Clitophon - Platonic Foundation

406 a

407 a

407 b

407 c

CLITOPHON – 406a–407c | 771

Clitophon

__________

narrator: SOCRATES of Alopece, son of Sophroniscus

persons in the dialogue: CLITOPHON oligarchic political leader

scene: no setting indicated

_____

SOCRATES: Someone told us recently that Clitophon,

the son of Aristonymus, in conversation with

Lysias,

was critical of Socrates’ discourses, while his praise of the instruction of

Thrasymachus

knew no bounds.

CLITOPHON:Whoever said so, Socrates, misinformed you about the discussion I had with Lysias

concerning yourself. For although in some respects I did not praise you, in other respects I

did. But since you are obviously rebuking me, while pretending to be unconcerned, I would

be glad to recount these discussions to you myself now that we are on our own, so that you

may be less inclined to believe that I think badly of you. Indeed, at the moment what you

have heard is probably incorrect, and so you seem to be somewhat harder on me than I

deserve. But if you allow me to speak freely, I’ll do so gladly as I wish to explain myself.

SOCRATES: Well, it would indeed be a shame for me to be intolerant when you are so eager to

benefit me. For obviously, having recognised in what way I am good or bad, I shall practise

and pursue the one and flee from the other as best I can.

CLITOPHON: Listen then, for, while in your company, I was often amazed at what I was hearing,

and I thought that in comparison with other speakers your discourse was the most exalted,

as you rebuked the people like a god descending upon the tragic stage chanting your words:

“People, whither are you being carried, ignorant of the fact that you are doing noth-

ing you should do, you who are so utterly serious about money and acquiring it for

yourselves? Yet in the case of your sons to whom you will bequeath all this, you

seek out no teachers of justice so that they will know how to use the wealth in a

just manner, if this is actually teachable. But even if this is a matter of practice and

exercise, you don’t look for anyone who is up to the task of training them thor-

oughly and guiding them carefully, nor have you looked after yourselves in this

way. Rather, when you see that yourselves and your children still prove to fare no

better when it comes to using your wealth, despite being adequately instructed in

writing, music and gymnastics, which you regard as a complete education in excel-

–––––

Clitophon was an Athenain statesman and thinker. He was involved in a coup that overthrew the democratic Athenain

government and installed a short-lived oligarchy during the Peloponnesian War. He is an interlocutor of Socrates in

Book I of the Republic 340a-d.

Lysias was an influential Athenian orator, Phaedrus 277a ff. He is present at the discussion in Book I of the Republic.

Thrasymachus was a sophist who is famously depicted conversing with Socrates in Book I of the Republic 336b ff.

Clitophon, David Horan translation, 11 Nov 25

lence, why do you neither despise this present education, nor seek out those who

will put an end to your lack of culture? But it is because of this very discordance

and heedlessness, and not because the foot can’t keep to the measure of the lyre,

that brother behaves towards brother and cities towards cities in an unmeasured and

discordant manner, through conflict and warfare in which they carry out and suffer

extremes of depravity. Yet you maintain that unjust people are unjust not because

of a lack of education or because of ignorance, but intentionally, and again you dare

to say further that injustice is shameful and detested by the gods. Now, how could

anyone intentionally choose such an evil as this? Because, you reply, he is overcome

by pleasures. But this is also unintentional, is it not, since to prevail is intentional?

In any case, the argument proves that doing injustice is unintentional, and every

man privately, and likewise all cities publicly, should exercise more care about this

than they do at present.”

Now, Socrates, whenever I hear you saying all this, as you frequently do, I am much pleased,

and I praise you wondrously; and also whenever you go on after this to say that those who

develop their bodies but neglect souls are doing something else of this sort by being neg-

lectful of the part that should rule, while attending to the part that should be ruled; and also

when you say that it is better for someone to refrain from using whatever he knows not how

to use. As, for instance, when someone knows not how to use eyes, ears or body as a whole,

it is better for him neither to hear nor see nor use his body for any other purpose rather than

using it in any way whatsoever. And, indeed, the same holds for skill, since whoever does

not know how to use his own lyre obviously does not know how to use his neighbour’s lyre

either, nor does anyone who does not know how to use other people’s lyres know how to

use his own lyre, nor any other instrument or possession at all. And this argument of yours

then beautifully concludes that whoever knows not how to use soul is better off keeping

his soul quiescent and not living at all, rather than being alive and acting according to his

own whims. And if it is necessary for such a person to be alive, it is better that he spend his

life as a slave rather than a free man, entrusting the rudder of his mind, just like a ship, to

someone else who had learned the skill of steering humanity, which you, Socrates, often

call statesmanship, saying that this is the same as jurisprudence and justice. Now, I have

nothing to say against these arguments, and very many others of this sort, wonderfully

expressed, stating that excellence is teachable and that we should care most of all for our

own self. I do not really have anything to say against these, and I don’t think I ever will,

and I believe that they are exhortative in the extreme, and beneficial too, as if we are simply

asleep and these are waking us up.

So, I paid attention in order to hear what was to follow this, putting my questions,

initially, not to yourself, Socrates, but to your like-minded comrades or companions, or

whatever such associates of yours should be called. I first questioned those whom you held

in the highest regard, asking them what argument would come next, and somewhat after

your manner, I made a suggestion to them. “Best of men,” said I, “how are we now to take

Socrates’ exhortation that we turn towards excellence? Is this all there is to say, and is it

not possible to pursue the matter further and understand it completely? Is it to be our lifelong

task to exhort those who have not yet been exhorted, and are they in turn to exhort others?

Or should we ask Socrates, and one another, a further question; having agreed that this is

exactly what a human being is to do, what follows? How, according to us, should we start

learning about justice? It’s as if someone exhorted us to care for the body, having observed

that we, like children, were unaware that there is such a thing as gymnastics and medicine.

What if he were to reproach us on this basis, saying that it is a disgrace to care totally for

407 d

407 e

408 a

408 b

408 c

408 d

408 e

772 | CLITOPHON – 407d–408e

wheat and barley and vines and whatever else we work for and acquire for the sake of the

body, while searching neither for a skill nor a means whereby the body might be in as good

a condition as possible, even though there are such skills? And what if we were to question

the person who exhorted us in this way by asking him what these skills are? He would prob-

ably reply that these are gymnastics and medicine. In the present case then, what, according

to us, is the skill concerned with the excellence of the soul? What do you say?”

The one among them who was regarded as the most formidable in these matters

replied to me. He told me what this skill was. “It is,” said he, “the very one you hear

Socrates speaking of, none other than justice.” I replied by saying, “Don’t just tell me its

name. No, proceed as follows. Medicine is, presumably, a skill of which there are two

outcomes, the first being ongoing production of additional physicians, the second being

health. But the second of these is not yet a skill; it is rather the result of the skill of teach-

ing and being taught, a result we call health. Similarly, in the case of the carpenter’s

skill, there is the house and there is carpentry, one being a result, the other being a subject

that is taught. And the same applies to justice; one outcome is the production of just peo-

ple in the same way that the other skills produce people with those particular skills. But

what is its other outcome, the result that the just man can produce for us? What do we say

this is? Tell me.” That man replied, I believe, that it is ‘the advantageous’, another said

that it is ‘the appropriate’, someone else suggested ‘the beneficial’, another ‘the prof-

itable’. So, I returned to the question and said, “In the other realm too, these terms such

as acting correctly, being profitable, beneficial, and so on, are applicable to any of the

skills. But to what are these all directed? Each skill will give its own reply, and so carpen-

try, for instance, will say that what is good, beautiful, and necessary, is directed to the pro-

vision of wooden objects, which are, of course, not the skill itself. So, describe the result

of justice in like manner.” Finally, Socrates, one of your companions replied with what

seemed like the most ingenious response, saying that the particular result of justice,

which belongs to none of the other skills, is to produce friendship in cities. This man,

when questioned further, said that friendship is good and is never bad, and as the ques-

tioning continued, he would not accept that what we refer to as the friendship of children

and beasts is indeed friendship. For he had to conclude that such friendships are, for the

most part, harmful rather than good. So to avoid such a conclusion, he said that such

friendships are not friendships at all, and that anyone who refers to them in this way is

naming them falsely. And he said that real and true friendship is, precisely, like-minded-

ness. When asked whether he would say that the like-mindedness is likeness of opinion or

of knowledge, he did not favour likeness of opinion because it is unavoidable that many

instances of harmful likeness of opinion occur among people, while he had agreed that

friendship is entirely good and is a result of justice. And so, he said like-mindedness was

the same, being knowledge and not opinion.

Now, at this stage in the argument we were getting nowhere. But those present were

well able to take him to task and say that the argument had come full circle back to where

we began and they said, “Medicine too is a sort of like-mindedness, and so are all of the

skills and they are all able to say what they are concerned with. But what you call justice

or like-mindedness has completely forgotten what it is directed towards, and there is no

clarity as to what precisely the result of justice is.”

That’s why, Socrates, in the end, I also put the question to you, and you told me that

justice is doing harm to enemies and good to friends. But later it turned out that a just person

never harms anyone, since everything he does to anyone is for their benefit. Having been

patient with this process, not once or twice but over a considerable time, my persistence

failed me, and although I believe you are better than anyone at exhorting people to care for

409 a

409 b

409 c

409 d

409 e

410 a

410 b

CLITOPHON – 409a–410b | 773

Clitophon, David Horan translation, 11 Nov 25

excellence, there are two possibilities; either this is as much as you can do and you can do

no more, as if someone, without being a helmsman, were to teach himself to praise this

skill as being of great value to humanity. And the same analogy applies to any of the skills,

and so, in relation to justice, someone might accuse you of being none the more knowl-

edgeable about justice simply because you are good at praising it. Now, I myself don’t think

that this is the case, but there are two possibilities: either you are not knowledgeable or you

are unwilling to share your knowledge with me. I think that’s why, in my perplexity, I go

to Thrasymachus and to anyone else I can. But if you are prepared at this stage to stop

giving me these exhortatory speeches, that’s what should happen now. Act as if I had been

exhorted, in respect of gymnastics, not to neglect my body. Following your exhortatory

speech, you would then explain the nature of my body and the sort of care it needs. Take it

then that Clitophon agrees that it is laughable to care for other things while neglecting the

soul for whose sake we work so hard at everything else. And at this stage you should also

presume that I have, in this way, said whatever follows those arguments that I have gone

through just now. So, I am saying, please just do as I ask so that I won’t do what I am now

doing, praising you before Lysias, and before others in some respects, while criticising you

in other respects. Indeed, Socrates, I declare that you are worth everything to a person who

has not yet been exhorted, but to someone who has already been exhorted, you almost get

in the way of their attaining happiness by arriving at complete excellence.

–––––

410 c

410 d

410 e

774 | CLITOPHON – 410c–410e