not recognise correctness ever be able to discern good-

ness or badness? But I am not expressing myself very clearly. Perhaps it would be clear if

I put it as follows.

CLINIAS: How?

ATHENIAN: There are, I suppose, thousands of imitations related to sight.

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: Well, what if someone was ignorant about the things that are being imitated in these

cases, and did not know precisely what body each of them has? Could he ever recognise the

correctness of the finished representation? For example, could he tell whether it has the cor-

rect number and placement of bodily parts, capturing how many there are, and how they are

situated next to one another in their proper arrangement, including their colours and shapes,

or whether all these have been fashioned in a confused manner? Do you think anyone could

ever decide on this without knowing what precisely the creature being imitated actually is?

CLINIAS: How could he?

ATHENIAN: What if we were to recognise that what has been drawn or manufactured is a human

1,082 | LAWS II – 668a–668e

668 a

668 b

668 c

668 d

668 e

being, and that the artist’s skill has captured all of its parts, colours and shapes? Is it neces-

sarily the case that someone who recognises this also recognises, quite readily, whether the

product is beautiful or is deficient in beauty in some particular way?

CLINIAS: Well, in that case, stranger, we would all in a sense recognise the beauties of the various

animals.

ATHENIAN: What you are saying is most correct. So in the case of each image – in painting, in

music, or in any form at all – mustn’t anyone who is to be an intelligent judge have the fol-

lowing three abilities? Mustn’t he be able firstly to recognise what it is, then how correctly

it is rendered, and thirdly how well any of the images has been fashioned in language,

melody and rhythm?

CLINIAS: So it seems, anyway.

ATHENIAN: Now, let us not omit mention of the difficulty that is involved in music. Indeed, since

there is more talk about music than there is about the other images, it requires much more

caution than any of the other images. For someone who falls into error here could do enor-

mous harm by favouring degenerate behaviour, and the error is very hard to notice because

our poets are lesser poets than the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never fall into

error to such an extent as to compose words for men, and give them the colour or melody

that belongs to women. Nor indeed would they frame a melody and bearing that belongs to

free men, and harmonise it with rhythms that belong to slaves and to men devoid of freedom.

Nor would they decide upon a rhythm and a bearing that is free, and then assign it a melody

or words that are opposed to the rhythm. Nor would they ever combine the sounds of beasts,

humans, mechanical devices, and noises of all sorts, into a unity, as though they were imi-

tating one thing. But human poets, who blend such sounds together with great relish and

jumble them up without rhythm or reason, would provide great amusement to people who,

as Orpheus

says, “are ripe for delight”, when they see these all jumbled up. But the poets

go further, and divorce rhythm and bearing from melody, put bare words to a metre, and

leave melody and rhythm without any language by making use of the harp and the flute on

their own. It is very difficult then to recognise, without words, what the rhythm and harmony

signify, or what imitations worth mentioning they resemble. So, we need to understand that

this sort of thing is crude in the extreme, as it is based on such a passion for speed, dexterity

and animal sounds that it uses the flute and the harp in the absence of dance or song. But

using either instrument on its own is the mark of a thoroughly uncultured trickster.

That is where the theory of all this stands. But in our case we are not considering

how our over thirty-year-olds and those who are over fifty should not practise music, but

how exactly they should do so. At this stage, then, our argument is indicating that those

over fifty-year-olds whose role will involve singing should receive a better education than

they get from choral music. For they need to be well aware, themselves, of rhythms and

harmonies and recognise them. How else could someone recognise the correctness of the

melodies and know which is suited to the Dorian mode and which is not, or whether the

rhythm that the poet assigned to this has been correctly assigned or not?

CLINIAS: No, it’s obvious that he could not do so at all.

ATHENIAN: Indeed, the general populace are being ridiculous when they believe they are up to the

task of recognising what constitutes good rhythm and harmony and what does not when

they have only been drilled in singing along and marching in step, and do not realise that

they are engaging in these activities in total ignorance. Whereas, in fact, every melody that

has what is appropriate to it is constituted correctly, and if it has what is inappropriate to it,

LAWS II – 669a–670c | 1,083

669 a

669 b

669 c

669 d

669 e

670 a

670 b

670 c

–––––

Orpheus was a legendary poet, musician and prophet.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

it is constituted improperly.

CLINIAS: That’s quite inevitable.

ATHENIAN: What about someone who does not recognise what exactly the melody has? Will he

ever recognise, as we were asking, whether it has been correctly constituted in any case?

CLINIAS: No, how could he?

ATHENIAN: Well, it seems we are now discovering, once again, that these singers of ours whom we

are encouraging – and, in a sense, compelling – of their own free will to sing need to have

been educated to the following extent. They each need to be capable of following the steps

of the rhythms and the chords of the melodies so that they may be able to select those that

are appropriate and suitable for men of their age and character to sing. They would sing in

this way, and as they sang they would enjoy innocent pleasures themselves, there and then,

and would provide leadership to the younger generation in the proper appreciation of good

character. Having been educated thus far, they would have access to a more rigorous edu-

cation than what is made available to the general population, and indeed to the poets them-

selves. Indeed, it is not imperative that a poet recognises whether the imitation is beautiful

or not beautiful, which was our third principle earlier, although it is well-nigh essential that

he knows harmony and rhythm. But our elders need to know all three principles in order to

decide what imitation is most exalted and what lies in second place, or they would never

be up to the task of charming our young folk towards excellence.

The argument intended, from the very outset, to demonstrate that our defence of the

chorus of Dionysus was a noble undertaking, and it has now said so, as best it can. So let’s

consider whether it has actually succeeded. Now, a gathering of this nature inevitably keeps

on getting more and more boisterous, I presume, as the drinking proceeds, and we said ini-

tially that this is an unavoidable outcome in the cases we are now describing.

CLINIAS: Unavoidable.

ATHENIAN: Everyone is beside himself and has a joyful time. In this condition he does not listen to

the others, but is free with his own speech, and he thinks he has become capable of ruling

both himself and the others.

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: Now, didn’t we say that when this happens, the souls of the drinkers, being heated like a

piece of iron, become softer and younger? So, just as they were in their younger days, they

are easily led by someone with the ability and the knowledge to train them and shape them.

And the one who shapes them now is the one who shaped them then. This is the good lawgiver,

who should give laws for the drinking party that are capable of making someone willingly do

the exact opposite when he is so confident and bold, so improperly devoid of shame, so resist-

ant to orderly behaviour, and so reluctant to observe in turn silence and speech, drinking and

music. The laws should be able also to send forth, along with justice, that most exalted and

divine fear which we call reverence and shame, to do battle against the ignoble courage.

CLINIAS: Quite so.

ATHENIAN: There should be legal guardians of these laws who work alongside them, as calm, sober

generals set over men who are not sober, since doing battle against drunkenness without

such men is more daunting than fighting your enemies without calm commanders. And

what is more, anyone who is unable willingly to obey these officers of Dionysus, the over

sixty-year-olds, shall incur as much disgrace, and more, than those who disobey Ares’ com-

manders on the battlefield.

CLINIAS: And rightly so.

ATHENIAN: Now, if there was this sort of drunkenness and this sort of entertainment, wouldn’t such

drinking companions be benefited, and part from one another better friends than they were

1,084 | LAWS II – 670d–671e

670 d

670 e

671 a

671 b

671 c

671 d

671 e

previously, rather than parting as enemies, as they do nowadays? Wouldn’t all their dealings

with one another be conducted in accordance with the laws, following these whenever the

sober men give the lead to those who are not sober?

CLINIAS: That’s right, provided the party is as you are describing it.

ATHENIAN: Then let us not criticise the gift of Dionysus in this unqualified way any longer, saying

that it is bad for the city and should be rejected. In fact, one could elaborate on this to an

even greater extent. Yet I am reluctant to describe to most people the greatest good that it

bestows, because people misunderstand and misinterpret what is said.

CLINIAS: What sort of benefit are you referring to?

ATHENIAN: : There is a report and a tradition in circulation according to which, this god, Dionysus,

was robbed of his soul’s understanding by his stepmother, Hera, and because of this he

introduced revelry and frenzied dancing to get his revenge. And that’s the very reason why

he gave us the gift of wine too.

Now, I leave such stories to those who think it safe to relate

them about the gods, but this much I do know. No living creature is ever born with the intel-

ligence, or as much intelligence, as it should possess when it reaches maturity. During the

stage of life in which it has not yet acquired its proper intelligence it is totally mad, makes

disordered noises, and as soon as it can stand up it jumps about in a disordered manner too.

And we should remind ourselves that the origins of both music and gymnastics, according

to us, lie in such behaviour.

CLINIAS: We remember, of course.

ATHENIAN: Didn’t we also say that this was the origin of the awareness of rhythm and harmony

instilled in us humans, and that the gods responsible for this were Apollo, the Muses and

Dionysus?

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: And, indeed, according to everyone else’s account, wine, it seems, was given to human-

ity out of revenge, to make us mad, whereas our own account maintains, on the contrary,

that it is a remedy, given so that we may acquire reverence of soul, and health and strength

of body.

CLINIAS: Your recollection of the argument is excellent, stranger.

ATHENIAN: Let us say, then, that one half of choral performance has been dealt with fully. Shall we

deal with the other half, as seems best, or shall we leave it?

CLINIAS: What are you referring to? What are the two divisions you are making?

ATHENIAN: Choral performance as a whole was, for us, the process of education as a whole, and

rhythm and harmony was the part of this that relates to the voice.

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: But although the part that relates to the movement of the body and the part that relates

to the movement of the voice have rhythm in common, bearing is unique to the body’s

motion, while melody is unique to the motion of the voice.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: Now, those aspects of the education of the voice towards excellence, which actually

reach the soul, we have for some reason called music.

CLINIAS: And rightly so.

ATHENIAN: But the movements of the body in creatures at play we called dance. And when move-

ment of this sort is conducive to the excellence of the body, we should refer to this skilled

discipline of the body, when used for such a purpose, as gymnastics.

CLINIAS: Correct.

LAWS II – 672a–673a | 1,085

672 a

672 b

672 c

672 d

672 e

673 a

–––––

Euripides, Cyclops 3.

Laws II, David Horan translation, 20 Nov 25

ATHENIAN: As for music, we said a moment ago that this half of choral performance had been

described and dealt with fully, and we may say so again now. But what about the other half?

What should be done about it, and how?

CLINIAS: My good man, you are conversing with Cretans and Spartans, and we have described

music in detail, but we are leaving out gymnastics. So what sort of answer do you expect

from either of us in reply to your question?

ATHENIAN: I would say that you have responded in pretty plain terms to my question, by asking

your question. Yes, I understand that although it is now a question, as I said, it is also an

instruction to deal with the subject of gymnastics fully.

CLINIAS: You have understood very well, and you should act accordingly.

ATHENIAN: So I should. Indeed, there is no great difficulty in speaking to the two of you on matters

you both know so well, for you are far more experienced in this art than in the other one.

CLINIAS: True enough.

ATHENIAN: Well, the origin of this playfulness is the habitual leaping that is natural to all creatures.

But the human being, as we said, having acquired an awareness of rhythm, developed and

brought forth dance. And since melody brings to mind and awakens rhythm, the two com-

bined together brought forth choral performance and play.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: And we maintain that we have already dealt with one part of this, and we shall try to

deal with the other part next.

CLINIAS: Yes, indeed.

ATHENIAN: Well, if it is acceptable to you two, let us put the finishing touch to our discussion of

the use of drunkenness first.

CLINIAS: What do you mean? What sort of finishing touch?

ATHENIAN: What if some city makes serious use of the practice we are referring to, in a lawful and

orderly manner, practising it in order to cultivate sound-mindedness? Suppose, in like man-

ner, that it does not do away with the other pleasures, on the same principle, because it is

aiming at mastery over them. Then this approach of ours should be applied to all these.

But what if, on the other hand, this is regarded as entertainment, and anyone who

likes is allowed to drink, whenever he likes, with whomsoever he pleases, while engaging

in any sort of behaviour at all? Then I could not cast my vote to allow this city or this man

ever to have recourse to drunkenness. And I would go even further than the practice of the

Cretans and Spartans, and propose the law of the Carthaginians, that no soldier may ever

taste liquor whilst on campaign. He should, rather, become a water drinker for the entire

duration. In the city too, no slave, male or female, should ever taste thereof, nor should a

magistrate during his year in office, nor should steersmen or jurors ever taste wine at all

whilst on duty, nor should any councillor who is attending a council meeting of any impor-

tance. In the daytime, no one should taste it at all except as part of a training regime or to

treat a disease. Nor at night either, whenever a man or a woman intends to conceive a child.

And one could mention very many other situations in which those in possession of reason

and correct law should not drink wine. And so, according to the argument, no city should

need lots of vineyards, and although agricultural production in general, and the entire

lifestyle, would be regulated, the production of wine in particular would be more moderate

and modest than anything else.

So, dear strangers, let this, if you agree, be our finishing touch to the argument con-

cerning wine.

CLINIAS: Well said. We agree.

_____

673 b

673 c

673 d

673 e

674 a

674 b

674 c

1,086 | LAWS II – 673b–674c