Cratylus - Platonic Foundation

383 a

383 b

384 a

384 b

384 c

384 d

112 | CRATYLUS – 383a–384d

Cratylus

__________

persons in the dialogue: SOCRATES of Alopece, son of Sophroniscus

HERMOGENES of Alopece, son of Hipponicus

CRATYLUS of Athens, Heraclitean philosopher

scene: no dramatic setting

_____

HERMOGENES: Well then, would you like to include Socrates here in our discussion?

CRATYLUS: If you wish.

HERMOGENES: Socrates, Cratylus here maintains that there is a correctness of names that belongs,

by nature, to each of the things that are, and what people conventionally call something

when uttering some part of their own language is not this name. There is, rather, a natural

correctness of names, the same for everyone, Greeks and non-Greeks alike. When I ask

him if his own name is, in truth, Cratylus, he agrees that it is. “And what is Socrates’ name?”

I ask. “Socrates,” says he. “Is this also the case with everyone else; whatever particular

name we call them is their name in each case?” “Well,” says he, “your name is not

Hermogenes, even if everyone calls you so.” And although I pursue the question and am

keen to know what exactly he means, he clarifies nothing and hides his intention from me

by pretending to be in possession of some personal understanding of his own about this

matter, which, if he deigned to express it fully, would force me to agree with him and say

exactly what he says. Now, if you can somehow interpret the oracular utterance of Cratylus,

I would be pleased to hear you. But I would be even more pleased to find out from you, if

you please, what you yourself think about the correctness of names.

SOCRATES: Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying that whatever is noble is dif-

ficult to understand, and indeed the subject of names happens to be no small matter. Now, if

I had already heard Prodicus’

fifty-drachma course of lectures, which, according to the man

himself, provides a comprehensive education in the subject, there would be nothing to stop

you from learning the full truth about the correctness of names here and now. But as it hap-

pens, I have only heard his one-drachma course, so I don’t really know where the truth about

such matters lies. I am, however, prepared to join in the search together with yourself and

Cratylus. But when he denies that Hermogenes is, in truth, your name, I suspect that he is

mocking you, for he believes perhaps that every time you set out to make some money, you

fail.

In any case, as I said just now, although such matters are difficult to understand, we

should make them the subject of a joint enquiry as to whether yourself or Cratylus is right.

HERMOGENES: Well, Socrates, for my part, although I have often been involved in discussions with

this man and with many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any correctness of a

name apart from convention and agreement. Indeed, it seems to me that whatever name

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

you give to something is the correct name, and if you change the name for a different one

and no longer use the original name, the new name is just as correct as the previous one. It

is just like changing the names of your household slaves, for no name naturally belongs to

any particular thing by nature, but by convention and custom on the part of those who create

the custom and use the name. If this is not the case, I myself am quite prepared to listen

and learn, not only from Cratylus, but from anyone else at all.

SOCRATES: Perhaps you have a point, Hermogenes, but let’s see. According to you, whatever some-

one calls something is the name of that thing.

HERMOGENES: That’s what I think anyway.

SOCRATES: Whether an individual or, indeed, a city calls it so?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: What about this? Suppose I call any of the things that are, for instance, what we currently

call a man, suppose I refer to this as a horse, and what we now call a horse as a man, will

the same thing have the name ‘man’ for the general public, and ‘horse’ for me personally?

And in the other case, will the same thing have the name ‘man’ for me, and ‘horse’ for the

public? Is that what you are saying?

HERMOGENES: That’s what I think, anyway.

SOCRATES: Come on then and tell me this. Is there something you call speaking the truth and some-

thing you call speaking falsehood?

HERMOGENES: There is.

SOCRATES: So there can be a true statement and a false statement?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Is the statement that states things that are as they are, true, while the one that states

them as they are not, is false?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, is it possible in a statement to state things that are and things that are not?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: But is a true statement true as a whole, while parts of it are not true?

HERMOGENES: No, the parts are also true.

SOCRATES: But are the large parts true while the small parts are not, or are they all true?

HERMOGENES: I think they are all true.

SOCRATES: Now, is there any part of a spoken statement that is smaller than a name?

HERMOGENES: No, that is the smallest.

SOCRATES: And is this name spoken as part of a true statement?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And according to you at least, this part is true.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: While part of a false statement is false, is it not?

HERMOGENES: I agree.

SOCRATES: So, since it is possible to utter a true and false statement, is it also possible to utter a

true and a false name?

384 e

385 a

385 b

385 c

CRATYLUS – 384e–385c | 113

–––––

Prodicus, a contemporary of Socrates, was a distinguished sophist from Ceos who taught semantics and rhetoric. He

is portrayed in Plato’s Protagoras, and is mentioned in quite a few of Plato’s other dialogues.

The name Hermogenes means ‘offspring of Hermes’. Due to his speed and mobility, Hermes was regarded as the god

of commerce and wealth, obtained through business activity.

Malcolm Schofield, The Classical Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2, Nov 1972, pp.246-53. Schofield argues in this paper that

the stretch of dialogue from 385b2-d1 (Burnet’s lineation) in the Cratylus does not belong where it is found in the

MSS (and consequently in our published texts), but fits rather between 387c5 and 387c6.

HERMOGENES: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, whatever a person says is the name of something, this name is its name for that

person?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And however many names someone says that a particular thing has, it will indeed have

that many names then, whenever he says so?

HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no other correctness of names apart from this: I call

something by one name, the name I gave it, and you call it something else, the name you,

for your part, gave it. And, in the same way, I notice that various cities have different set

names of their own for the same things; Greeks differ from other Greeks, as do Greeks from

non-Greeks.

SOCRATES: Come on now, Hermogenes, let’s see whether, in your view, this is also the case with

things that are. Is it the case that their being is private to each person, and so, as Protagoras

said, the measure of all things is man, and consequently, as things appear to me, so they are

for me, and as they appear to you, so they are for you?

Or do you think that things have

some fixity of being of their own?

HERMOGENES: On occasion, Socrates, out of sheer perplexity, I have ended up saying just what

Protagoras says, even though I don’t entirely believe that this is the case.

SOCRATES: What about this, then? Have you ever ended up not entirely believing that there is such

a thing as a bad person?

HERMOGENES: No, by Zeus, I have often come to the conclusion that some people are entirely bad,

a very large number actually.

SOCRATES: Well, have you ever thought that some are very good?

HERMOGENES: Very few indeed.

SOCRATES: But you do think so?

HERMOGENES: I do.

SOCRATES: And where do you stand on the following question? Are those who are very good also

very wise, while the very bad are very foolish?

HERMOGENES: Yes, I think that this is so.

SOCRATES: Now, if Protagoras spoke the truth

and it is actually true that, for each person, as things

seem so things are, is it possible that some people are wise while others are foolish?

HERMOGENES: No, it is not.

SOCRATES: Then I believe you are strongly of the view that since there is wisdom and there is folly,

Protagoras cannot possibly be speaking the truth. For presumably no one could be wiser

than anyone else, if whatever seems true for each person is true for that person.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: Nor indeed, I believe, do you hold to the opinion of Euthydemus,

that everything is

always simultaneously so for everyone in like manner, since if excellence and vice always

belong to everyone in like manner, some people could not be good while others were bad.

HERMOGENES: That’s true.

SOCRATES: Therefore, if everything is not always simultaneously so for everyone in like manner,

nor does each thing belong to each individual person, it is obvious that things are possessed

of some definite being of their own, not relative to us, nor dragged hither and thither by

how they appear to us. Rather, they hold, of themselves, to their own being which is natural

to them.

HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I believe that this is so.

SOCRATES: Now, could things be so by nature, while the same is not so for the actions belonging

to the things? Or do the actions themselves also constitute a species among things that are?

385 d

385 e

386 a

386 b

386 c

386 d

386 e

114 | CRATYLUS – 385d–386e

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

HERMOGENES: They do, indeed.

SOCRATES: So, the actions are enacted according to their own nature and not in accordance with

our opinion. For instance, what if we try to cut anything at all, may we cut this as we please,

with whatever we please, or if we wish to cut this in accordance with the nature of cutting

and being cut, and with what is natural, will we make the cut and succeed in doing so cor-

rectly, but go awry and achieve nothing if we act contrary to nature?

HERMOGENES: Yes, I think this is the case.

SOCRATES: And if we attempt to burn something, we should not burn it in accordance with every

opinion, but in accordance with the correct one which corresponds to the way in which this

is naturally burned or burns, and with what is natural.

HERMOGENES: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Does the same hold for other activities?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, speaking is one of these activities, is it not?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: What if someone speaks as he thinks he should speak? Will he be speaking correctly

when he speaks in this way, or will he be successful in speaking only if he speaks of matters

in a way that is natural for him to speak of them and for them to be spoken of? Otherwise,

won’t he go awry and achieve nothing?

HERMOGENES: I think that’s how matters stand.

SOCRATES: Now, naming is part of speaking, for we speak what we speak, I presume, by making

distinctions based upon names.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And naming is indeed an activity, since speaking is also an activity in relation to things,

is it not?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And activities, we saw, are not relative to us, but have a particular nature of their own?

HERMOGENES: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Then, if we are not to contradict our previous conclusions, should things be named in

the way that is natural to name them, and for them to be named with what is natural and not

as we wish? And shall we meet with success in naming things in this way and no other?

HERMOGENES: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Come on then, are we saying that something that has to be cut, has to be cut with some-

thing?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And does something that has to be woven have to be woven with something, and does

whatever has to be bored have to be bored with something?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And does whatever has to be named have to be named with something?

HERMOGENES: It does.

SOCRATES: With what should something be bored?

HERMOGENES: A drill.

387 a

387 b

387 c

387 d

387 e

388 a

CRATYLUS – 387a–388a | 115

–––––

Protagoras of Abdera was a renowned sophist who taught rhetoric and virtue, and wrote several books. He has an epony-

mous dialogue. The relativism captured here is considered at some length in Plato’s Theaetetus (especially 152a ff.).

This is a play on the title of Protagoras’ book, entitled Truth.

Euthydemus was a sophist from the island of Chios. He has an eponymous dialogue in which he and his brother

Dionysodorus delight in proving that the same propositions are both so and not so.

Schofield suggests relocating 385b2-d1 here.

SOCRATES: With what should something be woven?

HERMOGENES: A shuttle.

SOCRATES: And with what should something be named?

HERMOGENES: A name.

SOCRATES: Well said. So the name is also an instrument.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, suppose I were to ask what instrument is the shuttle. Isn’t it the one with which

we weave?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And when we are weaving what do we do? Don’t we separate the commingled warp

and woof threads?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Wouldn’t you answer in the same way about a drill and about the other instruments?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Can you answer then in the same way about a name? When naming with the name,

which is an instrument, what are we doing?

HERMOGENES: I cannot answer.

SOCRATES: Are we not instructing one another about something, and separating things as they are?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So a name is an instrument of instruction and it divides being, just as a shuttle does for

woven fabric.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: So a shuttle is for weaving?

HERMOGENES: Of course.

SOCRATES: So a weaver will use a shuttle well, and well means after the manner of a weaver, while

an instructor will use a name well, and well means after the manner of an instructor.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: When a weaver uses a shuttle well, whose work does he use?

HERMOGENES: The work of the carpenter.

SOCRATES: And is everyone a carpenter, or the person who has that skill?

HERMOGENES: The person with the skill.

SOCRATES: When a borer uses a drill well, whose work does he use?

HERMOGENES: The work of the blacksmith.

SOCRATES: And is everyone a blacksmith, or the person who has the skill?

HERMOGENES: The person with the skill.

SOCRATES: Very well. And when an instructor uses a name, whose work does he use?

HERMOGENES: I can’t say.

SOCRATES: Well, can you answer this question? Who has given us the names that we make use of?

HERMOGENES: I cannot.

SOCRATES: Don’t you think that convention

has given these to us?

HERMOGENES: So it seems.

SOCRATES: So when an instructor makes use of a name, is he using the work of the convention-

setter?

HERMOGENES: I think so.

SOCRATES: And do you think everyone is a convention-setter, or the person who has the skill?

HERMOGENES: The person with the skill.

SOCRATES: So, Hermogenes, it is not for everyone to give names, but for some fashioner of names

who is, it seems, the convention-setter, the rarest of artificers to arise among us humans.

388 b

388 c

388 d

388 e

389 a

116 | CRATYLUS – 388b–389a

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

HERMOGENES: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Come on then, let’s investigate where the convention-setter looks when giving names.

Let us consider this based upon the previous examples. Where does the carpenter look when

making a shuttle? Does he not look to the sort of thing whose nature is to weave?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: What about this? If the shuttle breaks while he is making it, will he make another one

by looking to the broken one, or to that form towards which he was looking when he made

the one that broke?

HERMOGENES: Yes, I think he would look to that form.

SOCRATES: Isn’t that what we would rightly call “what a shuttle is”?

HERMOGENES: I think so.

SOCRATES: And whether he needs to make a shuttle for a light or heavy garment, for linen or for

wool or for any sort at all, it should indeed possess the form of the shuttle, but in each case

mustn’t he give it the nature that is naturally best for its particular function?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the same holds for the other instruments. On discovering the natural instrument

for each particular task, he should impose that upon whatever it is to be made from, not as

he pleases but as is natural. So he must, it seems, know how to impose upon the iron the

drill that is natural for each particular task.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And impose upon the wood the natural shuttle for each particular task.

HERMOGENES: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Then each shuttle, it seems, is for a particular kind of weaving, and the same applies to

the other instruments.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, best of men, does the convention-setter need to know how to impose that natural

name for each thing upon the sounds and syllables, and make and impose all names by

looking to what name itself is if he is to be an authoritative giver of names? And if a par-

ticular convention-setter does not impose the name upon the same syllables, this name

should not be doubted. For neither does every smith, making the same instrument for the

same task, impose it upon the same iron, but, nevertheless, as long as he bestows the same

form, even on the different iron, the instrument retains its correctness, whether it is made

here or in non-Greek cities. Is this so?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Won’t you evaluate the convention-setter, either here or among non-Greek peoples, in

this way too? As long as he imposes the appropriate form of the name upon each thing, in

syllables of any sort, isn’t he just as good a convention-setter, here or anywhere else?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, who is the one who knows whether the appropriate form of shuttle is embodied

in wood of any kind? Is it the carpenter who has made it, or the weaver who uses it?

HERMOGENES: The user, Socrates, is more likely to know this.

SOCRATES: Now, who is the person who uses the product of the lyre maker? Isn’t he the one who

knows how best to supervise its manufacture, and would recognise whether or not it had

been well made, once it had been made?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

389 b

389 c

389 d

389 e

390 a

390 b

CRATYLUS – 389b–390b | 117

–––––

The Greek word nomos, translated here as ‘convention’, can also be translated as ‘law’. Hence, the related term ‘con-

vention-setter’(nomothetēs), which Socrates uses in the next line, is often translated as ‘lawgiver’.

SOCRATES: And who is this person?

HERMOGENES: The lyre player.

SOCRATES: And what about the work of a shipbuilder?

HERMOGENES: A ship’s captain is best.

SOCRATES: And who would best supervise the work of the convention-setter, and pass judgement

when it is complete, in this country or abroad? Won’t it be the person who uses his work?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Is this not the person who knows how to ask questions?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Does the same person know how to respond?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Do you call the person who knows how to ask questions and respond a dialectician?

HERMOGENES: Yes, a dialectician.

SOCRATES: So the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder under the supervision of the ship’s

captain, if the rudder is to be a good one.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And the work of the convention-setter, it seems, is to make a name, with the dialectical

person as supervisor, if names are to be properly given.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: It seems then, Hermogenes, that the giving of a name is not, as you imagine, an ordinary

matter for ordinary random persons. And Cratylus is speaking the truth when he says that

the names belong to the things by their nature, and not everyone is an artificer of names,

but only the person who looks to the natural name for each and is able to impose its form

upon the letters and syllables.

HERMOGENES: I don’t know how to oppose your arguments, Socrates, and yet it is not easy for me

to be persuaded so suddenly, and I think I would be better persuaded if you were to show

me what, according to you, this natural correctness of names is.

SOCRATES: Bless you, Hermogenes, I am not saying that there is any such thing. No, you have for-

gotten what I said a little earlier, that I don’t know about this, but I could enquire along

with you. And as we now investigate this, you and I, this much progress is already apparent;

a name does have some natural correctness and it is not every man who knows how to give

this to anything at all. Isn’t this so?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Therefore, if you have a desire to know, the next thing we should do is to investigate

what precisely the correctness of name is.

HERMOGENES: But of course I want to know.

SOCRATES: Then enquire.

HERMOGENES: How should I enquire?

SOCRATES: The correct way to enquire, my friend, is in the company of those who know, but you

pay money to them and you owe them a debt of gratitude. These people are the sophists

from whom your brother Callias has acquired his reputation for wisdom, having paid them

a great deal of money. But since you are not in control of your own inheritance, you must

implore your brother and ask him to teach you what he learned from Protagoras about the

correctness applicable to such matters as these.

HERMOGENES: Socrates, coming from me such a request would be strange indeed – that I, who do

not accept Protagoras’ truth at all, should place any value upon the details of such a truth

as this.

SOCRATES: Well, if that does not please you, then you should learn from Homer and the other poets.

390 c

390 d

390 e

391 a

391 b

391 c

391 d

118 | CRATYLUS – 390c–391d

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

HERMOGENES: And what does Homer say about names, Socrates, and where?

SOCRATES: There are many places where he makes significant, fine distinctions between the names

that humans and the gods call the same things. Don’t you agree that there are places where

he says something wonderfully important about the correctness of names? For it is surely

obvious that the gods call things by names that are correct by nature. Don’t you think so?

HERMOGENES: I fully understand that if the gods call things by names, they do so correctly. But

what passages are you referring to?

SOCRATES: Don’t you know that he says that the Trojan river that fought one on one with

Hephaestus is called Xanthos by the gods, but Scamander by humans?

HERMOGENES: I do.

SOCRATES: What about this? Don’t you think this is something special, to know that this river is

more correctly called Xanthos rather than Scamander? Or take, if you like, the example of

the bird which he says:

the gods have called Chalcis but humans call Cymnidis

Do you think it is an ordinary matter to learn how much more correct it is to call the same

bird Chalcis rather than Cymindis? Or what about the hill that is called both Batieia and

Myrina,

and many other examples from this poet and various others? But perhaps these

matters are too exalted for you and I to understand, whereas Scamandrius and Astyanax are

more amenable to human investigation, as, in my opinion, it is easier to investigate what

he maintains are the names of Hector’s son and what precisely he means by the correctness

of these. I am sure that you know the lines that include these references.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, which name do you think Homer believed to be the more correct name for the

boy – Astyanax or Scamandrius?

HERMOGENES: I cannot say.

SOCRATES: Think about this, then. Suppose someone were to ask you, “Do you think that the more

intelligent person or the more unintelligent person calls things by the more correct names?”

HERMOGENES: I would say that it is obviously the more intelligent person.

SOCRATES: Now in your opinion, on the whole, are the women in a city, or the men, the more intel-

ligent group?

HERMOGENES: The men.

SOCRATES: Now, you know, don’t you, that Homer says that Hector’s child was called Astyanax

by the men of Troy.

And since the men called him Astyanax, he was obviously called

Scamandrius by the women?

HERMOGENES: Well, so it seems.

SOCRATES: Didn’t Homer too believe that the Trojan men were wiser than their women?

HERMOGENES: I think so.

SOCRATES: So, he thought that Astyanax was a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Then, let’s look at the precise reason for this. Or does he himself explain the reason

very nicely? Indeed, he says:

he alone defended their city and long walls

391 e

392 a

392 b

392 c

392 d

392 e

CRATYLUS – 391e–392e | 119

–––––

Iliad xxi.332-380 and xx.74.

Iliad xiv.291.

Iliad ii.813 ff.

Iliad vi.402-403.

Iliad xxii.506.

Iliad xxii.507; ‘he’ refers to Hector.

For this reason, then, it seems it is only right to call the son of the defender, Astyanax, the

astu-anax, the lord of the city, which his father defended, as Homer says.

HERMOGENES: I see.

SOCRATES: But why, exactly? Indeed, I myself do not yet understand. Do you understand,

Hermogenes?

HERMOGENES: By Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: But, good man, did Homer himself not give Hector this name?

HERMOGENES: What of it?

SOCRATES: Well, this name seems to me to be much the same as Astyanax. Indeed, both seem to

be Greek, for anax (lord) and hector (possessor) seem to indicate the same thing since both

are names for a king, for surely a person is also the possessor of whatever he is lord of since

he is obviously in control of this, and has acquired it and possesses it. Or do you think I am

talking nonsense in the deluded belief that I have found some clue to Homer’s opinion about

the correctness of names?

HERMOGENES: By Zeus, you are not deluded. No, you have probably found something.

SOCRATES: At any rate, it is right, as I see it, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring

of a horse, a horse. I am not speaking of a case where something other than a horse is born

from a horse, a sort of aberration. I am referring, rather, to the natural offspring of its kind.

If a horse, contrary to nature, were to give birth to a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it

should not be called a foal but a calf. Nor, in my opinion, if non-human offspring is born

from a human being, should that offspring be called a human being. And the same applies

to trees and to everything else. Don’t you agree?

HERMOGENES: I do.

SOCRATES: Good, but be on your guard lest I somehow lead you astray, since, according to the

same argument, any offspring born from a king should be called a king. But whether the

same thing is indicated by one set of syllables or by another set does not matter. Nor does

it matter if a letter is added or subtracted as long as the essence of the thing is in control

and is revealed in the name.

HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Nothing complicated. No, this is something you already know. We speak the names of

the letters but not the letters themselves, with four exceptions: e, u, o and ō.

And you know

that we attach additional spoken letters to the other vowels and consonants in order to make

names for them. But as long as we include the demonstrative power of the letter, we are

right to call it by that name, and for us, that will indicate it. Take beta for example. You see

that adding ‘b’ and ‘t’ and ‘a’ does no harm and does not prevent the nature of the consonant

from being indicated by the whole name of the letter that the convention-setter wished to

name, and so he knew quite well how to give names to the letters.

HERMOGENES: Yes, I think that’s true.

SOCRATES: Doesn’t the same argument hold in relation to a king? For a king will usually be born

from a king, good from good, noble from noble, and the same holds for all other cases;

from each kind, another one like that is born unless some aberration arises. So they should

be called by the same names, but it is permissible to vary the syllables so that to those with-

out the expertise, names seem different even though they are the same, just like drugs pre-

pared by physicians, which vary in colour and smell and appear different although they are

the same. And yet, to the physician who discerns the power of the drugs, they appear the

same and he is not misled by the additions. And so, in like manner, someone who is knowl-

edgeable about names sees the power they possess and is not misled if a letter is added,

transposed or removed, or indeed if the power of the name is conveyed by completely dif-

393 a

393 b

393 c

393 d

393 e

394 a

394 b

120 | CRATYLUS – 393a–394b

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

ferent letters. For instance, in the case we have just described, ‘Astyanax’ and ‘Hector’ have

no letters the same except ‘t’, but they indicate the same thing. And what letters does

‘Archepolis’ (ruler of the city) have in common with these? Yet it signifies the same thing

nevertheless, and there are many other names which simply indicate ‘king’.

And again, there are others that indicate ‘general’, such as ‘Agis’ (leader),

‘Polemarchus’ (battle leader) and ‘Eupolemus’ (good in battle), and indeed such names as

‘Iatrocles’(famous healer) and ‘Acesimbrotus’ (healer of mortals) indicate ‘physician’. And

we might find lots of others differing in their syllables and letters but having the same power

when uttered. Is this so?

HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: In that case, those that come into being in accordance with nature should be assigned

the same names.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: What about those that have come into being, contrary to nature, in the form of some

aberration? For instance, when a disrespectful child is born to a good man who respects the

gods – as in our previous example of a horse giving birth to a calf – it should not, of course,

bear the name of the parent, but of the sort of thing that it is.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then a disrespectful child born to a respectful person should be given the name of the

disrespectful kind.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: So he should not, it seems, be called ‘Theophilus’ (beloved of God) or ‘Mnēsitheos’

(mindful of God) or anything of that sort, but by a name that indicates the opposite of these,

if names are to be correct.

HERMOGENES: Very much so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, just as the name ‘Orestēs’ (mountain-man) is likely to be correct,

whether it was given to him by chance or by a poet to point out with this name the wildness,

coarseness and ruggedness of his nature.

HERMOGENES: Apparently so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And it seems that his father’s name is also in accord with nature.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Indeed, it is quite likely that Agamemnon is the sort of person who would work hard at

whatever he decided upon, and persevere, bringing his plans to completion through his

excellence, and an indication of this is the length of his stay at Troy and his endurance. So,

the name ‘Agamemnon’ indicates that this man was admirable (agastos) for standing his

ground (epimonē). And the name ‘Atreus’ is probably correct too, for his murder of

Chrysippus and his cruel treatment of Thyestēs were all destructive and ruinous (atēra) to

his excellence. Now, the significance of the name is slightly altered and obscured so that

the nature of the man is not obvious to everyone. But to those with an understanding of

names, it adequately demonstrates what Atreus means. Indeed, whether in respect of his

stubbornness (ateires), his fearlessness (atrestos), or his ruinousness (atēros), the name is

correctly applied in any case. And I think that Pelops also has an appropriate name, for this

name indicates someone who sees what is close at hand.

HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: We are told, for instance, that in murdering Myrtilus he proved unable to anticipate or

394 c

394 d

394 e

395 a

395 b

395 c

CRATYLUS – 394c–395c | 121

–––––

The names epsilon, upsilon, omicron and omega used to designate those Greek letters did not exist in Plato’s time.

The letters were, rather, named by merely uttering the sounds.

foresee the far-reaching consequences for his entire family, and the extent of the misfortune

that would befall them. In his eagerness to secure his marriage to Hippodameia by any

means, he saw only what was close at hand and immediate or near (pelas). And if what we

are told about Tantalus is true, then everyone would agree that his name too has been cor-

rectly given, in accordance with his nature.

HERMOGENES: What are you referring to?

SOCRATES: To the many terrible misfortunes that happened to him during his life, culminating in

the overthrow of his own fatherland, and, after death in Hades, in amazing concord with

his name, a stone was suspended (talanteia) over his head. And it really seems as if some-

one, wishing to call him ‘Talantatos’ (weighed down completely), has disguised this inten-

tion and named him by saying ‘Tantalus’ instead. The circumstances of the legend seem to

have provided this name for him in some such manner as this. And it appears that his father,

who is said to be Zeus, also had an excellent name, although it is not easy to understand.

For the name of Zeus is really like a phrase consisting of two parts, some people using one

part, others using the other. For some call him Zēn, others Dia, and combining the two into

one demonstrates the nature of the god, which, according to us, is what a name should be

able to do. For there is no one who is more responsible for the life of us humans, and all

other creatures, than the ruler and king of all. Consequently, this god through whom (di

hon) all living creatures always have life (zēn) has been named correctly (di hon zēn). And

as I said, the name, being one, is divided into two parts, Dia and Zēn. To suggest that he is

the son of Cronus might seem disrespectful on first hearing, and to say that Zeus is the off-

spring of some huge intellect might sound preferable. For koros (representing Cronus) does

not indicate a child, but the pure (kathoros) and unblemished nature of reason (nous).

And he, the story goes, is the son of Uranus, and the upward vision is rightly called

‘ourania’, looking upwards (horōsa – looking, ta anō – above), and those who study the

heavens, Hermogenes, say that this results in pure reason and Uranus has the correct name.

And if I could have remembered the genealogy of Hesiod, where he describes even earlier

ancestors of these gods, I could have continued explaining that they too had correct names,

until I had tested this wisdom that has suddenly come upon me like this, I know not from

where, to see whether or not it will ebb away.

HERMOGENES: Yes, indeed, Socrates, you really do seem to me, suddenly, to be making prophetic

utterances, just like inspired people.

SOCRATES: Well, Hermogenes, for the most part I blame what has happened to me on Euthyphro

of Prospaltia.

Indeed, I was with him for a long time this morning and I was listening to

him, and it is quite likely that he was so inspired that he not only filled my ears with his

godly wisdom but has taken possession of my soul too. So, I think this is what we need to

do. For today, let’s make use of this wisdom and continue our investigation into the remain-

ing names, and tomorrow, if you agree, we shall send it on its way and be purified, having

found someone, either a priest or a sophist, who is adept in such purifications.

HERMOGENES: Yes, I agree. And I would be very glad to listen to whatever remains to be said about

names.

SOCRATES: Well, that is what we should do then. Now, since we have hit upon this general approach,

where would you like us to begin our investigation so that we may see whether the names

themselves shall act as witnesses and tell us whether each name is merely given at random,

or actually possesses a certain correctness? Now, the names in use for heroes and humans

may perhaps be deceiving us, for many of them are based on the names of ancestors, and in

some cases, as we said at the outset, they are quite inappropriate, while many such as

Eutychides (fortunate), Sosias (saviour) and Theophilus (beloved of God) are given in a spirit

395 d

395 e

396 a

396 b

396 c

396 d

396 e

397 a

397 b

122 | CRATYLUS – 395d–397b

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

of prayer. Now, in my opinion, we should leave names of that sort aside as we are most likely

to find those that are correctly given when dealing with whatever is eternal and natural. For

in such cases, it was most appropriate that the assignment of names be taken seriously. And

perhaps some of them were given by a power more divine than any human power.

HERMOGENES: I think that’s well expressed, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Now, wouldn’t it be right to begin with the gods and consider the way in which the

‘gods’ (theoi) are correctly called by this particular name?

HERMOGENES: Quite likely.

SOCRATES: Well, my guess is as follows. As I see it, the first humans to settle in Greece believed

only in those gods that many non-Greeks still believe in today – sun, moon, stars and sky.

Now, since they saw that these are always following a course, and running (theonta), they

named them ‘gods’ (theous) because their nature is to run (thein). Later, recognising the

other gods, they called them all by this same name. Is this likely to be true or am I talking

nonsense?

HERMOGENES: It is very likely.

SOCRATES: What should we look at after this?

HERMOGENES: Daimōnes (divine beings), of course.

SOCRATES: And what exactly does the name ‘daimōnes’

mean in truth, Hermogenes? You may

decide whether there is anything in what I am about to say.

HERMOGENES: Speak on.

SOCRATES: Do you know what daimōnes are, according to Hesiod?

HERMOGENES: I cannot recall.

SOCRATES: Don’t you recall that he says that the first race of humans to be born was a golden race?

HERMOGENES: Yes, I know that much anyway.

SOCRATES: Well, what he says about it is:

But since this race has been concealed by fate,

they are called sacred daimōnes who dwell beneath the earth,

noble, averters of evil, guardians of mortal men.

HERMOGENES: Yes, what of it?

SOCRATES: Well, I think he means not that this race is golden by nature, but that it is good and

noble for me, the fact that he refers to ourselves as an iron race is proof of this.

HERMOGENES: That’s true.

SOCRATES: And if anyone nowadays happened to be good, don’t you think he would say that he

belonged to that golden race?

HERMOGENES: Quite likely.

SOCRATES: And are the good also wise?

HERMOGENES: Yes, wise.

SOCRATES: Well this, I believe, is what he really means. Because the daimōnes were wise and

knowledgeable (daimonēs), he called them daimōnes, and in our ancient language this very

name is found. So, Hesiod and many other poets are right when they say that once a good

person dies, a great and honourable destiny is theirs, and the person becomes a daimōn in

accordance with the wisdom associated with that title. And, accordingly, I too maintain that

anyone who is good is daimōnic, whether they be living or deceased, and is correctly called

a daimōn.

397 c

397 d

397 e

398 a

398 b

398 c

CRATYLUS – 397c–398c | 123

–––––

Euthyphro appears in the eponymous dialogue of Plato where he is described as an authority on matters divine.

In Greek mythology, daimons were spirits who were themselves gods or children of gods. They typically served as

intermediaries between gods and humans. Plato, Apology (27d-e) and Symposium (202e).

Hesiod, Works and Days 121-123.

HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I think I am in complete agreement with you on this. But what about

the word ‘hero’? What would it be?

SOCRATES: This is not particularly difficult to understand, for their name is little altered and it indi-

cates their birth from love (erōs).

HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Don’t you know that heroes are demigods?

HERMOGENES: What of it?

SOCRATES: They have all been born from the love (erōs) of a god or a goddess for a mortal. And if

you look at this based upon the old Attic tongue, you will understand better. For it will show

you that ‘hero’ is a slight alteration of the name of ‘love’ (erōs) from which heroes are born.

So they are called heroes either for this reason or because they are sophists, clever speakers,

dialecticians who are well able to ask questions (erōtan). For ‘erein’ is the same as ‘legein’

(to speak). And so, as we have just said, heroes, when spoken of in the Attic tongue, turn

out to be rhetoricians and questioners, and our tribe of heroes becomes a race of rhetoricians

and sophists. Now, this is not difficult to understand, but it is harder to understand why

exactly members of the human race are called humans. Can you say?

HERMOGENES: How could I, my friend? Even if I were able to find out, I wouldn’t make the effort

because I believe you are more likely to make the discovery than I am.

SOCRATES: It seems that you believe in the inspiration of Euthyphro.

HERMOGENES: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, you are right to believe in it. Indeed, I myself apparently have come up with such

an ingenious notion just now that if I am not careful I am in danger this very day of becom-

ing wiser than I need to be. Consider this. In the first place it is necessary to recognise that

when it comes to names, we often insert letters or remove them, departing from our intention

in naming, and we sometimes change the accents. For example, in order to turn the phrase

‘dii philos’ (friend of Zeus) into a name, we removed the second ‘i’ and pronounced the

middle syllable with a grave rather than an acute accent (diphilus). In other cases, by con-

trast, we insert letters and pronounce grave accents as acute.

HERMOGENES: True.

SOCRATES: Well, it seems to me that the name for human beings has also undergone such a process.

One letter, ‘a’, has been removed and the final syllable has become grave, turning a phrase

into a name.

HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: As follows. This name, ‘human’ (anthrōpos), indicates that the other creatures do not

consider or reflect upon or scrutinise anything they see, while a human being sees (opōpe)

and simultaneously scrutinises and reflects upon whatever has been seen. And so, of all

creatures, a human being is rightly named ‘human’ (anthrōpos) for scrutinising (anathrōn)

whatever is seen (opōpe).

HERMOGENES: Well, what next? May I ask about the next thing I would like to find out?

SOCRATES: Certainly.

HERMOGENES: After these examples, there is, I think, something that follows naturally. Indeed, we

speak, I presume, of the body and the soul of a human being.

SOCRATES: Of course.

HERMOGENES: Then let’s analyse these names too, just as we did with the previous ones.

SOCRATES: Do you mean that we should consider how soul reasonably comes by that name, and

do the same too for body?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, speaking off-hand, I think that those who gave soul its name had something as

398 d

398 e

399 a

399 b

399 c

399 d

124 | CRATYLUS – 398d–399d

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

follows in mind. They observed that when soul is present it is the cause of the body being

alive, providing its ability to draw breath and be revived, and when the reviving (anapsu-

chon) power departs, the body is destroyed and dies. And that, I believe, is why they called

it ‘soul’ (psuchē). But, quiet please. I think I can discern something more persuasive to

Euthyphro and his followers who, in my opinion, would despise this interpretation and

regard it as commonplace. Let’s see if you like this.

HERMOGENES: Speak on.

SOCRATES: Do you think that there is anything besides soul that sustains the nature of every single

body, so that it lives and moves?

HERMOGENES: There is nothing else.

SOCRATES: What about this? Don’t you also believe, with Anaxagoras, that nous and soul are what

order and hold the nature of everything else too?

HERMOGENES: I do.

SOCRATES: So, it would be only right to give to this power, which holds and sustains (orchei, echei)

nature (phusis), this particular name, ‘phusechei’ (nature-holder). And it is possible to pro-

nounce this more elegantly as ‘psuchē’ (soul).

HERMOGENES: Entirely so, and I think this explanation is more skilful than the first one.

SOCRATES: Indeed so, although to give it its true name (phusechei) certainly sounds odd.

HERMOGENES: Yes, but what should we say about the next word?

SOCRATES: Do you mean ‘body’?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: There is, I think, much to say, and if the word is altered slightly there is even more to

say. And indeed, some maintain that the body (sōma) is a tomb (sēma) for the soul, as though

it was, at present, entombed. Or again, because body indicates (sēmainei) whatever the soul

would indicate (sēmainēi), it is accordingly correctly called an ‘indication’ (sēma). But it

seems to me for the most part that this name was given by the adherents of Orpheus as if

the soul was paying a penalty for some offences, and the body was an enclosure like a prison

to keep the soul safe. So the body (sōma) is a safe (sōma) for the soul until such time as it

has paid for its offences in full, and body is named accordingly and there is no need to alter

a single letter.

HERMOGENES: Well, Socrates, I think that enough has been said on these names. But what about

the names of the gods – Zeus for instance, whom you spoke of just now? Should we conduct

an enquiry in the same way as to where precisely the correctness of their names lies?

SOCRATES: Yes, by Zeus, Hermogenes, if we are possessed of any intelligence, the very best

approach is to admit that we know nothing about the gods themselves, nor about the precise

names they call themselves, which are of course true names. But, in terms of correctness,

a second approach would be to call them by the names they love to be called by in our con-

ventional prayers, since we know nothing else. In fact, this custom seems good to me, so if

you like, let’s conduct our investigation by first announcing to the gods that, because we

are unworthy to do so, we shall not be investigating them, but human beings and the opin-

ions they held when they gave the gods those names. For this approach will avoid divine

retribution.

HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, that sounds reasonable to me. Let’s do as you suggest.

SOCRATES: Should we begin in the customary manner with Hestia?

HERMOGENES: Right.

SOCRATES: Well, what would you say was in the mind of whoever gave Hestia her name?

399 e

400 a

400 b

400 c

400 d

400 e

401 a

401 b

CRATYLUS – 399e–401b | 125

–––––

Hestia, goddess of the hearth, was typically invoked first in prayers. Her name resembles estin (it is).

HERMOGENES: By Zeus, I don’t think that’s an easy question to answer either.

SOCRATES: It is quite likely, Hermogenes, that the first name givers were not ordinary folk but lofty

thinkers with much to say.

HERMOGENES: What of it?

SOCRATES: It is obvious to me that people of this sort gave the names, and if names in foreign lan-

guages are investigated, the meaning of each will be discovered just as well. For instance,

in the case of what we call ‘ousia’ (being), there are some who call this ‘essia’ and others

who call it ‘ōsia’. Now, taking the first of these alternatives, essia, it is reasonable to call

the being of things ‘Hestia’, and furthermore, we also say that whatever partakes of being

‘is’ (estin), and on this basis could be correctly named Hestia. For we seem, in ancient times,

to have called ‘ousia’ (being), ‘essia’. But someone, thinking of sacrifices, might also con-

clude that the name-givers had this in mind, for those who call the being of everything

‘essia’ are likely to sacrifice to Hestia first before any other gods. Those, on the other hand,

who called being ‘ōsia’ would agree, more or less, with Heraclitus that all of the things that

are are in motion, and nothing remains as it is. So, their cause and ruler is that which pushes

(ōthoun), and it was right therefore to name it ‘ōsia’. And that is as much as we who know

nothing should say. After Hestia, it is only right to investigate ‘Rhea’ and ‘Cronus’. The

name of Cronus we have already dealt with. But perhaps I talk nonsense.

HERMOGENES: Why so, Socrates?

SOCRATES: A swarm of wisdom has come into my mind, my friend.

HERMOGENES: What sort of a swarm?

SOCRATES: Well, it is most odd to recount, but I think it does carry a certain conviction.

HERMOGENES: Which is?

SOCRATES: I seem to picture Heraclitus uttering ancient words of wisdom from the era of Cronus

and Rhea, spoken also by Homer.

HERMOGENES: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Heraclitus says, I presume, that everything is in motion and nothing remains as it is,

and he compares things that are to the flow of a river, saying that “you cannot step twice

into the same river”.

HERMOGENES: So he does.

SOCRATES: Now, do you think that whoever gave the names Rhea and Cronus to the ancestors of

the other gods thought differently from Heraclitus? Do you think he gave the names of

streams to both of them just by chance? Just as Homer for his part refers to “Ocean the

origin of the gods, and mother Tethys”,

as I believe does Hesiod. Orpheus too says, I

believe, that:

First to wed was fair flowing Ocean

Who took to wife his sister, Tethys, his mother’s child.

Notice that they are in agreement with one another, and they all incline towards the doctrines

of Heraclitus.

HERMOGENES: What you are saying makes sense to me, Socrates. But I do not understand what

the name ‘Tethys’ means.

SOCRATES: But the name itself is almost stating that it is a disguised name for a spring. For that

which sifts (diattomenon) and filters (ēthoumenon) represents a spring and the name Tethys

combines both of these words.

HERMOGENES: That is elegant, Socrates.

SOCRATES: It certainly is. But what is next? Zeus, we have already explained.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then let’s speak about his brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, and the other name he goes by.

401 c

401 d

401 e

402 a

402 b

402 c

402 d

126 | CRATYLUS – 401c–402d

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, it seems to me that Poseidon is so named because the nature of the sea hindered

him as he proceeded and would not allow him to advance, acting as a sort of bond for his

feet. So, the god with dominion over the power of the sea was named Poseidon because he

was foot-bound (posi-desmon) and the ‘e’ was probably added to improve the sound. But

perhaps it does not mean this, and it was spoken initially with a double ‘l’ in place of the

‘s’ because the god knows (eidota) a great deal (polla). Or perhaps he was named ‘the

Shaker’ (ho seiōn) because of his shaking activity, and the ‘p’ and the ‘d’ are additions.

Pluto is named as the giver of wealth (ploutos) because wealth comes up from beneath the

earth. It seems to me that most people assume that his name refers to the unseen (aides), so

out of fear they call him Pluto.

HERMOGENES: And what is your view of the matter, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Well, it seems to me that people have been misled in many ways about the power of

this god and are unjustifiably afraid of him. They are afraid because once any of us dies we

remain forever in his realm, and because our soul arrives before him bereft of a body, they

are also fearful on that account. But in my opinion, all of this, and the dominion and name

of the god, point to the same conclusion.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: I shall explain to you how I see all this. Tell me, then, what is the strongest bond for

any living creature in order to ensure that it remains in some particular place – necessity or

desire?

HERMOGENES: Desire is a much stronger bond, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Now, don’t you think that lots of people would escape from Hades if he did not bind

those who go there with the strongest bond?

HERMOGENES: Of course.

SOCRATES: So he binds them, it seems, by desire and not by necessity, since he binds them by the

strongest bond.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Now, there are many desires, are there not?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: So he binds them with the greatest desire of all if he is indeed to restrain people with

the greatest bond.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, when someone believes they will become a better person by being with someone

else, is there any greater desire than this?

HERMOGENES: No, not at all, by Zeus, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So that’s why we should maintain, Hermogenes, that none of the people who dwell

there has any desire to leave, not even the Sirens themselves, for they too are under his spell,

just like all the others. This, it seems, is because Hades knows how to utter beautiful words,

and, on account of this, the god is a perfect sophist and a great benefactor of those who are

with him there, and he is also the cause of so much good to ourselves here. Because he is

surrounded by so much in his own realm, he bears the name Pluto (wealth) for this reason.

Furthermore, he has no desire to be with us humans while we still hold onto our bod-

ies, but he does associate with us once the soul is purified of all the badness and desires

402 e

403 a

403 b

403 c

403 d

403 e

404 a

CRATYLUS – 402e–404a | 127

–––––

Fragment 91, Diels-Kranz.

Iliad xiv.201, 302.

Fragment 15, Kern.

associated with the body. Don’t you think then that he is a philosopher who appreciates that

he may restrain people under these circumstances, having bound them with the desire for

excellence? But while they are possessed of the excitement and madness of the body, not

even his father, Cronus, would be able to hold them to himself by binding them with his

famous shackles.

HERMOGENES: There seems to be something in what you are saying, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So, Hermogenes, the name Hades is not really derived from the unseen (aides), but it

is much more likely that the convention-setter called him Hades because of the fact that he

knows (eidenai) all that is good.

HERMOGENES: Very well. But what have we to say about Dēmēter, Hēra, Apollo, Athena,

Hephaestus, Ares, and the other gods?

SOCRATES: Dēmēter is apparently so called because, like a mother (mētēr), she gives (didousa) the

gift of food. Hēra is the lovely one (eratē) because Zeus is said to have married her for love.

But perhaps the convention-setter, speaking in exalted terms, called the air (aera) Hēra, placing

the beginning at the end to conceal his intention. You would recognise this if you were to

repeat the name Hera over and over. As for Pherephatta, this name is feared by many, and so

too is the name Apollo because, it seems, of a lack of experience of the correctness of names.

For they change Persephone to Phersephone (bringer of slaughter, pherein phonon), and this

apparently terrifies them, although it points out the fact that the goddess is wise. For since

things are in motion, wisdom would be that which fixes upon, or is in touch with, or has the

ability to follow. So the goddess may rightly be called Pherephapa, or the like, because of her

wisdom and her contact (epaphē) with that which is moving (pheromenon). That’s why Hades,

who is wise, associates with her, because she is a goddess of this sort. But nowadays people

distort her name by assigning more importance to nice sound than to the truth, and so they

call her Pherephatta. And as I say, in the case of Apollo, many people are fearful on account

of the name of the god as though it discloses something terrible. Have you noticed this?

HERMOGENES: I have indeed, and what you are saying is true.

SOCRATES: But in my opinion the name is most beautifully suited to the power of the god.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: I shall try to explain my view on the matter. Indeed, there is no single name better suited

to the four powers of the god so that it somehow encompasses them all and shows his musi-

cal, prophetic and medical power, and his skill in archery too.

HERMOGENES: Please continue. Yes, you seem to be saying that the name is unusual.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, it harmonises well with the musical nature of the god. For in the first

place, the purifications and purgations, both in medicine and in prophecy, and the fumiga-

tions with medicinal or oracular remedies, and the ablutions associated with these, and the

sprinklings too, would all have one function – to render the person pure in body and in soul.

Is this so?

HERMOGENES: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Now, wouldn’t Apollo be the god who purifies, cleanses (apolouōn) and delivers us

(apoluōn) from such evils as these?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: In that case, in respect of the deliverances and cleansings, he may correctly be called

‘Aploun’ (he who cleanses), being a physician of maladies of this sort. In respect of prophecy,

and what’s true and what’s simple (aplous), which are indeed the same, it would be correct

to call him by the name that the people of Thessaly use, for they all call this god ‘Aploun’.

And because he is a master archer who is ever-darting (aei-bolōn), he is ‘Aeiballōn’ (ever-

throwing). And in respect of music, we need to understand that the letter ‘a’ often indicates

404 b

404 c

404 d

404 e

405 a

405 b

405 c

128 | CRATYLUS – 404b–405c

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

‘together’, and in this case it refers to movement together around the sky, around the poles

as they are called, and also to harmony in song, which is called concord, because all these,

as the experts in music and in astronomy tell us, move together at the same time, by a certain

harmony. And this god Apollo supervises the harmony by moving them all together, for gods

and for humans. So, just as our words for ‘following’ (akolouthon) and ‘lying together’

(akoitin) substitute the prefix ‘a’ for the prefix ‘homo’, so too, although he was called

‘Omopolōn’, we called him ‘Apollo’, adding an extra ‘l’ because the other name can mean

something distressing.

And even now some people are still suspicious, and because they

don’t consider the power of the name in the correct manner, they are afraid that it is indicating

some sort of destruction. In fact, as was said earlier, the name encompasses all the powers

of the god – simplicity, ever-throwing, cleansing and moving together.

The Muses, and the realm of music in general, seem to derive their name from the

word ‘mōsthai’ (to seek after) and from philosophic enquiry. Leto is so called because of

the meekness of the god, as evidenced by her willingness (ethelēmona) to grant whatever

anyone asks for. Or perhaps her name is Lētho, which is what many foreigners call her,

because it seems her character is not harsh, but gentle and smooth (leion), and that’s why

they call her ‘Lētho’. Artemis appears to be so called because of her soundness (artemes)

and orderliness (kosmion) and her preference for virginity (parthenia), but it is just as likely

that those who gave the goddess that name called her ‘she who knows excellence’ (aretēs

histora). Or perhaps it was because of her hatred of procreation (aroton misēsasēs) involving

a man and a woman. Or whoever gave the god her name did so for one of these reasons, or

for all of them.

HERMOGENES: What about Dionysus and Aphrodite?

SOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, you are asking me a big question. In fact, there is a serious way

of explaining the names of these gods, and a playful one. You had best ask others for the

serious account, but there is nothing to prevent us going over the playful one, for the gods

are quite fond of playing. Indeed, Dionysus would be the one who gives (didous) wine

(oinos), being playfully called ‘Didoinysos’. As for wine, since most people who drink it

believe (oieithai) that they are possessed of intelligence (nous) when they are not, it may

correctly be called ‘oionous’. There is no need to contradict Hesiod about Aphrodite, and

we can accept that she was so called because of her birth from foam (afrou).

HERMOGENES: But surely Socrates, you, an Athenian, won’t forget about Athena, or indeed

Hephaestus or Ares.

SOCRATES: That is hardly likely.

HERMOGENES: Indeed not.

SOCRATES: Now, it is not difficult to explain the origin of her other name.

HERMOGENES: Which is?

SOCRATES: We do call her ‘Pallas’, I presume?

HERMOGENES: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, those who believe that this name was given because of her dancing in armour,

would, in my opinion, be correct in their belief, for to raise oneself up from the ground or

to lift something else in one’s hands is to shake (pallein) or be shaken (palleisthai), to dance

or be danced.

HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, she is called Pallas because of this.

405 d

405 e

406 a

406 b

406 c

406 d

406 e

407 a

CRATYLUS – 405d–407a | 129

–––––

Apolōn means destroying or slaughtering.

Hesiod, Theogony 195-197.

HERMOGENES: And rightly so. But what about her other name?

SOCRATES: You mean Athena?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: This, my friend, is a weightier matter. The ancients seem to have thought about Athena

in much the same way as experts on Homer do nowadays. Indeed, most such commentators

say that he represents Athena as ‘nous’ or thought (dianoia), while the person who devised

her name seems to have thought about her in much the same way, but he spoke of her in

even more elevated terms as the intellect (noesis) of God (theou). He seems to say that she

is ‘a theonoa’, using the letter ‘a’ in place of ‘e’, as foreigners do, also omitting the ‘i’ and

the ‘s’. But perhaps this was not the reason, and perhaps he called her ‘Theonoēn’ (divine

apprehension) because she apprehends (noousēs) the divine (theia) better than the others.

And we cannot rule out the possibility that, wishing to say that this god was the embodiment

of intellect (ēthei noēsin), he called her ‘Ēthonoēn’, but he himself, or others afterwards,

made a change to make the name prettier and called her ‘Athēnaa’.

HERMOGENES: What do you say about Hephaestus?

SOCRATES: Are you asking about the noble ‘knower of light’ (phaeos histora)?

HERMOGENES: Probably.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it obvious to everyone then that this god is Phaistos with the letter ‘e’ added on?

HERMOGENES: Quite likely, unless some further suggestion occurs to you, as it probably will.

SOCRATES: Well, so that I don’t suggest it, ask me about Ares.

HERMOGENES: I’m asking.

SOCRATES: Well, if you like, he could be ‘Ares’ in respect of his vigour (arren) and courage

(andreion), or again, if you prefer, because he is hard and unbending, in other words ‘tough’

(arraton). Accordingly, ‘Ares’ would be an entirely appropriate name to call the god of war.

HERMOGENES: Very much so.

SOCRATES: But, by the gods, let’s leave the gods aside as I have become afraid of discussing them.

Question me about anything else you like “so that we may see how”

the horses of

Euthyphro behave.

HERMOGENES: Yes, I shall do so, yet I have one more request of you about Hermes, since Cratylus

says that I am no Hermogenes (offspring of Hermes). So let’s try to investigate Hermes and

understand this name, so that we may decide if Cratylus has a point.

SOCRATES: Well then, this name, ‘Hermes’, seems to be concerned with speech, and he seems to

be an interpreter (hermēnea), a messenger, a thief, deceptive in his arguments, and a dealer,

and all such activity involves the power of speech. Now, as we said previously, to speak

(eirein) is to use words, and Homer often uses the word ‘emēsato’ which means to contrive.

So, from both these usages, the convention-setter imposed upon us this name for the god

who contrived (emēsato) speaking, which is ‘eirein’, and speech, as if to say “people, it is

only right that you should call the god who contrived (emēsato) speech (eirein), Eirmēs.”

But nowadays we beautify the name, or so we think, and call him ‘Hermes’. And Iris too

seems to be named after speech (eirein) because she is a messenger.

HERMOGENES: Well, by Zeus, in that case I think Cratylus did well to say that I am no Hermogenes

(offspring of Hermes), since when it comes to contriving speech, I am not up to much.

SOCRATES: And it is also reasonable, my friend, that Pan, with his twofold nature, is the son of Hermes.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: You know that speech indicates all things and keeps them circulating and moving, and

it is twofold, true and false.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, the true speech is smooth and divine, dwelling on high among the gods, while

407 b

407 c

407 d

407 e

408 a

408 b

408 c

130 | CRATYLUS – 407b–408c

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

the false speech dwells down here among the broad mass of humanity, and it is coarse and

tragic, for most of the stories and falsehoods are based here and concern the tragic life.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: So it is only right that the one who reveals and is constantly (aei) moving (polōn) every-

thing (pan) would be Pan, the goatherd (aipolos), the two-fold son of Hermes, with his

upper parts smooth and his lower parts coarse and goat-like (tragoeidēs). And Pan, if he is

indeed the son of Hermes, is either speech or the brother of speech, and it is no surprise

that brother resembles brother. But as I said let’s get away from discussion of the gods.

HERMOGENES: Yes, if you wish, Socrates, of gods of this sort at any rate. But is there any reason

not to explain those of another sort, such as sun, moon, and stars, earth, ether, air, fire and

water and the seasons and the year?

SOCRATES: Well, you are asking a lot of me. Nevertheless, since it will please you, I am willing.

HERMOGENES: It would please me, indeed.

SOCRATES: Well then, what would you like to deal with first? Or should we deal with the sun, the

first one you mentioned?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, I think the answer would become more obvious if we were to use the Doric version

of the name. For they call the sun (helios) ‘Halios’. Now, it could be called Halios because

it gathers (holizein) human beings together whenever it rises, or because it is constantly

revolving (aei heilein) about the earth, or it could be because it seems to be responsible for

the variegation (poikillein) of whatever arises from the earth, and ‘poikillein’ (to variegate)

and ‘aioilein’ have the same meaning.

HERMOGENES: What about the moon (selēnē)?

SOCRATES: It looks as if this name puts Anaxagoras under some pressure.

HERMOGENES: Why is that?

SOCRATES: It seems to be pointing out that his recent pronouncement that the moon gets its light

from the sun is of more ancient date.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: Selas (brightness) and phōs (light) presumably have the same meaning.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And if what Anaxagoras’ followers say is true, the light associated with the moon is

presumably always both new (neon) and old (henon), for as the sun revolves about the

moon, it constantly casts new (neon) light upon it, and there is also the old (henon) light of

the previous month.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And many people call the moon ‘selanaia’.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: Because the moon always possesses new and old brightness, the most appropriate name

by which to call it would be ‘selaenoneoaeia’ (selon neon kai henon echei aei), but this is

condensed down to ‘selanaia’.

HERMOGENES: Well, at least the name is poetic, Socrates, but what do you say about ‘month’ and

‘stars’?

SOCRATES: Month (meis) would correctly be called ‘meiēs’ from ‘meiousthai’ (to decrease). The

stars (astra) seem to get their name from lightning (astrapēs), but because lightning turns

408 d

408 e

409 a

409 b

409 c

CRATYLUS – 408d–409c | 131

–––––

Iliad v.221-222.

Anaxagoras was a natural philosopher from Clazomenae in Ionia, and lived a generation before Socrates. His influence

on Socrates is described in Plato’s Phaedo (97c ff.).

our gaze upwards (anastrephei) it should be ‘anastrōpē’, which we call ‘astrapē’ nowadays

to make it prettier.

HERMOGENES: What about fire and water?

SOCRATES: The word ‘pur’ (fire) perplexes me. Perhaps the Muse of Euthyphro has deserted me,

or perhaps this word is just too difficult. Note the device I introduce in all situations like

this where I am perplexed.

HERMOGENES: Which is?

SOCRATES: I’ll tell you. Answer me this. Can you say how fire (pur) came to be so called?

HERMOGENES: By Zeus, I cannot.

SOCRATES: Well, here is what I suspect; think about this. I notice that Greeks, especially those who

live among non-Greeks, have adopted many names from them.

HERMOGENES: What of it?

SOCRATES: If someone were to investigate the reasonableness of these names by referring to the

Greek language rather than the language from which they happen to derive, you know that

they would be perplexed.

HERMOGENES: Quite likely.

SOCRATES: Look at this name ‘fire’ (pur), and decide whether or not it is non-Greek. Indeed, it is

not easy to connect this word to the Greek language, and the Phrygians obviously use a

slightly altered version, as they do also in the case of ‘water’ and ‘dog’ and many other names.

HERMOGENES: Indeed so.

SOCRATES: Now, although something could be said about these words, we should not press this too

far. So, on this basis, I am leaving ‘fire’ and ‘water’ aside. As for ‘air’ (aēr), Hermogenes,

is it so called because it raises (airei) things up from the ground, or because it is always

flowing (aei rei), or because wind arises when air flows? Indeed, the poets presumably refer

to the winds as ‘blasts’ (aētai), so perhaps a poet says ‘blast-flow’ (aētorroun) as if he is

saying ‘wind-flow’ (pneumatorroun). As for ‘ether’ (aithēr), my understanding is that it

may rightly be called ‘aeitheēr’ because it is always running (aei thei) and flowing (rei)

about the air (aēr). Earth (gē) would better indicate its meaning if it were named ‘gaia’.

Indeed, it would be correct to call ‘gaia’ a mother, as Homer does, for he uses ‘gegaasin’

to mean ‘to be born’ (gegenēsthai). Very well, what is next?

HERMOGENES: The seasons (hōrai), Socrates, and the two names for year, ‘eniautos’ and ‘etos’.

SOCRATES: If you wish to understand ‘the seasons’ (hōrai), the word should be spoken in the ancient

Attic dialect as (horai), for they are seasons (horai) because they demarcate (horizein) win-

ter and summer, the winds and the fruits of the earth. So they would rightly be called ‘horai’

because they demarcate (horizousai). The two words ‘eniautos’ and ‘etos’ for year are more

than likely a single word. For that which leads whatever grows or is born, in their turn, into

the light, and scrutinises them within itself (en hautōi exetazei) is called ‘eniautos’ by some

because this occurs in itself (en hautōi), and ‘etos’ by others because it scrutinises (etazei).

This is just like the division of the name Zeus, as discussed previously,

whom some call

‘Zen’, others ‘Dia’. Although the account as a whole is ‘that which scrutinises within itself’

(en heautōi etazon), this single account, when spoken, is divided so that two names arise

from the one account, ‘eniautos’ and ‘etos’.

HERMOGENES: Well, Socrates, you are making great progress indeed.

SOCRATES: At this stage, I think I am apparently forging ahead in wisdom.

HERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: You will say so even more in a moment.

HERMOGENES: Well, after this class of names I would gladly look at where precisely the correctness

lies in the case of the noble names associated with excellence, such as ‘wisdom’ (phronēsis),

409 d

409 e

410 a

410 b

410 c

410 d

410 e

411 a

132 | CRATYLUS – 409d–411a

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

‘comprehension’ (sunesis) and ‘justice’ (dikaiosunē), and any others of that sort.

SOCRATES: Well, my friend you are stirring up a significant class of names. Nevertheless, since I

have donned the lion’s skin,

I should not turn coward, but get on with the enquiry, it seems,

into wisdom, comprehension, understanding and knowledge, and all those other noble

names you speak of.

HERMOGENES: We certainly shouldn’t quit before the job is done.

SOCRATES: And indeed, by the dog, I think that the intuition that occurred to me just now was not

a bad one, and those ancient personages who gave us these names were very much like

most wise folk these days, who get dizzy because they perform so many about-turns in their

search for the nature of things that are. And consequently, the actual things seem to them to

be turning around and moving in every possible way. However, they do not blame this opin-

ion upon their own internal condition. They believe, rather, that the actual things themselves

are like this by nature, never stable or certain, constantly flowing and moving, always full

of every sort of motion and change. This is what occurred to me in relation to all the names

we are now considering.

HERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Perhaps you have not noticed the names just mentioned are applied as if the things

named are moving, flowing, and changing in every way.

HERMOGENES: No, that did not occur to me.

SOCRATES: Well, to start with, the first one we mentioned is certainly named on the basis of such

considerations as these.

HERMOGENES: What name?

SOCRATES: ‘Wisdom’ (phronēsis) is intelligence (noēsis) of motion (phoras) and flow (rou). Or it

may be interpreted as the advantage (onēsis) of motion (phoras), but in any case it is con-

cerned with motion. Or, if you like, take ‘understanding’ (gnōme), which indicates enquiry

(skepsis) and observation (nōmēsis) of generation (gonē), since ‘to enquire’ is the same as

‘to observe’. Or, if you prefer, the name ‘intelligence’ (noēsis) itself is the aspiration (hesis)

for the new (neon), and the fact that things are new (neon) indicates that they are ever-

changing, and whoever gave us the name reveals this aspiration of the soul (neon hesis) to

be neoesis (intelligence). For noēsis was not originally so called; rather, two ‘e’s had to be

spoken in place of the ‘ē’ to form ‘noeesis’. Sound-mindedness (sōphrosunē) is the preser-

vation (sōtēria) of wisdom (phronēsis), which we have just looked at. And indeed, ‘knowl-

edge’ (epistēmē) implies that the worthy soul follows (hepei) the moving things, without

falling behind or running ahead, and so, having inserted an ‘e’, it should be called ‘hep-

eïstēmē’. Accordingly, comprehension (sunesis), for its part, seems to be a sort of working

out, for whenever someone is said ‘to comprehend’, it is really the same as being said ‘to

know’, for ‘to comprehend’ means that the soul proceeds along with or goes along with

(sun iēmi) things. Then again, ‘sophia’ (wisdom) indicates contact with motion.

The word is somewhat obscure and foreign, but we must remember that the poets

often say of whatever proceeds quickly from its starting point that it rushes (esuthē). Indeed,

one of the famous men of Sparta went by the name ‘Sous’ (rush), for that is what the Spartans

call a rapid onslaught. So, ‘sophia’ indicates contact with this motion, as the motion of things

that are. As for the word ‘good’ (agathon), this is supposed to apply to that which is admirable

411 b

411 c

411 d

411 e

412 a

412 b

412 c

CRATYLUS – 411b–412c | 133

–––––

See 395e-396b.

According to legend, after killing it, Heracles wore the skin of the Nemean lion, which was said to have remarkable

powers.

See 439c for a similar point.

in all of nature. For since things that are are in motion, some move rapidly while others move

slowly. Now, not all that is fast is admirable, but part of it is admirable. So the designation

‘good’ (agathon) is given to the admirable (agastos) part of the fast (thoos).

Now, it is easy to conclude that justice (dikaiosunē) is the comprehension (sunesis)

of what’s just (dikaios), but the actual word ‘just’ (dikaion) presents a difficulty. For it

seems, indeed, that most people agree up to a point but thereafter there is conflict. For those

who believe that the universe is in motion assume that it is the sort of thing that can, for the

most part, do nothing but provide space. But there is something passing through all this on

account of which everything that comes into being arises. This, they maintain, is extremely

fast and subtle, for it would not be able to pass through everything without being repelled

unless it was the subtlest, and so fast relative to the others that they appear to stand still.

Now, since it governs all the others by passing through (diaïon) them, it is correct to

call it by this name, ‘dikaion’ (just), with the ‘k’ added for ease of pronunciation. So, up to

this point, as I said just now, it is agreed by many people that this is what the just (dikaion)

is. But I, Hermogenes, being persistent about this, have found out about all these matters in

secret teachings; that this is what’s just, and the cause, for the cause is that through which

(di ho) anything arises, and someone stated that it is correct to call it Zeus (Dia) for that

reason. But when, having heard this, I nevertheless ask gently, “If this is the case, my friend,

what precisely is just?”, they think, at that stage, that I am asking too many questions and

going beyond all bounds. They tell me that I have done enough enquiring and then, wishing

to satisfy me, they try a variety of arguments, but agree with one another no longer.

One says that the sun is the just, for this governs things by passing through (diaïonta)

them and burning (kaonta) them. Yet, when I tell this to someone else, because I am

delighted at hearing something so good, he laughs at me and asks if I believe there is no

justice among us humans once the sun has set. So I persist, and ask him what he himself

has to say, and he replies that the just is ‘fire’. But this is not easy to understand. Another

says that it is not the fire itself but the actual heat that is in the fire. But someone else says

that all these suggestions are laughable, and that the just is what Anaxagoras says it is –

namely, reason (nous). For reason, he says, is self-ruling, mixes with nothing, and orders

all things as it passes through everything.

By then, my friend, I’m even more perplexed

than I was when I set out to learn about the just and what precisely it is. In any case, the

name appears to have been given for the reasons mentioned, and that’s what our enquiry

was about.

HERMOGENES: It seems to me, Socrates, that you have heard these suggestions from someone else

and have not come up with them just now.

SOCRATES: What about the other names?

HERMOGENES: You certainly did not hear those suggestions from someone else.

SOCRATES: Listen then, for perhaps I might actually mislead you into believing that the remaining

suggestions are not something I have heard. So, what is left after justice? We have not yet

dealt with courage. Now, it is obvious that injustice (adikia) is an impediment to that which

passes through (diaïon), whereas courage indicates that the name ‘courage’ is given in battle.

Since what is is flowing, a battle in what is would simply be the opposite flow, and if we

omit the ‘d’ from the word ‘andreia’ (courage), the name ‘anreia’ (opposite flow) reveals

this activity. Of course, courage is not a flow that is opposed to every other flow. It is, rather,

opposed only to the flow that is contrary to what’s just, otherwise courage would not be

praiseworthy. And the words ‘male’ (arren) and ‘man’ (anēr) mean much the same as

courage (andreia) in respect of upward flow (anō rhoē). It looks to me as if the word

‘woman’ (gunē) is intended to be ‘birth’ (gonē), while ‘female’ (thēlu) appears to be named

412 d

412 e

413 a

413 b

413 c

413 d

413 e

414 a

134 | CRATYLUS – 412d–414a

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

from ‘nipple’ (thēlē), which in turn, Hermogenes, is so called because it makes things flour-

ish (tethēlenai), like watered plants.

HERMOGENES: So it seems, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And, indeed, the word ‘flourish’ (thallein) itself seems to me to resemble the rapid sud-

den growth in the young. It is as if the name-giver has imitated this process in the name,

which he forms by combining ‘to run’ (thein) and ‘to jump’ (hallesthai). But do you notice

how I go off course once I come across smooth ground? And we do have many seemingly

important matters left.

HERMOGENES: That’s true.

SOCRATES: One of which is to see what precisely the word ‘skill’ (technē) means.

HERMOGENES: Very much so.

SOCRATES: Doesn’t it indicate the possession (hexis) of reason (nous), once you remove the initial

‘t’ and insert an ‘o’ between the ‘ch’ and the ‘n’ and between the ‘n’ and the ‘ē’ to form

‘echonoē’?

HERMOGENES: With some difficulty, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Heavens, don’t you know that the names that were originally given have, by now, been

submerged by people who wish to make them more dramatic, attaching extra letters and

taking them away for ease of pronunciation, twisting them this way and that, both to embel-

lish them and because of the passage of time? Otherwise, don’t you think that the insertion

of the letter ‘r’ into the word ‘katoptron’ (mirror) is unusual? I believe rather that this sort

of thing is done by people who think nothing of the truth, but only of the shape of the mouth.

And so they make lots of additions to the original names, finally making it impossible for

anyone at all to understand what precisely the name means. So the Sphinx is called by that

name rather than ‘phix’,

and there are many other examples.

HERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, that is how matters stand.

SOCRATES: Now, once anyone is allowed to add or delete whatever letters they wish from the names,

the process becomes very easy, and any name may be associated with any activity.

HERMOGENES: That’s true.

SOCRATES: True indeed, but I think you, a wise overseer,

should protect measure and likelihood.

HERMOGENES: I would like to do so.

SOCRATES: And so would I, Hermogenes, but do not carry the verbal precision too far, blessed

man, lest you “weaken my strength”.

For I am approaching the summit that I spoke of,

once, after ‘skill’, we have investigated ‘mechanism’. Indeed, ‘mechanism’ seems to me to

indicate ‘extensive achievement’ (anein epi polu), for ‘mēkos’ (extent) somehow indicates

the same thing as ‘epi polu’ (much). So, the word mechanism (mechanē) is composed of

these two words, ‘anein’ (to accomplish) and ‘mēkos’ (extent) combined.

But, as I said just now, we need to get to the summit of these deliberations, so we

should investigate what the words ‘excellence’ and ‘badness’ actually mean. One of them

is not yet clear to me, while the other seems to be obvious since it concurs with the previous

examples. Indeed, since things are in motion, all that moves (ion) badly (kakōs) would con-

stitute ‘badness’ (kakia). But when this happens in soul, and soul goes badly to things, this,

for the most part, is what is generally called ‘badness’. But I think that what ‘going badly’

actually means is also clear from the word ‘cowardice’ (deilia), which we have overlooked

and not yet dealt with, although we should have dealt with it along with courage. I think

414 b

414 c

414 d

414 e

415 a

415 b

415 c

CRATYLUS – 414b–415c | 135

–––––

Fragment 12, Diels-Kranz.

For the use of this form of the word in Hesiod, see Theogony 326.

See 390b ff.

Iliad vi.265.

we have also overlooked many others. Now, cowardice indicates a strong bond of the soul,

for ‘lian’ (excess) is a sort of strength. So cowardice (deilia) would be the excessively great

bond (desmos) of the soul, and it is bad, just as aporia (not proceeding) is bad, and so too,

it seems, is anything that impedes movement and progress. So it appears that this ‘going

badly’ is obviously a hindered and impeded motion, and any soul that possesses it becomes

filled with badness. Now, if the name ‘badness’ is applied to this sort of thing, then excel-

lence (aretē) would be the opposite of this, indicating, in the first place, ‘proceeding easily’

(euporia), and secondly that the flow of the good soul is always free. And so the unchecked

and unimpeded flow has taken this name, it seems, but this name should really be ‘aeireitēn’

(ever flowing), but it has been condensed down and is called ‘aretē’. Now, perhaps you

may say that I am making this up, but I maintain that if what I said previously about badness

is correct, then this suggestion about the name ‘excellence’ is correct too.

HERMOGENES: What then about the word ‘bad’, which was the basis of much of what you said pre-

viously? What does that word mean?

SOCRATES: I think, by Zeus, this word is somewhat strange and hard to understand, so in this case

too I shall use that approach of mine.

HERMOGENES: What approach?

SOCRATES: The approach whereby I declare that this word too is of non-Greek origin.

HERMOGENES: Yes, you’re probably right. So let’s leave these words and try to look at ‘noble’

(kalon) and ‘base’ (aischron) and their reasonableness.

SOCRATES: Well, what ‘base’ means seems quite obvious to me, and indeed this concurs with pre-

vious examples. For to me it looks as if whoever gave us the names is consistently censuring

whatever impedes or restrains things in their flow. So, in this case, he has given this name

‘aeischoroun’ to that which always (aei) restricts (ischei) the flow (roun), but nowadays it

is condensed down and called ‘aischron’ (base).

HERMOGENES: What about ‘beautiful’ (kalon)?

SOCRATES: This is more difficult to understand. Yet it does speak for itself, except that the letter

‘ō’ has been altered in accent and length.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: This name seems to designate ‘thought’.

HERMOGENES: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Come on, what do you think is responsible for calling by name each of the things that

are? Is it not that which gave the names?

HERMOGENES: Entirely so.

SOCRATES: And this would be thought, would it not, either of gods or of humans or both?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is not that which called things by name the same as that which calls them now,

namely thought?

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it also the case that whatever nous and thought bring about is praiseworthy, while

anything they do not bring about is blameworthy?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Does the practice of medicine bring about medical accomplishments, and the practice

of carpentry the accomplishments of carpentry? What do you say?

HERMOGENES: I think that this is so.

SOCRATES: Then, does the practice of naming (to kaloun) bring about beautiful accomplishments?

HERMOGENES: Yes, it must.

SOCRATES: And, according to us, thought (dianoia) is that which names?

415 d

415 e

416 a

416 b

416 c

416 d

136 | CRATYLUS – 415d–416d

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So, this designation ‘beautiful’ (kalon) is, correctly, the name for wisdom (phronēseōs),

which brings about the sort of accomplishments which we describe as beautiful, and which

we welcome.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Now, what names of this sort are still left?

HERMOGENES: Those that are related to the good and noble, such as ‘beneficial’, ‘profitable’, ‘use-

ful’ and ‘advantageous’, and their opposites.

SOCRATES: Well, at this stage, I think you should be able to work out the word ‘beneficial’ for your-

self, for it appears to be closely related to knowledge. Indeed, it is simply indicating the

movement of the soul along with things, and whatever is enacted by such movement has,

it seems, been called ‘beneficial’ and ‘a benefit’ (sumphora) because it moves (pheresthai)

about (peri) with (sum) (sumperipheresthai) things. The word ‘advantageous’ (kerdaleon)

comes from ‘kerdos’ (gain), and restoring the ‘n’ instead of the ‘d’ in the word ‘kerdos’ to

form ‘kernos’

reveals what it means, for it is ‘the good’, but in a different form. Indeed,

because the good mingles with (kerannutai) and passes through everything, it was given a

name (kernos) expressing this power, but a ‘d’ was inserted in place of the ‘n’ and it was

spoken as ‘kerdos’ (gain).

HERMOGENES: What about ‘profitable’ (lusitelon)?

SOCRATES: It seems, Hermogenes, the name-giver does not use this word as traders do when their

investment is released. I don’t think that this is what he means by profitable. Rather, because

the good is the swiftest of all, it does not allow things to stand still, nor allow motion to come

to an end, stop or pause. It continually sets the motion free, if there is any attempt to bring it

to an end, and thus renders the motion unceasing and undying. It is in this sense, I think, that

the good is declared to be profitable, for that which releases (luon) the end (telos) of motion

is called ‘lusiteloun’ (profitable). ‘Beneficial’ (ōphelimon) is a foreign word which is often

used by Homer in the form ‘ophellein’, and this designates ‘increasing’ or ‘making’.

HERMOGENES: What have we to say about the opposites of these?

SOCRATES: Those that are simple negations of these words do not, in my opinion, require an expla-

nation.

HERMOGENES: What are those?

SOCRATES: ‘Unbeneficial’, ‘useless’, ‘unprofitable’ and ‘disadvantageous’.

HERMOGENES: That’s true.

SOCRATES: But ‘harmful’ and ‘hurtful’ do require an explanation.

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, ‘harmful’ (blaberon) means that which harms (blapton) the flow (roun), while

‘harm’ (blapton), for its part, indicates wanting (boulomenon) to grasp (haptein), and ‘to

grasp’ is actually the same as ‘to bind’, which the name-giver consistently censures. Now,

that which wishes (boulomenon) to grasp (haptein) the flow (roun) would most correctly be

‘boulapteroun’, but it looks to me as if this has been called ‘blaberon’ to make it sound nicer.

HERMOGENES: Socrates, what elaborate names you come up with! In fact, you seemed to me to be

using your mouth just now as a flute to render the prelude to the hymn of Athena as you

pronounced ‘boulapteroun’.

SOCRATES: Those who gave us the name are responsible for this, Hermogenes, not I.

416 e

417 a

417 b

417 c

417 d

418 a

CRATYLUS – 416e–418a | 137

–––––

See 409d.

The analysis here indicates that kerdos (gain) is an altered form of kernos, a word related to a verb which means to

mix or mingle, but the word kernos is not in the text and does not have this meaning in Greek.

HERMOGENES: That’s true, but what about ‘hurtful’? What would this be?

SOCRATES: Yes, ‘hurtful’, what precisely would that be? Observe, Hermogenes, how true my state-

ment was when I said that by adding and removing letters people significantly alter the

intentions of words, so that by making very minor alterations they sometimes make words

indicate their direct opposites. Take for instance the word ‘deon’ (obligation).

Indeed, I had this in mind just now, and I was reminded of it by what I was just about

to say to you. Our lovely modern language has actually distorted the words ‘deon’ (oblig-

ation) and ‘zēmiōdes’ (harmful) to indicate their direct opposites, thus concealing what the

word intends, whereas the ancient language reveals what both words intend.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: I’ll tell you. You know that our ancestors made much use of the letters ‘i’ and ‘d’, espe-

cially the women, who are most protective of the ancient language. But nowadays people

turn ‘i’ and the ‘e’ into ‘ē’, and the ‘d’ into ‘z’, as these give a loftier sound.

HERMOGENES: How so?

SOCRATES: For example, people nowadays call ‘day’ ‘hēmera’, whereas ancient speakers called it

‘himera’ in some cases, and ‘hemera’ in others.

HERMOGENES: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Now, are you aware that only the ancient name reveals the thinking of the name-giver?

For when, from darkness, light has arisen, people are glad and they long (himeirousin) for

this, and so they call it ‘himera’.

HERMOGENES: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: But nowadays the name is so dramatised that you would not understand what this word

means. In fact, some people think that day (hēmera) makes things gentle (hēmera) and has

this name for this reason.

HERMOGENES: I believe so.

SOCRATES: And you also realise that the people of old called a yoke ‘duogon’ rather than ‘zugon’.

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And although the word ‘zugon’ reveals nothing, that which binds a pair together for

the purposes of drawing something is correctly given the name ‘duogon’. But now it is just

‘zugon’. Indeed, there are very many more instances of this.

HERMOGENES: Apparently.

SOCRATES: In the same way, the word ‘deon’ (obligation), thus spoken, indicates initially the

direct opposite of all the other words associated with the good. For although obligation is

a form of good, it appears to be a shackle or an impediment to motion as if it is actually

akin to harm.

HERMOGENES: Very much so, Socrates, it does appear that way.

SOCRATES: Not if you make use of the ancient name, which is much more likely to be correct than

the modern one. In fact, it will be in agreement with our previous words for good if, in

place of the ‘e’, you restore the ‘i’, as in the ancient word. For the word ‘diïon’ (going

through) indicates the good that the name-giver praises, whereas ‘deon’ (shackle) does not.

Accordingly, whoever gave us the names does not contradict himself, and ‘obligation’, ‘use-

ful’, ‘profitable’, ‘advantageous’, ‘good’, ‘beneficial’ and ‘easy’ all appear the same. They

are indicating, with different names, that which brings order and that which moves, which

is consistently praised, while that which restricts and binds is censured. And indeed, in the

case of ‘harmful’ (zēmiōdes), if you restore the ‘d’ in place of the ‘z’, as in the ancient word,

it will be evident that this name (dēmiōdes) applies to that which binds (dounti) motion

(ion).

HERMOGENES: What about ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ and ‘desire’ and names of that sort, Socrates?

418 b

418 c

418 d

418 e

419 a

419 b

138 | CRATYLUS – 418b–419b

Cratylus, David Horan translation, 6 Nov 25

SOCRATES: These don’t look particularly difficult, Hermogenes. For pleasure (hēdonē) has this

name because it is the activity that tends to our advantage (hē onēsis), but a ‘d’ is inserted

so that it is called ‘hēdonē’ (pleasure) rather than ‘hēonē’. Pain (lupē) seems to get its name

from the breakdown (dialusis) which the body undergoes when experiencing pain.

‘Grief’ (ania) is that which impedes motion (ienai). ‘Suffering’ (algēdōn) looks to

me like a foreign word which comes from the word ‘grieving’ (algeinos). ‘Distress’ (odunē)

seems to be so called from the entering in (endusis) of pain. In the case of ‘vexation’

(achthēdōn), it is evident to all that the word bears a resemblance to a weight (achtos or

baros) imposed upon motion. ‘Joy’ (chara) seems to have been so called from the relaxed

and easy motion of the soul. The word ‘delight’ comes from ‘delightful’ (terpnon), which

is so called from the gradual motion (herpsis) of the soul, which resembles breath (pnoē)

and is rightly called ‘herpnoun’, but over time this has been called ‘terpnon’. The word

‘euphrosunē’ (cheerfulness) requires no further explanation since it is obvious to all that

this name derives from the good disposition (eu sumpheresthai) of the soul towards things.

Although the right name is ‘eupherosunē’, we call it ‘euphrosunē’ (cheerfulness).

‘Desire’ (epithumia) presents no difficulty either, for this name was obviously given

to the power that enters into (epi) the heart (thumos), while ‘thumos’ would get this name

from the raging (thusis) and seething (zesis) of the soul. The name ‘himeros’ (longing)

given to the flow (rous) which draws the soul most of all, for it rushes (hiemenos) forth

(rhei) and is sent towards (ephiemenos) things, and in so doing it draws the soul forcibly

due to the intent of the flow, and because of all this power it is called ‘himeros’ (longing).

Now, ‘yearning’ (pothos) indicates that it is not a desire or flow for that which is present,

but for that which is elsewhere (allothi pou ontos) or absent (apontos), and so it is then

called ‘pothos’ (yearning). So, when someone desires that which is present, this is called

‘longing’, but the same desire is called ‘yearning’ (pothos) when it is for that which is not

present.

‘Love’ (erōs) has this name because it flows in from outside, and the flow itself is

not native to the person who has it, but is brought in from outside through the eyes. That is

why in ancient times it was called ‘esros’ (influx), from the inflowing (esrein), for we used

the short ‘o’ then rather than a long ‘ō’, but nowadays it is called ‘erōs’ because of the sub-

stitution of these letters. Are there any other names you think we should consider?

HERMOGENES: What about ‘opinion’ and words of that sort? How do these appear to you?

SOCRATES: ‘Opinion’ (doxa) is either named after the pursuit (diōxis) in which the soul engages

when pursuing the knowledge of how things are, or, as is more likely, the shooting (bolē)

of the bow (toxon). At any rate, the word ‘thought’ (oiēsis) concurs with this word, for this

seems to be pointing to the motion (oisis) of the soul towards all things, as each of the things

that are, actually is. Similarly, ‘deliberation’ (boulē) is somehow ‘shooting’ (bolē), while

‘wishing’ (boulesthai) indicates being sent towards (ephiesthai) something, as does ‘delib-

erating’ (bouleuesthai). All these words appear to follow from ‘opinion’ (doxa) and to bear

a resemblance to ‘shooting’ (bolē), as do their opposites. And so ‘lack of deliberation’ (abou-

lia) seems to be ‘missing the mark’ (atuchia), as if someone failed to shoot or hit whatever

was meant, intended or desired.

HERMOGENES: At this stage, Socrates, you seem to be quickening the pace.

SOCRATES: Yes, because the end is now in sight. But I would still like to explain ‘compulsory’ and

‘willing’ because these come next. Now ‘willing’ (hekousion), by this name, would be indi-

cating that which yields and does not resist, but, as I say, is yielding to motion (eikon toi

419 c

419 d

419 e

420 a

420 b

420 c

420 d

CRATYLUS – 419c–420d | 139

–––––