Sophist - Platonic Foundation

Sophist

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persons in the dialogue: THEODORUS of Cyrene, geometer

THEAETETUS of Sounion, student of Theodorus

SOCRATES of Alopece, son of Sophroniscus

STRANGER from Elea

scene: in an Athenian gymnasium

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THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, as agreed yesterday,

we have come in person, and appropriately we

are bringing this stranger, one of the people from Elea, an associate of those who follow

Parmenides and Zeno.

He is a man with a great love of wisdom.

SOCRATES: In that case, Theodorus, are you unwittingly bringing in some god rather than a stranger,

as Homer’s phrase would have it, when he says that the gods in general, and the god of

strangers in particular, become the companions of people who partake of true righteousness,

to behold the excesses and the good order of humanity?

So, perhaps this companion of

yours may indeed be one of those higher powers, who is going to watch over and refute

our sorry predicament in these arguments, as he is a god of refutation.

THEODORUS: That is not the manner of this stranger, Socrates. No, he is more moderate than those

who take controversies seriously. Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all,

though he is certainly divine, for I refer to all philosophers as divine.

SOCRATES: And rightly so, my friend. In fact, you could say that this kind is just as difficult to dis-

cern as that of the god. Because most people do not recognise them, they go in and out of

the cities in all sorts of guises.

And the actual philosophers, not the artificial ones, looking

down from on high at the life of those below seem to some quite worthless, and to others

most precious. Sometimes they appear as statesmen, at other times as sophists, and then

again to some people they give the appearance of being utterly insane. Now, if it is accept-

able to our stranger, I would like to find out from him what the people in his country think

about these, and what names they use.

THEODORUS: What are you referring to?

SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman and philosopher.

THEODORUS: What do you want to ask? What exactly is puzzling you about them?

SOCRATES: This: whether they regard all of these as one or two, or, as the names imply, three, also

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SOPHIST – 216a–217a | 211

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Theaetetus 210d.

The anonymous stranger is from Elea, a city in western Italy, which was home to the pre-Socratic philosopher

Parmenides and his student Zeno.

Odyssey ix.270-271. The god of strangers is Zeus.

Odyssey xvii.485-487.

distinguishing three kinds and applying a name individually to each.

THEODORUS: Well, I don’t think that he is at all reluctant to give an account of these. But what

does our stranger say?

STRANGER: Just that, Theodorus. There is no reluctance at all, nor is there a problem stating that

my people believe there are three. But to define what exactly each of them is would not be

a simple or easy task.

THEODORUS: Well now, Socrates, by chance you have introduced questions much like those we

happened to be asking him before we came here, and he gave the same excuse to us at the

time as he gave to you just now. However, he does say that he has heard enough, in detail,

and has not forgotten it.

SOCRATES: Then, stranger, do not deny us the first favour we ask, and tell us this much. Do you

usually prefer to deliver a lengthy oration expressing what you wish to present to someone,

in your own way? Or do you work through questioning, as Parmenides once did in my pres-

ence, as he expounded glorious arguments when I was young, while he was, by then, quite

an elderly man indeed?

STRANGER: Well, Socrates, this interactive approach is easier with someone who converses mildly

and co-operatively, but otherwise it is better to do the talking oneself.

SOCRATES: Then you may select any member of the company you wish, for they will all respond

gently to you, though if you take my advice you will choose one of the young men –

Theaetetus here – or any of the others whom you prefer.

STRANGER: Socrates, I feel a certain shame now at our first encounter for not making conversation

based on short word-for-word exchanges instead of expounding a lengthy and prolonged

oration all by myself, or with a respondent, as though I were putting on an exhibition. In

fact, there is more to this than one might imagine from your question, and any account of

it must be an extremely lengthy one. Then again, it seems to me discourteous and uncivil

not to oblige you and these people, especially when you express it in this way. As for

Theaetetus, well I unreservedly accept him as a partner in discourse, based on my own pre-

vious conversation, and your present recommendation.

THEAETETUS: Go ahead, dear stranger, and, as Socrates says, you will be doing us all a favour.

STRANGER: There is probably no more to be said on these issues, and from now on the discussion

should be with you, Theaetetus. So, if the length of it causes problems, do not blame me

for that. Blame these friends of yours instead.

THEAETETUS: Well, at the moment I don’t think I shall give up on that account. However, if some-

thing like that does happen, we could involve Socrates here, the namesake of ‘the’ Socrates,

as he is the same age as I am, we train together, and he is well used to working with me.

STRANGER: Well said, and you can make that decision for yourself as the discussion proceeds. But

you and I should now investigate this together, beginning firstly, I believe, with the sophist,

searching and clarifying through argument what precisely he is. Indeed, at the moment our

only common possession is his name, though perhaps we have the function upon which we

both confer that name, privately within ourselves. But we should always come to agreement

on the issue itself through arguments rather than a mere name in the absence of argument.

We intend to investigate this kind, the sophist, but it is not the easiest thing in the world to

comprehend what precisely he is. Now, whenever major issues need to be worked out prop-

erly, everyone has traditionally agreed that in such circumstances we should practise first

with small and simple things before moving on to the greater. So now, Theaetetus, I am

advising us, in view of the difficulty and elusiveness of the sophistic kind, to practise the

method first on something simpler, unless you can suggest an easier way.

THEAETETUS: No, I cannot.

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STRANGER: In that case, do you want us to resort to some ordinary example, and attempt to position

it as a model for what’s more important?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Well then, what should we choose first as something minor and well known, and yet

having an account no shorter than the important items? What about an angler, since he is

readily recognisable to everyone without being of any great significance?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: Well, I hope he provides us with a method and an account that is suitable to our purposes.

THEAETETUS: That would be good.

STRANGER: Come on, let’s begin as follows. Tell me whether we should propose that he is a skilled

person or someone who is unskilled, but has some other power.

THEAETETUS: He is certainly not unskilled.

STRANGER: Well then, all skills belong basically to two forms.

THEAETETUS: How so?

STRANGER: Farming and the general care of any mortal creature, also the assembling or moulding

of what we call household goods, and the imitative skill, may all be most properly referred

to by a single name.

THEAETETUS: How? What is it?

STRANGER: When a person brings something into being which previously was not, we usually say

that he who brings it into being produces it, and whatever is brought into being is produced.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: And the power of everything we just mentioned is directed towards production.

THEAETETUS: That is indeed their direction.

STRANGER: Then we may refer to these by the general term ‘productive’.

THEAETETUS: We may.

STRANGER: Now, besides this, there is the whole form that includes learning, knowledge acquisition,

finance, sport and hunting. Although none of these actually manufacture anything, some

manipulate by speech and action what has come into being or already exists, while others

prevent anyone else from manipulating them. On this basis, all these subdivisions may very

properly be said to constitute an acquisitive skill.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that would be appropriate.

STRANGER: Then, since all skills are either productive or acquisitive, in which of the two should

we place angling, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: In the acquisitive. I suppose that is obvious.

STRANGER: But are there not two forms of the acquisitive, one being an exchange between willing

participants through gifts, hire or purchase, while the rest includes all manipulation based

upon word or deed, and this would be the manipulative skill?

THEAETETUS: It appears so anyway, from what has been said.

STRANGER: But what about this? Shouldn’t the manipulative skill be divided into two?

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: By designating all overt manipulation as competitive, and all manipulation by stealth

as hunting.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: However, it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting in two.

THEAETETUS: Tell me how.

STRANGER: By categorising it as the hunting of living or lifeless prey.

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SOPHIST – 218e–219e | 213

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This is a reference to the meeting and discussion depicted in Plato’s Parmenides.

THEAETETUS: Why yes, if there are indeed both.

STRANGER: How could there not be both? Though it is best to disregard the hunting of the inani-

mate, as it does not even have a name, except for certain parts of diving and other trifling

activities of that sort. However, we should refer to the hunting of living creatures as animal

hunting.

THEAETETUS: So be it.

STRANGER: Can’t we also say, properly speaking, that animal hunting is twofold in form? One kind

involving land animals is divided into many forms and names, while the other includes the

swimming creatures and is generally called water animal hunting.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Now, we observe that one class of swimming creatures has wings, while the other lives

in the water.

THEAETETUS: Obviously.

STRANGER: And the hunting of the winged kind is generally referred to as fowling, I suppose.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s what it’s called.

STRANGER: While the hunting of the water dwellers is, in general, termed fishing.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: What about this? Can’t we also divide this hunting again into two broad significant

parts?

THEAETETUS: Based upon what?

STRANGER: Based on whether they conduct the hunt with traps or by striking.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean? And how do you distinguish between these?

STRANGER: Well, whatever encloses something, and completely surrounds it to imprison it, may

properly be called a trap.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: So, baskets, nets, snares, nooses and the like must obviously be referred to as traps.

THEAETETUS: Indeed.

STRANGER: Then we shall say that this part of hunting is trapping, or something of that sort.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: But, Theaetetus, hunting effected by impact with hooks or tridents is different from

this, and should now be referred to by the single word ‘striking’, unless someone has a

better suggestion.

THEAETETUS: Let’s not bother about the name, this one will suffice.

STRANGER: Well, I believe that striking that occurs at night by firelight is referred to by the hunters

themselves as fire-hunting.

THEAETETUS: It is, indeed.

STRANGER: While striking conducted in daylight is generally termed barbing, as both the tridents

and the hooks are barbed at the tip.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s what it is called.

STRANGER: Now, this striking by barbing, when performed from above upon prey which is below,

is called tridentry, I believe, as it is usually done using tridents.

THEAETETUS: Well, that’s what some people call it.

STRANGER: However, there is, so to speak, only one form still left.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: The kind which delivers the blow which is opposite to the trident and is effected with

a hook, but not to any random part of the body of the fish, but always to the head and mouth

of the victim, pulling him upwards from below with rods or sticks. By what name shall we

say this process should be called, Theaetetus?

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THEAETETUS: Well, we proposed earlier that we needed to discover something, and I think our

search has just been concluded.

STRANGER: So, now you and I have come to agreement not just about the name of angling, but we

have also acquired a satisfactory account of the function itself. Indeed, from the totality of

skills, one half was acquisitive, half of the acquisitive was manipulative, and half of manip-

ulative was hunting. Half of hunting was animal-hunting, and half of animal-hunting was

water animal-hunting. The lower division of water animal-hunting was fishing, and half of

fishing was striking, and half of striking was barbing. Now, the barbing by a blow which

pulls upwards from below has a name which reflects this activity, and this is the angling

for which we have been seeking.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that has certainly been made abundantly clear.

STRANGER: Come now, let’s try to find out what exactly a sophist is, based upon this model.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Now, the first question we asked was whether we should regard the angler as an ordinary

man, or as someone with a skill.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And shall we now propose, Theaetetus, that this other man is an ordinary man, or in

truth utterly wise?

THEAETETUS: He is certainly not an ordinary man. However, I understand what you mean, as he

falls far short of the wisdom which his name implies.

STRANGER: But it seems we must propose that he has some skill.

THEAETETUS: Well, in that case, what precisely would it be?

STRANGER: By the gods, have we ignored the fact that this man is related to the other man?

THEAETETUS: Who is related to whom?

STRANGER: The angler to the sophist.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: To me they are both quite obviously hunters of some sort.

THEAETETUS: What is the hunt of the sophist? We have said what the other man hunts.

STRANGER: We somehow divided all hunting into two parts just now, one of swimming creatures

and the other of land creatures.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And we went on to discuss those swimming creatures who live in water, while we left

the land animals undivided, though we said there were many forms.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: So, beginning with the acquisitive skill, the sophist and the angler proceed together up

to this point.

THEAETETUS: So it seems, anyway.

STRANGER: However, they diverge when it comes to animal hunting, and one will hunt animals in

seas, rivers and lakes.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: While the other will hunt by land, and in quite different rivers of wealth and youth,

which are like abundant meadows, in order to manipulate the creatures in them.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

STRANGER: There are two significant parts of land animal hunting.

THEAETETUS: What are they?

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The Greek word for sophist is related to sophos, the word for wise, skilled, clever. Hence, a sophist is one who stakes

some claim to wisdom.

STRANGER: One is of the tame and the other of the wild.

THEAETETUS: Is there any hunting of tame animals?

STRANGER: Yes, if man is indeed a tame animal. But propose whatever you like, either that no ani-

mal is tame, or that some other animal is tame while man is wild, or that man is actually

tame but in your opinion there is no hunting of men whatsoever. Make whatever one of

these statements pleases you, and let that be our definition.

THEAETETUS: Well, I believe that we are tame creatures, and I say that there is hunting of men.

STRANGER: Let’s declare that tame animal hunting also has a twofold division.

THEAETETUS: On what basis is that said?

STRANGER: By defining piracy, enslavement, tyranny, and everything military under the single

heading of violent hunting.

THEAETETUS: Good.

STRANGER: And by then referring to skill in winning court cases, speaking to crowds, and general

conversation, all together, as the single skill of persuasion.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: Now, we should say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

THEAETETUS: What are they?

STRANGER: One operates in private, the other in public.

THEAETETUS: Yes, each of these does constitute a form.

STRANGER: Now, isn’t the hunting of private persons, for its part, either reward-accepting or gift-

bearing?

THEAETETUS: I do not understand.

STRANGER: It seems you have not yet paid attention to the hunting carried out by lovers.

THEAETETUS: To what aspect?

STRANGER: That besides everything else, they bestow gifts on those whom they hunt.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

STRANGER: Well, let this form then be called the skill of love.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: But the form which accepts reward converses for the sake of gratification, and lays its

bait entirely through pleasure, demanding only its own sustenance as a reward. And I think

we would all refer to this as flattery, a skill in making things pleasant.

THEAETETUS: Yes, what else could it be?

STRANGER: However, when it professes to carry on its discourse as though for the sake of excel-

lence, and exacts a financial reward, doesn’t that kind deserve a different name from the

previous one?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must.

STRANGER: What name? Try to say.

THEAETETUS: Well, it’s obvious. Indeed, we seem to me to have discovered the sophist. So, having

said that, I think I would be calling it by the appropriate name.

STRANGER: Then it seems, Theaetetus, based on the present account, that what must be referred to

as sophistry is an acquisitive skill of hunting live, land-dwelling prey, hunting humans pri-

vately for money payment, which seems to be educational, and is a hunt for rich and famous

young men. That is what our current argument concludes.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: Let’s take a further look at this. For what we are pursuing belongs to no ordinary skill

but to an extremely variegated one. And, indeed, in our previous deliberations, the appear-

ance is given that it is not what we are now saying it is, but is a different kind.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

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STRANGER: The acquisitive skill somehow was a twofold form, one part was hunting and the other

exchange.

THEAETETUS: It was, indeed.

STRANGER: Should we now declare that there are two forms of exchange, one based on gifts, the

other on purchase?

THEAETETUS: Let’s say so.

STRANGER: And we shall actually go on to say that purchasing is divided in two.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: By distinguishing between the sale of one’s own productions, which is ‘self-selling’,

and dealing in the productions of others, which is barter.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: What about this? Don’t we refer to barter within the city, which is roughly half of it, as

retailing?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And the barter between one city and another, by sale and purchase, as trading?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Have we not observed that there is trading which, in one case, exchanges for money

whatever sustains and provides for the body, and, in another case, whatever sustains and

provides for the soul?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean by that?

STRANGER: Perhaps we don’t recognise this in relation to the soul, though we do presumably under-

stand the other instance.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Well, let’s speak about music and skills in general, which are constantly going from

city to city, being bought in one place, brought somewhere else and sold. Paintings, enter-

tainments and much else besides are brought in and sold, some for the delight, others for

the more serious intent, of the soul. Now, a buyer or seller of these has as much right to be

called a trader as those who sell food and drink.

THEAETETUS: What you say is very true.

STRANGER: And shouldn’t a man who buys up items of knowledge, and goes from city to city

exchanging them for money, also be called by the same name?

THEAETETUS: Quite emphatically.

STRANGER: Now, one part of this trading for the benefit of the soul may properly be called exhibit-

ing, and the other part is just as ridiculous, but nevertheless, since it is the actual sale of

knowledge, it must be assigned a name relevant to this activity. Is this not so?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Therefore, the part of this knowledge-selling which relates to the subjects of the other

skills should be called that, while the part which deals with the subject of excellence should

be called something else.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Well, in the case of the other subjects, skill-selling would be an appropriate name. Now,

you must try to give the name of the part which deals with excellence.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, it is the very object of our search! What other name could you safely utter?

It is the sophistic kind.

STRANGER: None other. Come on, we shall summarise this now by saying that sophistry has made

its second appearance as part of the acquisitive skill, which exchanges by purchasing

through trading, which is for the benefit of the soul, and traffics in words and knowledge

concerning excellence.

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THEAETETUS: Exactly.

STRANGER: Actually, I think you have a third instance. For if one of them settled down in the city

and proposed to make a living by buying some knowledge, and also fabricating his own

knowledge on the same subjects, and making sales, presumably you would call him by the

exact same name as you used just now.

THEAETETUS: I would have to.

STRANGER: And so, the part of the acquisitive skill which involves exchange by purchasing, whether

by retailing or self-selling, in either case whatever involves selling knowledge in this way,

you would presumably refer to, always, as sophistic.

THEAETETUS: I must, for I need to keep following the argument.

STRANGER: Then let’s proceed to consider if the kind which we are pursuing actually bears a resem-

blance to something like this.

THEAETETUS: Like what?

STRANGER: We said that the acquisitive skill had a competitive part.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we did.

STRANGER: So, quite predictably, we divide it in two.

THEAETETUS: Tell me how it is done.

STRANGER: By designating one part as contentious and the other as combative.

THEAETETUS: That’s it.

STRANGER: Is it quite reasonable and appropriate then, to assign a name such as ‘violent’ to the

part of the combative which pitches bodies against one another?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And when it is one argument against another, what else can we call it, Theaetetus,

except disputatious?

THEAETETUS: Nothing.

STRANGER: And we should propose that the part concerned with disputes is twofold.

THEAETETUS: How so?

STRANGER: Well, when it is conducted in public, with one long speech opposing another, and the

concern is justice and injustice, then it is a judicial dispute.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: However, when it is done in private, and has been broken up into questions and answers,

is there anything else we usually call it except contradiction?

THEAETETUS: Nothing.

STRANGER: And the sort of contradiction which argues about contracts and proceeds at random and

without skill, this should be designated as a particular form, since the discussion recognises

it as separate. However, our predecessors never gave it a name, nor would it be worth our

while to do so now.

THEAETETUS: True, for it has such minute and multifarious sub-divisions.

STRANGER: But when it does involve a skill, and disputes comprehensively about justice itself and

injustice and about other matters, don’t we usually refer to it as argumentative?

THEAETETUS: What else could we call it?

STRANGER: Now, there is a form of the argumentative which wastes money, and a form which

makes money.

THEAETETUS: There certainly is.

STRANGER: Well, let’s try to say what names should be given to each of them.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we should do that.

STRANGER: Now, I think that when the pleasure of engaging in these leads to neglect of one’s own

affairs, and the speech affords no pleasure to the many people who hear it, then in my opin-

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ion it is nothing other than talkativeness.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s the sort of thing that is said about it.

STRANGER: Then, the opposite of this makes money from private arguments, and it is now your

turn to try to name it.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, what else can one say without falling into error, except that a wondrous crea-

ture has turned up again for the fourth time, the object of our pursuit, the sophist.

STRANGER: So, our argument has now revealed further that the sophist is none other than the money-

making kind, as it seems, belonging to the argumentative, contradictory, disputatious, com-

bative, competitive skill in acquisition.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Now do you see how true it is that this is a creature of many aspects who will not be

“captured with one hand”, as the saying goes?

THEAETETUS: Then we must use both!

STRANGER: Yes, we must. And we should do this to the best of our ability by pursuing a particular

mark of his. Tell me, then, do we have certain names for common household tasks?

THEAETETUS: Indeed there are many, but what sort of tasks are you asking about?

STRANGER: We refer to tasks such as filtering, sifting, sieving and winnowing.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: And in addition to these, there is dressing wool, spinning, adjusting the web, and we

know countless other such terms which are involved in the skills. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: What quality of them do you wish to demonstrate when you give these examples

and ask about them all?

STRANGER: All of these terms somehow refer to discrimination.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Then, according to my argument, we should assign one name to the single skill which

is involved in them all.

THEAETETUS: What shall we call it?

STRANGER: Discrimination.

THEAETETUS: So be it.

STRANGER: Well, let’s see if there is any way that we can proceed to discern two forms of this.

THEAETETUS: You are asking me to think very quickly.

STRANGER: And yet in the distinctions we described, one separated worse from better, another like

from like.

THEAETETUS: When you put it like that it appears so anyway.

STRANGER: Now, I do not have a name for the second one, but I do have a name for discrimination,

which leaves the better and discards the worse.

THEAETETUS: Say it.

STRANGER: All such discrimination is, as I understand it, referred to by everyone as purification.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s what it is called.

STRANGER: And couldn’t everyone see that purification has two forms?

THEAETETUS: Given time, perhaps. However it is not obvious to me at the moment.

STRANGER: Well, it is surely appropriate to comprehend the many forms of bodily purification

under a single name.

THEAETETUS: What are they? And what is this name?

STRANGER: There are those which apply to living creatures and effect purification within the body,

making proper divisions by means of gymnastics or medicine, and outside the body through

the process of bathing. These we regard as commonplace. There are also those affecting

inanimate things which are cared for by wool-dressing and adorning in general, and are

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given numerous trivial and apparently ridiculous names.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: They certainly are, Theaetetus. However, it is of no particular concern to the method

based on arguments, whether purification by washing or medication benefits us much or

little. For it endeavours to discern the inter-relation and non-relation of all the skills, with

the aim of acquiring intelligence, and to that end it respects them all equally. Indeed, because

of their similarity, this method does not believe that one is more ridiculous than another.

And it does not regard a person as more important if he exemplifies his skill in hunting

through generalship, rather than louse-catching, though it will probably regard him as more

pretentious.

Now, let’s go back to the question you asked. What name shall we assign to the col-

lective capacities whose function is to purify living and lifeless bodies? And it will make

no difference to this method whether the title sounds impressive or not, as long as it sepa-

rates out whatever purifies the soul, and combines whatever purifies anything else. Indeed,

if we do in fact understand its intention, this method has attempted to separate mental purifi-

cation from the others.

THEAETETUS: But I do understand, and I agree that there are indeed two forms of purification,

though one form is concerned with the soul, which is separate from the one concerned with

the body.

STRANGER: Really excellent! Now, listen to the next aspect, and try in turn to cut that form in two.

THEAETETUS: I shall try to make this division on whatever basis you suggest.

STRANGER: Do we say that vice in the soul is something different from excellence?

THEAETETUS: What else could we say?

STRANGER: And purification was the casting aside of whatever was in any way base, leaving the

other part.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it was.

STRANGER: So then, to whatever extent we discern any removal of badness from the soul, we may

properly refer to that process as purification.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: Now we should state that there are two forms of badness of the soul.

THEAETETUS: What are they?

STRANGER: One is like a disease in the body, while the other is like a deformity that arises.

THEAETETUS: I do not understand.

STRANGER: Perhaps you think that disease and discord are not the same?

THEAETETUS: Again, I do not know how to respond to this.

STRANGER: Do you believe that discord is anything other than disagreement, born of some corrup-

tion, among naturally kindred elements?

THEAETETUS: Nothing other.

STRANGER: And is deformity anything other than the absence of measure, a characteristic which is

ugly in every case?

THEAETETUS: Nothing else.

STRANGER: What about this? In the souls of base people, don’t we observe that opinions are opposed

by desires, spirit by pleasures, and reason by aversions, and that all these are opposed to

one another?

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: However, all of these are necessarily kindred.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: So, we shall be right in referring to vice as discord and disease of the soul.

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THEAETETUS: Absolutely right.

STRANGER: What about this? If things that partake of motion and have been assigned some target

wander off that target with every attempt, and miss the mark, would we say that this happens

to them through proper measure in relation to one another, or alternatively through lack of

measure?

THEAETETUS: Obviously through lack of measure.

STRANGER: Now, we do know that any soul which is ignorant of anything is ignorant unwillingly.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: And, indeed, ignorance is nothing but the disordered thinking of a soul, intent upon

truth, whose understanding goes astray.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: So we must propose that an ignorant soul is deformed and lacking in measure.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

STRANGER: Now, there are, it appears, two kinds of badness in the soul. One, which most people

call vice, is clearly a disease of the soul.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: The other they call ignorance, but they are unwilling to agree that it is a badness arising

only in the soul.

THEAETETUS: It certainly should be conceded, though I doubted it now when you said that there

are two kinds of badness in the soul, and that cowardice, lack of restraint, and injustice

should all be regarded as a disease within us, while the many varieties of ignorance should

be designated as deformity.

STRANGER: Now, in the case of the body, aren’t there two skills relating to the two conditions?

THEAETETUS: What are the two?

STRANGER: Gymnastic for deformity and medicine for disease.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

STRANGER: And when it comes to violence, injustice and cowardice, surely punishment is the skill

which is naturally closer to justice than any other?

THEAETETUS: Quite likely. At least that’s what people think.

STRANGER: What about the other case? Could anyone prescribe anything more appropriate than

teaching to remedy ignorance in its entirety?

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

STRANGER: Come now. Should we say that there is only one kind of teaching, or are there more,

two of which are the most significant? Consider this.

THEAETETUS: I am considering it.

STRANGER: Well, I think the quickest way for us to find out would be as follows.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: By seeing whether ignorance has somehow got a division in the middle of it. For if it

is twofold, it is obvious that teaching must also have two parts, one corresponding to each

kind of ignorance.

THEAETETUS: Yes, but is the division we are now looking for becoming evident to you?

STRANGER: Well, I think I can discern a distinct form of ignorance which is extensive and prob-

lematic, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: Being of the opinion that you know something when you do not know. It is likely that

this is how all mistaken thinking arises in everyone.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: And, indeed, it is only this form of ignorance which is given the name of foolishness.

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SOPHIST – 228c–229c | 221

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Now then, what should we call the part of teaching which does away with this foolish-

ness?

THEAETETUS: Well, stranger, I believe that the other part of it is called technical instruction, while

this part, among ourselves in the city at any rate, is called education.

STRANGER: Almost all the Greeks do the same, Theaetetus. However, we shall still need to consider

whether education is completely indivisible, or has some subdivision worth naming.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we should consider that.

STRANGER: It seems to me that there is a way of dividing this further.

THEAETETUS: On what basis?

STRANGER: There seems to be a part of teaching in discourse, which is a rougher method, and

another one, which is smoother.

THEAETETUS: Can we say what sort of methods they are?

STRANGER: Well, there is the traditional method which fathers use towards their sons, a method

still used by many today whereby they either get angry with them whenever they fall into

error, or else resort to more gentle exhortation. This may in general most correctly be called

didactic.

THEAETETUS: So it is.

STRANGER: However some people, having considered this for themselves, seem to conclude that

all ignorance is involuntary, that no one who thinks that he is wise will ever wish to learn

about matters of which he thinks himself knowledgeable, and that after a lot of trouble, the

didactic form of education accomplishes little.

THEAETETUS: A correct conclusion.

STRANGER: Accordingly, they set about the eradication of this opinion in another way.

THEAETETUS: What way?

STRANGER: They question him on matters about which he believes he is talking sense, when he is

talking nonsense. They readily discover that his opinions are quite confused. So, by argu-

ments, they gather the opinions together and place them side by side, and then they show

him that these contradict themselves, about the same issues, in the same ways, and on the

same basis. And those who recognise this become angry with themselves and gentle towards

others, and they are liberated by this method from their exalted and fixed views about them-

selves. Their liberation brings the greatest delight to those who hear it, and constancy to

those who experience it.

Indeed, dear child, the physicians of the body recognise that the body derives no

benefit from any food it is offered until the internal impediments are first removed. So too

these purifiers of the soul understand that the soul will obtain no advantage from any learn-

ing which it is offered until someone resorts to refutation, and brings the man who is

refuted to a condition of humility where the impediments to learning have been removed,

he is rendered pure, and he thinks that he knows only what he does actually know, and

nothing more.

THEAETETUS: And this is surely the best and most sound-minded condition to be in.

STRANGER: Now, on account of all this, Theaetetus, we must also state that refutation is the greatest

and most powerful of purifications, and we must realise that the unrefuted man, even if he

happens to be the Great King,

is utterly unpurified, and is both uneducated and deformed,

where a man who intends to be truly happy should be most pure and good.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: Well then, what shall we call those who employ this skill? Indeed, I am afraid to say

sophists.

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222 | SOPHIST – 229d–231a

THEAETETUS: Why is that?

STRANGER: In case I assign them too much honour.

THEAETETUS: But surely the people we are discussing bear some resemblance to sophists.

STRANGER: Yes, and so does a wolf to a dog, the fiercest animal to the tamest. And a cautious man

must always be on his guard, especially when dealing with resemblances, for they are a

most slippery class. Anyway, let them be called sophists, for I don’t think that disputes over

minor distinctions will arise once people are sufficiently vigilant.

THEAETETUS: No, it is quite unlikely.

STRANGER: So let there be a purificatory part of the skill of discrimination, and from purification

let us separate out the part which deals with the soul. Let teaching be part of this, and let

education be part of teaching, and let us say that the part of education which brings about

refutation of a vain presumption to wisdom turns out in our present argument to be nothing

other than the noble kind of sophistry.

THEAETETUS: Well, let’s say so. But on account of the multiplicity of manifestations, I am now

perplexed about what exactly I should say that the sophist really is with any confidence

that I am speaking the truth.

STRANGER: Your perplexity is to be expected. But you must also appreciate that the man himself is

intensely perplexed by now as to how he will continue to evade this argument. Indeed, the

proverb is right in saying that “it is not easy to escape all the grips of the wrestler”. So now

is the very best moment, and we must set upon him.

THEAETETUS: Well said.

STRANGER: Well, now that we have stopped, let’s catch our breath first, and while we are resting

let’scount up for ourselves how many times the sophist has appeared to us. Now, I think he

was first discovered as the paid hunter of the young and wealthy.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And secondly as a trader in things which are learned by the soul.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: And didn’t he appear for the third time as a retailer of the same things?

THEAETETUS: Yes, and for the fourth time selling his own knowledge himself.

STRANGER: Your recollection is correct. Now I shall try to remember the fifth. Indeed, he was a

contestant in verbal competitiveness, specialising in the argumentative skill.

THEAETETUS: He was, indeed.

STRANGER: Well, although the sixth was actually disputed, we agreed nevertheless to propose that

he is a purifier of souls from opinions that are an impediment to learning.

THEAETETUS: Yes, entirely so.

STRANGER: Well, do you appreciate that when someone appears knowledgeable about many subjects

but is called by the name of a single skill, this appearance is not sound. Rather, it is obvious

that whoever experiences this in relation to any skill is unable to discern clearly that aspect

of the skill that all these understandings look to. Consequently he assigns multiple names,

rather than one, to whoever possesses them.

THEAETETUS: It’s likely that this happens in exactly the way you describe.

STRANGER: Let’s ensure that it does not happen to us in our search, due to laziness. Rather, let us

first take one of the statements about the sophist again, as there was one which did seem

particularly revealing to me.

THEAETETUS: Which one?

STRANGER: We said that he was a contradictor.

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–––––

The Great King traditionally referred to the King of the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: What else? Isn’t he also a teacher of others, in this particular skill?

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.

STRANGER: Let’s consider this. In what realm do these men claim that they can turn people into

contradictors? Our enquiry should begin as follows. Do they render people competent in

contradicting about the divine realm which is unmanifest to the multitude?

THEAETETUS: Well that is what people say, anyway.

STRANGER: And what about the manifest realm of earth and sky, and the subjects associated with

them?

THEAETETUS: These too.

STRANGER: In fact, whenever something is said in private gatherings concerning the entire field of

becoming or being, we are aware, aren’t we, that these men are brilliant at arguing against

it, and they enable others to do the same.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: And again, don’t they also promise to enable people to dispute about laws, and affairs

of state in general?

THEAETETUS: Indeed, no one, or hardly anyone, would converse with them unless they made that

promise.

STRANGER: Indeed, for each and every skill, what is needed in each case to argue against the prac-

titioner himself has presumably been composed, written down, and published for anyone

who wishes to learn.

THEAETETUS: You seem to me to be referring to the writings of Protagoras,

on wrestling and the

other subjects.

STRANGER: And of many others besides, blessed man. However, doesn’t this skill in contradiction

seem, in short, to be a power which is up to the task of disputation on all subjects.

THEAETETUS: Well, there is nothing it seems to leave out.

STRANGER: Well, by the gods, child, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young people

may view this matter with more insight, while we older men are more dim.

THEAETETUS: What matter? What exactly are you referring to? I do not quite understand what you

are asking me now.

STRANGER: Whether it is possible for a human being to know all things.

THEAETETUS: In that case, stranger, the human race would indeed be blessed.

STRANGER: Then how could someone who is not knowledgeable himself ever say anything worth-

while when he contradicts a person who knows?

THEAETETUS: He simply cannot do so.

STRANGER: Well, what on earth can this wondrous sophistic power be?

THEAETETUS: Wondrous in what way?

STRANGER: In the way that they are somehow able to arm young people with the belief that they

are wiser than everyone about everything. For it is obvious that if the sophists neither con-

tradicted properly nor gave that appearance to the young, or again if they did give that

appearance but were not regarded as more learned due to this disputatiousness, then

according to you hardly anyone would want to pay money to become their pupils in these

subjects.

THEAETETUS: Hardly anyone indeed.

STRANGER: But nowadays they want to do this.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: Presumably because the sophists are believed to be knowledgeable themselves with

regard to whatever they contradict.

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THEAETETUS: That must be so.

STRANGER: And are we saying that they may contradict every proposition?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: So they will appear to their pupils to be wise about everything.

THEAETETUS: They must.

STRANGER: But they are not, for this turned out to be impossible.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must be impossible.

STRANGER: So our sophist has turned out to have an opinion-based knowledge about everything,

but not truth.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly. And what we are now saying is probably the most accurate thing we

have said about these fellows.

STRANGER: Well, let’s take a clearer example of this.

THEAETETUS: What sort of example?

STRANGER: As follows. Apply your mind to this and try to answer really well.

THEAETETUS: Answer what?

STRANGER: If someone were to maintain that on account of a single skill he knew not how to speak

and argue, but how to do and make everything there is...

THEAETETUS: What do you mean by everything?

STRANGER: You immediately fail to understand the point of what was said. In fact, it seems you do

not understand the phrase ‘everything there is’.

THEAETETUS: No, I do not.

STRANGER: Well, I am saying that you and I are included in ‘everything’, as well as all the other

animals and plants.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

STRANGER: If someone said he was going to make you and me, and all the other creatures...

THEAETETUS: What could he mean by ‘making’? Indeed, you are not actually referring to some

sort of farmer, since you are also talking about a maker of animals.

STRANGER: And also of sea and earth, sky and gods, and everything else there is. What’s more, he

makes them quickly and sells each of them for very little money.

THEAETETUS: You are describing some sort of game.

STRANGER: Indeed. Mustn’t you regard it as a game when someone says that he knows everything

and would teach this to someone else for a small sum in a short time?

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: And do you know of any form of game more skilled and elegant than that of imitation?

THEAETETUS: Not at all. Indeed, you have proposed a very extensive form, all captured in a single

word, more diverse than almost anything else.

STRANGER: And so we appreciate that a man who professes to be able to make everything by means

of a single skill, will be able to make imitations with the same names as the real objects by

means of the skill in painting, and to deceive the less intelligent of the young children, who

view the paintings from afar, into believing that he is entirely competent to complete any

task he wishes.

THEAETETUS: How could he fail?

STRANGER: Now, shouldn’t we presume that there is some other skill involving words by which

one could beguile the young through their ears with words, while they are still at a far

remove from matters of truth, showing them verbal images of everything so as to make the

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SOPHIST – 233d–234c | 225

–––––

Protagoras was a famous sophist. He is immortalised in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, and his relativist philosophy is

considered extensively in the first part of Plato’s Theaetetus

statements seem true, and the speaker seem the wisest of all men on every issue?

THEAETETUS: Yes, there would be another skill like this, wouldn’t there?

STRANGER: Now, Theaetetus, most of those when they hear this, must, given enough time and

advance in years, encounter things that are, and be compelled through their experiences to

get a clear apprehension of things that are. This changes the opinions they once held, so

that what was significant will appear trivial and what was easy will appear difficult, and all

the illusions created by words will be turned completely upside down by the practical sit-

uations which they encounter. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: Yes, as far as I can judge at my age anyway. But I believe that I am one of those who

are “still at a far remove from matters of truth”.

STRANGER: In that case, all of us here will try, and indeed are trying, to draw you as close as possible

to the truth in the absence of these experiences. So now, tell me something about the sophist.

Is it clear by now that he is a sort of beguiler who imitates things that are, or are we still

hesitating, in case he truly possesses as many items of knowledge as the number of subjects

on which he seems to be able to practise contradiction?

THEAETETUS: How could he, stranger? No. It is fairly clear by now from what has been said, that

he is one of the huge number of people involved in entertainment.

STRANGER: Well, in that case, we should propose that he is a beguiler and a sort of imitator.

THEAETETUS: What else could we propose?

STRANGER: Come now, our task at this stage is to make sure that the creature does not get away.

Indeed, we have almost captured him in a sort of web of devices involving our statements

about these matters. Consequently, he will never escape the next proposal.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: That he is someone who belongs to the wonder-working kind.

THEAETETUS: And I agree with that statement about him at least.

STRANGER: It is accepted then that we should divide the image-making skill immediately, and

descend into it, and if the sophist opposes us there, arrest him on the orders of lordly reason,

hand him over to that king, and publicise his capture. But if he should somehow dive down

into the subdivisions of the skill of imitation, we shall follow along, and continually divide

the part which contains him until he has been caught. There is no way that this, or any other

kind, will ever boast of escaping the method of those who are thus able to proceed in this

way, based upon both the particular and the general.

THEAETETUS: Well said! We should do as you say.

STRANGER: Now, based upon the process of division we have been using, it seems to me that I can

now discern two forms of imitative skill, but I don’t think that I can yet figure out which of

them contains the object of our search.

THEAETETUS: You should first say what the two forms are, and then make the division for us.

STRANGER: I can see one skill within it, the skill in making imitations. This is most in evidence

when someone produces the imitation according to the proportions of length, breadth and

depth of the original, with the appropriate colours being assigned to each part.

THEAETETUS: Yes, but isn’t that what all imitators try to do?

STRANGER: Not in the case of those who somehow fashion or draw huge works of art. Indeed, if

they were to give true proportions to the limbs, you know that the upper parts would appear

smaller than they should and the lower parts larger, because one is viewed from a distance

and the other from close up.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: So these craftsmen nowadays set the truth aside, and fashion into their images not the

actual proportions, but those which will seem to be beautiful, do they not?

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THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: So, in the first case, where it is different but like, is it fair to call it a likeness?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And the part of the skill of imitation that deals with this should be called what we called

it before, likeness-making.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it should be called that.

STRANGER: But what about something that appears to resemble the beautiful, because the viewpoint

is unfavourable, but is not like what it is said to be like, once someone is able to get a proper

view of such an object? What should we call this? Well, since it appears to be like, though

it is unlike, should we call it an appearance?

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.

STRANGER: And isn’t this very common in painting, and in imitation generally?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: And wouldn’t it be best if we referred to the skill which produces appearances rather

than likenesses as appearance-making?

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: Now, these are the two forms of image-making I was talking about – likeness-making

and appearance-making.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: And yet, even now I am not able to see an obvious solution to the issue that bothered

me earlier, in which of these two should the sophist be placed. Yes, the man is really won-

drous, and extremely hard to catch clear sight of, since even now he has taken refuge very

nicely and cleverly in a form which is hard to examine thoroughly.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

STRANGER: Now, are you agreeing because you recognise this, or have you been drawn along by

the force of the argument to agree quickly out of habit?

THEAETETUS: How? What are you referring to?

STRANGER: We really are involved in an extremely difficult investigation, my friend. Indeed this

appearing, and seeming without being, and saying things which are not actually true, all

these are now full of difficulties, and they always have been. For it is extremely difficult,

Theaetetus, to maintain that there really is false speech and false thinking, without being

involved in contradictions as soon as this is said.

THEAETETUS: What contradictions?

STRANGER: This statement has dared to propose that what is not, is. For otherwise falsehood would

not have come into being. But, my boy, beginning when we were children up until his death,

the great Parmenides emphasised this to us, stating in prose what he also says in verse.

“Never shall this be proved that things that are not, are,

but do thou, in thine enquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.”

So that is the testimony of the great man. But in fact, the statement itself would reveal most

if it were probed moderately. So first let’s spend a while looking at this, if it makes no dif-

ference to you.

THEAETETUS: I accept anything you propose. So just proceed by considering how the argument

may best unfold, and lead me also along that path.

STRANGER: Well, that’s what must be done. So tell me, would we dare to use the expression ‘that

which in no way is’?

THEAETETUS: Well, why not?

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Parmenides, Fragment 7, II.1-2. These lines are quoted again at 258d with a minor variation.

STRANGER: If one of his pupils who had considered this were asked, not for the sake of argument

or sport, but seriously, to tell us to what the expression ‘what is not’ should be applied, what

do we think he would say? To what sort of thing would he apply the phrase himself? To

what would he apply it, and how would he explain this to the questioner?

THEAETETUS: You have asked a difficult question, and it is almost completely impossible for some-

one like me to answer it.

STRANGER: Well, isn’t it obvious in any case that the term ‘what is not’ may not be applied to any

of the things that are?

THEAETETUS: No, how could it?

STRANGER: Then, since it is not actually applicable to what is, neither may it be applied to some-

thing.

THEAETETUS: Indeed not.

STRANGER: And presumably it is clear to us that we always use the word ‘something’ in relation to

what is, for it is impossible to use this word on its own, naked and isolated from all of the

things that are. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it’s impossible.

STRANGER: Do you agree because you recognise that when speaking of ‘something’ we must be

speaking of some one thing?

THEAETETUS: That’s right.

STRANGER: Yes, indeed. And you will agree that ‘some thing’ indicates one, and ‘some things’ indi-

cates two or many.

THEAETETUS: How could I disagree?

STRANGER: Well then, when not speaking of something, it is most necessary, it seems, that we are

speaking of absolutely nothing.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it is most necessary.

STRANGER: Could we ever agree that such a person is speaking at all, when he is speaking of noth-

ing? No, we should not even say that a man is speaking when he tries to utter what is not.

THEAETETUS: This argument should end our perplexity anyway.

STRANGER: Don’t make extravagant claims yet, my friend, for there are other perplexities. Indeed,

the greatest and first of them actually relates to the very principle involved here.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean? Speak, and do not hesitate at all.

STRANGER: If we take something that is, I presume we may add to it something else that is.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: But shall we say that it is ever possible to add anything which is, to what is not?

THEAETETUS: No, how could we?

STRANGER: Now, we include number in general among things that are.

THEAETETUS: Well, if we propose that anything is, we must surely propose that number is.

STRANGER: Therefore we should not even attempt to apply number, be it multiple or be it one, to

‘what is not’.

THEAETETUS: Well, the argument does seem to indicate that it would not be appropriate to attempt

this.

STRANGER: How, then, could anyone either utter through the mouth, or in any way comprehend in

thought, things that are not, or what is not, in the absence of number?

THEAETETUS: Tell me why not.

STRANGER: Well, whenever we say ‘things that are not’, aren’t we trying to attribute multiplicity

of number to them?

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.

STRANGER: But whenever we say ‘what is not’, we attribute one in that case, do we not?

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THEAETETUS: Well, that is very clear, anyway.

STRANGER: And yet we have been saying that it is neither proper nor correct to try to attach being

to non-being.

THEAETETUS: What you are saying is perfectly true.

STRANGER: Do you appreciate then that it is not possible to utter correctly, or speak of or think of

non-being just by itself? It is rather unthinkable, unspeakable and unutterable, and there is

no account thereof.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: In that case, wasn’t I mistaken earlier when I said that I was going to state the greatest

perplexity involved here, when another even greater perplexity may be stated?

THEAETETUS: What perplexity?

STRANGER: You surprise me! Do you not realise from what has already been said, that ‘what is not’

reduces even the person who tries to refute it to such perplexity that it forces him to con-

tradict himself on the issue?

THEAETETUS: What are you saying? Make this a bit clearer.

STRANGER: Don’t look to me for clarity. For although I am proposing that what is not must partake

neither of one nor of many, I said, both then and now, that it is one, for I said ‘what is not’.

Do you understand?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And what’s more, I actually said a little earlier that it is unutterable, unspeakable, and

there is no account thereof. Do you follow?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of course.

STRANGER: So in trying to associate ‘being’ with this, am I not contradicting what I said before?

THEAETETUS: It appears that you are.

STRANGER: Then again, when I applied the word ‘that’ to it, wasn’t I referring to it as one?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And, indeed, in saying that there is ‘no word’ for it, and it is ‘unspeakable’ and ‘unut-

terable’, I used a statement that implies one.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: And yet we say that properly speaking it should not be defined as one, or many, or be

called ‘it’ at all, for the use of this phrase would attribute the form of one.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: Well, what is to be said about me? It turns out that the refutation of non-being is again

defeating me. So, as I said, we should not look to my pronouncements for the correct man-

ner of speaking about ‘what is not’. Instead, let it be your turn, and let’s consider what

you say.

THEAETETUS: What are you referring to?

STRANGER: Since you are young, you should come before us, fair and noble, exert yourself, and

try your very best to make some correct utterance about this without attributing being, or

one, or numerical multiplicity to what is not.

THEAETETUS: It would be strange if I had any great desire to attempt this myself in the light of

what has happened to you.

STRANGER: Well, if that’s what you think, then let’s forget about you and me. Until we encounter

someone who can do what I asked you to do, we should say that the sophist has very cun-

ningly dived down into a place we cannot enter.

THEAETETUS: That is certainly how it seems.

STRANGER: Well, in that case, if we say that he has some skill which involves appearances, he will

readily attack us for this usage of words, and turn those words against us by asking what

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SOPHIST – 238d–239d | 229

precisely we mean at all by ‘image’ when we refer to him as an image-maker. So consider,

Theaetetus, how we should respond to this impetuous questioning.

THEAETETUS: Obviously we are talking about images both in water and in mirrors, and also paint-

ings, sculptures, and all the other varied productions of this sort.

STRANGER: Apparently, Theaetetus, you have never seen a sophist.

THEAETETUS: Why do you say that?

STRANGER: He will have you thinking that his eyes are shut or that he has no eyes.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: If you were to answer him in that way and refer to mirror images or fashioned images,

he would laugh at your words for speaking as though he was a man who could see. He

would pretend that he recognised neither mirror nor water, nor had any sight at all, and

would just ask you something about your words.

THEAETETUS: What would he ask about?

STRANGER: In all these instances, and you say that there are many, you decided to employ a single

word, and you used the word ‘image’ as one term applicable to all the instances. So defend

this. Speak, and do not yield any ground to this fellow.

THEAETETUS: Well, stranger, what else can we say an image is except another sort of object made

like the true object?

STRANGER: Are you speaking of another sort of true object? Or what do you mean by ‘sort of

object’?

THEAETETUS: It is not true at all, but like the true.

STRANGER: Are you saying that the true object actually is?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: And what about this? Is the not true opposite to the true?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: So, are you saying that the likeness actually is not, if you say that it is not true?

THEAETETUS: Yet somehow or other it is.

STRANGER: Though you are not saying that it truly is.

THEAETETUS: Indeed not. However, it is actually an image.

STRANGER: So, while it actually is not, it is actually what we call an image.

THEAETETUS: It really seems that something like this combines what is with what is not, and is

very strange.

STRANGER: Indeed, how could it be otherwise? And now you may see that our many-headed sophist,

by means of this interchanging, has compelled us against our will to agree that what is not

somehow is.

THEAETETUS: I see it, indeed.

STRANGER: And now, shall we be able to define this skill of his without contradicting ourselves?

THEAETETUS: In what way? What sort of contradictions are you afraid of?

STRANGER: Whenever we say that he is deceiving us about the appearance, and his skill is one of

falsification, shall we say that our souls form false opinion at that time, on account of the

skill of this man? Or what precisely shall we say?

THEAETETUS: That’s it! What else could we say?

STRANGER: What’s more, false opinion will be thinking the opposite of things that are. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: Just so. It will be thinking their opposite.

STRANGER: So are you saying that false opinion thinks things that are not?

THEAETETUS: It must.

STRANGER: Does it think that things that are not, are not? Or does it think that things that are not at

all, somehow are?

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230 | SOPHIST – 239e–240e

THEAETETUS: Things that are not must somehow be, if anyone is ever to speak falsely, even a

little.

STRANGER: What about this? Doesn’t false opinion also think that things that entirely are, are not

at all?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And this too is false?

THEAETETUS: This too.

STRANGER: And so I presume, on this basis, a statement will be considered false if it says that things

that are, are not, or that things that are not, are.

THEAETETUS: Yes, how else could a statement of this sort arise?

STRANGER: Hardly at all, but the sophist will deny this. Or is there any way that a right-minded

person would accept these formulations in the light of what we agreed before? Do we under-

stand what agreements are meant, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Indeed, how could we fail to understand? He will claim that we are saying the oppo-

site of what we said a moment ago, once we dare to state that there is falsity both in opinions

and based upon words. For we are constantly compelled to associate what is with what is

not, despite having agreed just now that this is utterly impossible.

STRANGER: Your recollection is correct. But now we really must consider what to do about the

sophist. For you see that we are well supplied with many objections and perplexities, once

we propose to track him down in the skill of falsification and beguilement.

THEAETETUS: I do, indeed.

STRANGER: And we have elaborated only a small portion of the problems which are almost limitless.

THEAETETUS: Well, if that is the case, it would seem to be impossible to capture the sophist.

STRANGER: What next? Shall we become cowards, and give up now?

THEAETETUS: I say that we should not do that if we are somehow able to get even the slightest grip

on this fellow.

STRANGER: Then you will have to be quite forgiving, and, as you have just said, be satisfied if we

can somehow make even minor inroads against such a powerful argument.

THEAETETUS: How could I refuse?

STRANGER: In that case, I have a further request of you.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: Do not presume that I am becoming some sort of parricide.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

STRANGER: It will be necessary in defending ourselves to probe the statement of Parmenides, our

father, and force the assertion that in some respect what is not, is, and again what is, in

some way, is not.

THEAETETUS: It is evident that some such contention must feature in these discussions.

STRANGER: Yes, mustn’t this be evident even to a blind man, as they say? For if these statements

are neither refuted nor accepted, it will hardly be possible for someone to speak about false

statements or false opinions being either images, likenesses, imitations or appearances – or

to speak of any skills associated with them – without looking ridiculous by being forced to

contradict himself.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

STRANGER: Well, for these reasons we must dare to attack the paternal maxim. Or if some scruple

hinders us from doing this, we should abandon the matter entirely.

THEAETETUS: Well, this should not hinder us at all.

STRANGER: Then I shall still make a third small request of you.

THEAETETUS: Just name it.

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SOPHIST – 241a–242a | 231

STRANGER: When I spoke just now, I indicated that I have always been daunted by the refutation

of these, and this is especially so right now.

THEAETETUS: You did say that.

STRANGER: Now, I am afraid that because of what I have said, you will think that I am mad for

changing my stance back and forth. After all, we are taking on the refutation of the propo-

sition

for your sake, if we do actually refute it.

THEAETETUS: Well, in my opinion, there is no problem at all if you embark upon this refutation

and proof. Have no concern on my account.

STRANGER: Come now, where should one begin this audacious discourse? Indeed, my boy, I think

that there is a certain inevitable path for us to follow.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: We should first investigate the matters that seem clear to us now, in case we have some-

how been confused about them, and yet agree with one another as readily as though we had

a good understanding.

THEAETETUS: Explain your meaning more clearly.

STRANGER: It seems to me that Parmenides has conversed with us quite casually, and so has anyone

who has ever set about specifying how many, and of what sort, are things that are.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: Each of them appears to me to be telling us a story, as though we were children. One

says that things that are, are threefold, and some of them on occasion conduct some sort of

battle with one another, and at other times become friends, marry, have children and look

after their offspring. Another says there are two factors, wet and dry or hot and cold, and

he sets up a household for them and marries them off, while we Eleatic folk, beginning

with Xenophanes or even earlier, recount our stories as though what we refer to as ‘all

things’ are actually one. But some Ionian and, later, some Sicilian Muses consider it safest

to combine both stories, and say that what is, is both many and one, and is held together by

enmity and friendship.

“Though it is separating, it is continually combining”, say the more

severe of these Muses.

But the milder ones relaxed the requirement that it always be this

way, and they say that it alternates, and that the all is sometimes one and is friendly on

account of Aphrodite, at other times it is many and at war with itself due to some strife.

Now, some of these men may have spoken the truth in all this, or they may not, though it

is difficult and problematic to attribute such a serious failing to famous men of old. But we

can say one thing without reproach.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: That they have shown no regard for common folk, and they despise us. For each of

them pursues his own line of argument without considering at all whether we are following

what they say or are being left behind.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

STRANGER: Whenever one of them speaks and says that many or one or two is, or has become, or

is becoming; or again, that heat is mixed with cold; or elsewhere proposes divisions and

combinations; by the gods, Theaetetus, can you ever understand what they are saying?

Indeed, when I was younger and someone mentioned what is not – the phrase that is puz-

zling us now – I thought I understood perfectly. But you see now just how perplexed we

are about this issue.

THEAETETUS: I see.

STRANGER: But when it comes to ‘what is’, the soul may well be in the grip of a similar predicament.

We profess to be unconcerned about this and to understand this and not the other whenever

someone mentions it, yet we may be equally perplexed about both.

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232 | SOPHIST – 242b–243c

THEAETETUS: Quite likely.

STRANGER: And, indeed, the same may be said of anything else we discussed previously.

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.

STRANGER: Well, we shall consider all those other matters later on, if you wish. But we must now

investigate the important, fundamental and primary issue.

THEAETETUS: Which one do you mean? Or is it obvious that you are saying that we must first

examine ‘what is’, and what exactly those who use the phrase think that it indicates?

STRANGER: You have understood precisely, Theaetetus. For I am saying that this is indeed the

approach we should adopt. We should resort to close questioning, as though the men were

actually present, and say, “Come on, all you who say that hot and cold, or any pairs like

that, are all things. What precisely are you attributing to both when you say that both are

and each is? What should we understand by this ‘is’ of yours? Is it a third factor in addition

to the other two, and should we propose on your behalf that the all is no longer two but

three? For presumably you do not take one of the pair and call it being, and say that both

of them equally ‘are’, for in either case they would effectively be one and not two.”

THEAETETUS: What you say is true.

STRANGER: “Well then, do you want to call the pair of them being?”

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

STRANGER: Then we shall say, “But, friends, even with this formulation you would be stating unam-

biguously that the two are one.”

THEAETETUS: What you have said is absolutely correct.

STRANGER: “Now, since we have become perplexed, you must clarify adequately, to our satisfaction,

what precisely you wish to indicate whenever you use the word ‘being’. For you have obvi-

ously known this all along, while we thought that we knew at one stage but have now

become perplexed. So, explain this point to us first so that we may not presume to under-

stand your doctrines when the very opposite is the case.” Surely there would be nothing

wrong, child, in saying these things, and putting them to these men, and to anyone else who

maintains that all is more than one?

THEAETETUS: Not in the least.

STRANGER: And what about those who say that the all is one? Shouldn’t we find out, as best we

can, what precisely they mean by ‘being’?

THEAETETUS: How could we do otherwise?

STRANGER: Then let them answer this question. “Do you say that one alone is?” To which they will

reply, “We do say so”, won’t they?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: “And is there something which you call being?”

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: “And is it what you call one? Are you using two names for the same thing, or how does

this work?”

THEAETETUS: What answer will they give next, stranger?

STRANGER: Obviously, Theaetetus, it is not at all easy for someone who has proposed this hypothesis

to respond to what we have just asked, or any other question for that matter.

THEAETETUS: Why so?

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SOPHIST – 243d–244c | 233

–––––

This, and the ‘paternal maxim’ mentioned just above, refer to the statement of Parmenides’ quoted at 237a.

Heraclitus, who maintained that all things were in permanent tension, was from Ionia. Empedocles was from Sicily.

According to him, the elemental things included Love and Strife, alongside fire, air, water and earth.

Heraclitus, Fragment 51.

STRANGER: Well, to agree that there are two names when you have proposed that there is nothing

except one, is presumably ridiculous.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must be.

STRANGER: And it would be altogether ridiculous to accept the assertion that there is a name, when

it does not possess an account.

THEAETETUS: What is ridiculous about it?

STRANGER: Well, in proposing that the name is different from the object, he is presumably referring

to two things.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And, indeed, should he propose that the name is the same as the object, he will either

be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or he will say it is the name of something,

and the name will turn out to be the name of a name and of nothing else.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: And the one will be the name of one, as there is only one, and also the one of the name.

THEAETETUS: It must be.

STRANGER: What about this? Is the whole different from what is one, or will they say it is the same

as this?

THEAETETUS: They will have to say it is the same, and they do say so.

STRANGER: If it is a whole, and is, as Parmenides says, equally balanced in all directions from the

centre, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, for it must not be more in one place and less

in another. Then, since what is is like this, what is will have a centre and extremities. And

since it has these, it certainly must have parts, must it not?

THEAETETUS: So it must.

STRANGER: Moreover, there is nothing to prevent whatever is divided into parts from having the

characteristic of the one associated with all its parts, and in this way, being all, it could also

be one whole.

THEAETETUS: Why not, indeed?

STRANGER: But isn’t it impossible for something with these characteristics to be just the one itself?

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Presumably what is truly one must be described as entirely without parts, according to

the correct account.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must be.

STRANGER: But the sort of one which consists of many parts will not accord with this account.

THEAETETUS: I understand.

STRANGER: Now will ‘what is’ be both one and whole, as it possesses the character of the one, or

should we utterly deny that ‘what is’ is a whole?

THEAETETUS: That’s a difficult choice you are offering.

STRANGER: Well, that is certainly true. For ‘what is’, having been somehow characterised as one,

will appear not to be the same as the one, and so all things will be more than one.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: However, if ‘what is’ is not a whole on account of being characterised as one, and yet

the whole itself is, then ‘what is’ turns out to be missing part of itself.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: And based upon this argument, ‘what is’ will be non-being, as it is deprived of itself.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: Furthermore, all things become more than one, as both ‘what is’ and the whole have

each acquired a separate, distinct nature.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

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234 | SOPHIST – 244d–245c

STRANGER: But if the whole is not at all, then the very same applies to ‘what is’, and so in addition

to its not being, it could never come into being either.

THEAETETUS: Why so?

STRANGER: Whatever has come to be has always come to be as a whole. Consequently, we cannot

talk about being or becoming as if they are without including the one or the whole among

things that are.

THEAETETUS: That certainly seems to be the case.

STRANGER: And, indeed, whatever is not a whole cannot be something with any number at all. For

if it had number, whatever that number might be, it would have to correspond to that number

as a whole.

THEAETETUS: Precisely.

STRANGER: And, indeed, a myriad of other issues, each involving endless perplexities, will present

themselves to anyone who maintains that ‘what is’ is either some two or only one.

THEAETETUS: Yes, the issues that are now arising make this quite evident. One leads on to another,

bringing a larger and more problematic lack of direction to whatever has already been said.

STRANGER: Now, we have not talked about everyone who gives a precise account of being and non-

being, but let this be enough. Next, we should consider those who give a more general

account, so that we may see, by reviewing them all, that it is no easier to say precisely what

‘what is’ is than to say what ‘what is not’ is.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we should proceed to consider these too.

STRANGER: And, indeed, there seems to be a sort of battle between gods and giants among them in

their dispute with one another about being.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Well, some are dragging everything from heaven and the unseen down to earth, literally

grabbing trees and rocks in their hands. Indeed, they lay hold of all such objects and stren-

uously maintain that that alone is, which gives rise to some contact and touch. They define

body and being as the same, and if any of the others say that there is anything without a

body, they are utterly contemptuous and they want to hear no more.

THEAETETUS: Yes, you are describing fearsome men, and indeed I myself have met many of them

before.

STRANGER: Yes. That’s why those who oppose them conduct their defence very cautiously, from

above, from the unseen, maintaining forcibly that true being consists of certain bodiless

forms which can be known by reason. And they gradually break the bodies of those other

men into little pieces in their discussions, and what the others maintain to be true they refer

to as a sort of becoming in motion, rather than being. And there is always a huge battle

going on between both parties about these issues, Theaetetus.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: Then let’s obtain, from both sides in turn, the account of being that they favour.

THEAETETUS: How shall we obtain them?

STRANGER: It will be easier in the case of those who propose that being consists of forms, for they

are gentler people. However, it is more difficult, perhaps almost impossible, from those who

drag everything by force to the physical. But I think they should be dealt with as follows.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: The best thing would be to make better people of them, if that were somehow possible.

But if this is not to be, let’s make up a story, assuming that they would be willing to answer

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–––––

This refers to the mythical story of the Giants’ unsuccessful attempt to take Olympus from the Olympian gods. This

was considered the battle of all battles. Hesiod, Theogony 675-715.

questions more fully than now. For agreement with reformed individuals will be preferable

to agreement with worse. However, we are not interested in the people themselves. We are

seeking the truth.

THEAETETUS: Quite so.

STRANGER: Then call upon these reformed folk to answer you, and you should interpret what is said.

THEAETETUS: I shall.

STRANGER: Well, let them say whether they maintain there is such a thing as a mortal, living being.

THEAETETUS: How could they deny this?

STRANGER: And won’t they agree that this is a body with a soul in it?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: And do they include soul among things that are?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: What about this? Don’t they agree that a soul can be just or unjust, and can be wise or

ignorant?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: But isn’t it from the possession and presence of justice and wisdom that each of these

souls becomes like this, while their opposites do the opposite?

THEAETETUS: Yes, they agree with all this too.

STRANGER: And they will surely agree that whatever is capable of being present or absent is some-

thing.

THEAETETUS: They do say so.

STRANGER: So, if they accept that there is justice, wisdom and excellence in general, and their

opposites, and also soul in which they arise, do they say that any of these is visible and tan-

gible, or are they all unseen?

THEAETETUS: Hardly any of these is visible.

STRANGER: What about this? Do they say that anything of this sort has a body?

THEAETETUS: They do not answer the entire question in the same way. Although they think that

the soul has acquired a body of some sort, when it comes to wisdom and the other qualities

you asked about, they are ashamed either to admit that these are not included among things

that are, or to maintain emphatically that they are all physical.

STRANGER: Well, Theaetetus, we can see that these men have been reformed. For the original stock,

their earth-born ancestors, would not have been ashamed of anything. Instead, they would

insist that whatever they are unable to squeeze with their hands is nothing at all.

THEAETETUS: Yes, you have expressed their attitude fairly well.

STRANGER: Then let’s question them once more. Indeed, if they are prepared to concede that there

is even a small non-physical portion of things that are, that is sufficient. For they must

explain the shared nature that has arisen simultaneously in the non-physical, and also in

anything physical, with reference to which they say that they both are. Perhaps this may

leave them perplexed. And if that is what happens to them, then consider this. Would they

be willing to accept a suggestion from us and agree that ‘what is’ is as follows?

THEAETETUS: What is the suggestion? Tell us and we shall know immediately.

STRANGER: Well, I am saying that anything actually is, once it has acquired some sort of power,

either to affect anything else at all, or to be affected, even slightly, by something totally

trivial, even if only once. Indeed, I propose to give a definition, defining things that are as

nothing else except power.

THEAETETUS: Then, since they do not have anything better to suggest right now, they accept this.

STRANGER: Very well, though perhaps a different suggestion may occur both to us or them later.

For the present, let this stand as it has been agreed by both parties.

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236 | SOPHIST – 246e–248a

THEAETETUS: Let it stand.

STRANGER: Now, let us move on to the others, the friends of the forms, and you should interpret

their doctrines for us too.

THEAETETUS: I shall.

STRANGER: “Presumably you make a distinction between becoming and being, and you refer to

them as separate. Is this so?”

THEAETETUS: “Yes.”

STRANGER: “And you say our communion with becoming is through the body, by means of sense

perception, while it is by means of reasoning through the soul that we commune with actual

being, which you say is always just the same as it is, while becoming is always changing.”

THEAETETUS: “Yes. That is what we say.”

STRANGER: “Now, best of all men, the communing which you ascribe to both, isn’t it what we men-

tioned a moment ago?”

THEAETETUS: What was that?

STRANGER: “An action or an effect arising from some power, from their coming together with one

another.” You probably do not hear their response to this so clearly, Theaetetus, but perhaps

I can hear it, as I am quite familiar with them.

THEAETETUS: What then? What account do they give?

STRANGER: They do not agree with what we said just now to the earth-born men about being.

THEAETETUS: What was that?

STRANGER: We somehow proposed an adequate enough definition of things that are: whenever the

power to be affected or to affect, even to the slightest extent, is present in something, that

something is something that is.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Now to this they reply that the power to be affected and to affect is a feature of becom-

ing, but they say that neither power attaches to being.

THEAETETUS: Don’t they have a point?

STRANGER: A point which makes us say that we still need to find out more clearly from them

whether they also concede that the soul knows, and that being is known.

THEAETETUS: They will surely assent to that.

STRANGER: “What about this? Do you say that the knowing, or being known, is an action, an effect,

or both? Or is one an action, and the other an effect? Or do neither of them have anything

to do with action and effect?”

THEAETETUS: Obviously they would say neither, otherwise they would be contradicting what they

said before.

STRANGER: I understand. Instead, they would say that if knowing is indeed some action, it follows

that whatever is known must, for its part, be affected. Indeed, based on this account, since

being is known by the act of knowing, insofar as it is known, it is changed to that extent

because it is affected, which we insist does not happen to the quiescent.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: But, by Zeus, what are we saying? Are we actually going to be persuaded so easily that

change, life, soul and thought are absent from what altogether is, that it neither lives nor

thinks, but abides unchanging, solemn and pure, devoid of intelligence?

THEAETETUS: No, stranger. That would be an awful proposition were we to accept it.

STRANGER: But would we say that it has intelligence, but does not have life?

THEAETETUS: How could we?

STRANGER: But if we say that both of these are within it, shall we then deny that it has them in a

soul?

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THEAETETUS: How else could it have them?

STRANGER: But if it actually has intelligence, life and soul, does it remain totally unchanging,

although it has a soul?

THEAETETUS: This all sounds unreasonable to me.

STRANGER: And, of course, we must concede that change, and what is changed, both are.

THEAETETUS: How could we deny it?

STRANGER: It follows, therefore, Theaetetus, that if there is no change, there is no intelligence in

anything, or about anything at all.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: And yet, if we concede instead that everything is moving and changing, by this argu-

ment too we shall be removing intelligence from things that are.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Do you think there could ever be sameness of characteristics or manner or relation,

without rest?

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

STRANGER: But in the absence of these, can you see how there could be intelligence, or how it

could ever come into being anywhere?

THEAETETUS: Not in the least.

STRANGER: Well then, we must do battle, using every possible argument, against the man who

would make strong assertions about anything at all, having done away with knowledge,

thought and intelligence.

THEAETETUS: Definitely.

STRANGER: Now, all these issues are necessarily, it seems, of the utmost importance to the philoso-

pher, and because of these he must not accept that the universe is at rest, whether it is said

to be one or to consist of many forms. Nor should he listen at all to those who say that ‘what

is’ is changing everywhere. Instead, he should invoke the childish prayer, ‘I want every-

thing’, and should say that ‘the all’ and ‘what is’ are a combination of both the unchanging

and the changing.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

STRANGER: Well then, is it likely that we have at last come to grips with ‘what is’ by this argu-

ment?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Oh dear, Theaetetus, perhaps not! I think that we are just about to appreciate the per-

plexity involved in this enquiry.

THEAETETUS: How? Why have you said this?

STRANGER: Bless you! Do you not realise that we are now in utter ignorance about this, though we

seem to ourselves to be talking sense?

THEAETETUS: Well, so it seems to me, but I do not quite understand how we got into this condition

without noticing it.

STRANGER: Well, in agreeing with what has been said, consider carefully whether we may justifiably

be open to the very questions which we ourselves put previously to those who say that the

universe is heat and cold.

THEAETETUS: What questions? Remind me.

STRANGER: Yes, certainly. And I shall try to do this at any rate by questioning you, just as we ques-

tioned the others, so that we may also make some progress at the same time.

THEAETETUS: Right.

STRANGER: Very well then. Don’t you say that motion and rest are completely opposite to one

another?

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THEAETETUS: They must be.

STRANGER: And do you also say that in like manner they both are, and that each of them is?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I do say that.

STRANGER: And when you accept that they are, do you mean that both of them and each of them is

moving?

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

STRANGER: Then, in saying that both of them are, are you indicating that they are both at rest?

THEAETETUS: No, how could they be?

STRANGER: So, are you proposing that being is some third thing in the soul besides these two, and

having understood that both rest and motion are encompassed by this, do you look to their

commonality of being, and thus make the statement that they both are?

THEAETETUS: Yes. It is quite likely that we do, in truth, have an intuition that ‘what is’ is some

third entity, whenever we say that motion and rest are.

STRANGER: So ‘what is’ is not the two together, motion and rest, but something different from them.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

STRANGER: Then, based upon its own nature, ‘what is’ is neither at rest nor in motion.

THEAETETUS: Hardly.

STRANGER: Well then, where is there still left for someone’s mind to turn who wishes to establish

anything clear and certain about this for himself?

THEAETETUS: Where indeed?

STRANGER: I do not think there is any easy option left, for if something is not moving, how can it

not be at rest? Or if it is not at rest at all, then how can it not be moving? Yet ‘what is’ has

just appeared before us, outside of both motion and rest. But is this possible?

THEAETETUS: No, it is totally impossible.

STRANGER: However, it would be right to recall something about these.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: That we ended up in utter perplexity when we were asked what precisely the phrase

‘what is not’ should be applied to. Do you remember?

THEAETETUS: How could I forget?

STRANGER: And are we now in any less perplexity in relation to what is?

THEAETETUS: Well, stranger, it seems to me that we are in even greater perplexity, if that is possi-

ble.

STRANGER: Let’s take it, then, that this is where our difficulty lies. However, since what is and what

is not are equally involved in perplexity, there is now some hope. For as one of them becomes

more dimly or clearly evident, the other will do the same. And if we prove unable to discern

either, we shall scrutinise the description of both at once, as appropriately as we can.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

STRANGER: Then let’s explain how it happens that we refer to the same thing by many names,

depending on the occasion.

THEAETETUS: What sort of thing do you mean? Give an example.

STRANGER: You know that we speak of a man, calling him lots of different things, attributing colours

to him, and also shapes, dimensions, excellences and vices. In all these cases, and numerous

others, we are saying not only that he is a man, but also that he is good, and countless other

things. And in other cases, by the same argument, we propose that each is one, and then

refer to it as many, and so we describe it by many names.

THEAETETUS: What you say is true.

STRANGER: Well, at any rate, I believe we have provided a feast for the young and for the old men

whose learning came late in their lives. For it is easy for anyone to appreciate quite readily

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that it is impossible for the many to be one and also for one to be many, and indeed they

delight in forbidding man from being called good, and they only allow good to be called

good and man to be called man. Indeed, Theaetetus, I imagine you have often met those

who take this sort of thing seriously. Sometimes older men who are amazed at such marvels,

due to the poverty-stricken state of their intellect, actually believe that they have discovered

the very repository of all wisdom.

THEAETETUS: They certainly do.

STRANGER: Then, so that our discussion may be all inclusive, we should direct our questioning now

to all those who have ever discoursed on being in any way at all, and to those with whom

we discussed this earlier.

THEAETETUS: And the questions are?

STRANGER: “Whether we may neither attach being to motion and rest, nor attach anything at all to

anything else, and should we therefore propose, in our own discussions, that these are

unmixed, and it is impossible for them to participate in one another? Or should we have

grouped them all together as the same, in their capacity for communion with one another?

Or can some have this capacity while others do not?” Well, Theaetetus, can we say which

of these options they would choose?

THEAETETUS: I cannot answer these questions on their behalf at all.

STRANGER: Then why don’t you answer them one by one, and see what the consequences are in

each case?

THEAETETUS: A good suggestion.

STRANGER: First, if you wish, let’s propose that they say that nothing has any power of communion

with anything else at all. In that case, movement and rest will have no share of being, will

they?

THEAETETUS: Not in that case.

STRANGER: But will either of them be, if they have no communion with being?

THEAETETUS: They will not.

STRANGER: Well, all parties have been instantly overthrown by this concession it seems, including

the ‘universe is motion’ people, those who say it is one and at rest, and anyone who main-

tains that things that are consist of forms which are always just the same as they are. Indeed,

all of these people associate being with something, some by saying that the universe is actu-

ally movement, others by saying that it is actually rest.

THEAETETUS: Quite so.

STRANGER: And, indeed, those who propose to combine all things at one time and to separate them

at some other time, either by having unlimited things coming from one and returning to

one, or else by dividing all things into finite elements and making combinations of these,

regardless of whether they propose that this happens successively or continuously, these

people would be talking nonsense in all cases, if, in fact, there is no comingling.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: And what’s more, the people who pursue this question, in the most ridiculous manner,

are those who allow nothing to be referred to as different because it shares a different char-

acteristic.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Well, presumably they are compelled to use ‘to be’ in relation to everything. They can-

not help employing ‘apart’ and ‘the others’ and ‘itself’, and very many more expressions,

and connecting them when they speak, and so they are refuting themselves. The enemy and

future opponent is within themselves, as the saying goes, and they walk about carrying his

voice inside them like the strange ventriloquist, Eurycles.

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THEAETETUS: The comparison you make is both accurate and true.

STRANGER: Well then, should we concede to all things the capacity for intercommunion with one

another?

THEAETETUS: Even I would be able to do away with that suggestion.

STRANGER: How?

THEAETETUS: Well, movement itself would be totally at rest, while rest itself would, in turn, be

moving if they were to come together with one another.

STRANGER: And, presumably, it must be utterly impossible that movement be at rest, and rest in

motion?

THEAETETUS: It must be.

STRANGER: Only the third option is left then.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Well, it must be some one of the following: either everything will mix together or noth-

ing will, or some will and others will not.

THEAETETUS: There are no other options.

STRANGER: And yet the first two were found to be impossible.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: So anyone who wishes to give the right answer will select the last of the three.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

STRANGER: Now, since some things will do this and others will not, they would be behaving much

like the letters of the alphabet, for some of them will not fit together with one another, while

others will fit together.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: And the vowels are better at this than the other letters. They are like a bond running

through them all so that it is impossible for one of the others to attach to anything else with-

out at least one of the vowels.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

STRANGER: Does everyone know what letters can combine with what, or is a skill required by some-

one who is to do this properly?

THEAETETUS: There is a skill.

STRANGER: What is it?

THEAETETUS: Grammar.

STRANGER: And isn’t it the same where high and low notes are concerned? Does the musical person

have the skill to recognise which notes go together and which do not, while the unmusical

person does not understand this?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it is the same.

STRANGER: And we shall find that similar distinctions between skill and lack of skill apply to other

subjects.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Yes. And since we have agreed that the kinds can also mix with one another in this

same way, mustn’t a man who is going to show correctly which of the kinds accord with

one another or reject one another proceed through the arguments with some knowledge?

And will he also need some knowledge to show whether there are certain kinds which per-

vade all the kinds and keep them together, so that they can be mixed together, and again, in

the case of division, whether the causes of division are entirely different?

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–––––

Eurycles was a soothsayer who, like a ventriloquist, had another voice within, which urged him to speak of future

events. Aristophanes, Wasps 1017-1020.

THEAETETUS: How could he do it without knowledge, perhaps even the supreme knowledge?

STRANGER: Well now, Theaetetus, what are we going to call this knowledge? Or, by Zeus, have we

stumbled unwittingly upon the knowledge belonging to free men? And is it possible that

we have found first the philosopher, whilst looking for the sophist?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

STRANGER: This division on the basis of kinds, without thinking that the same form is a different

form or that a different one is the same, should we not say that this belongs to dialectical

knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Yes, we should.

STRANGER: Therefore, someone who can do this readily discerns one characteristic extending

entirely through many things, each of which is separate and one; and many characteristics

which are different from one another, encompassed externally by one characteristic; fur-

thermore, one characteristic connected in one kind through multiplicities that are wholes;

and many characteristics which are distinct and completely separate. This is knowing how

to distinguish, kind by kind, which way they commune and which way they do not.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: And I am sure that you will never grant this dialectical skill to anyone except a man

who loves wisdom, purely and righteously.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, how could one grant it to anyone else?

STRANGER: It is in some such place as this that we shall find the philosopher, both now and hereafter,

if we search for him. It is, indeed, difficult to see this person plainly, but the difficulty of

seeing the sophist is of a different sort from this.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Well, the sophist runs away into the darkness of non-being, attaching himself to this

by practice, and he is hard to discern because of the darkness of the place. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

STRANGER: However the philosopher is always devoted, through reasoning, to the characteristic of

what is. And he is also not at all easy to see because of the brightness of that region, as it is

impossible for the eyes of the common soul to sustain the gaze that looks towards the divine.

THEAETETUS: Yes, all this is no less likely to be so than what was said about the sophist.

STRANGER: Well, we shall consider the philosopher in more detail presently, if we so desire. But it

is obvious, I presume, that we must not give up on the sophist until we can see him properly.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

STRANGER: Indeed, we have actually agreed now that some of the kinds will combine with one

another, while others will not, and some will combine with few, others with many, and also

that some are all-pervasive and are allowed to combine with everything. So we should pro-

ceed to the next issue by considering the following question, not about all the forms, lest

we get confused by the multiplicity, but selecting some of those which are said to be the

most important. We should first ask what sort each is, and then what their power to com-

mune with one another is. In this way, we shall at least understand something about being

and non-being, as far as our current method of enquiry allows, even if we cannot apprehend

them with total clarity, and we may somehow be allowed to say that ‘what is not’, is actually

non-being, and avoid reproach.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we must do this.

STRANGER: Now, the most important kinds are those we have just mentioned – being itself, rest

and motion.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: And we also say that two of them do not mix with one another.

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THEAETETUS: They do not.

STRANGER: And yet being mixes with both, for presumably both are.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: So there are these three.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: And of these, each of the two is different from the other, and the same as itself.

THEAETETUS: Quite so.

STRANGER: Well now, what precisely are the ‘same’ and the ‘different’ which we have just men-

tioned? Are they two additional kinds, apart from the first three, two kinds which must nec-

essarily combine with the three, and should we investigate them as though there were five

and not three? Or is this ‘same’ and ‘different’ something belonging to the other three, which

we are referring to without noticing it?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

STRANGER: But of course, motion and rest are neither different nor the same.

THEAETETUS: How so?

STRANGER: Whatever we attribute to motion and rest jointly cannot itself be either of the two.

THEAETETUS: Why is that?

STRANGER: Because motion would then be at rest, and rest would be moving. For the involvement

of either of the two with both of them will compel the other one to change to the opposite

of its own nature, since it is partaking of its opposite.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

STRANGER: However, both partake of the same and the different.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Therefore, we may not say that either motion or rest is the same or the different.

THEAETETUS: No.

STRANGER: Well then, should we think of ‘what is’ and ‘the same’ as one thing?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

STRANGER: But if ‘what is’ and ‘the same’ do not signify anything different, then saying once more

that motion and rest both are will amount to referring to them both as the same.

THEAETETUS: Yes, but that is impossible.

STRANGER: So it is impossible for ‘the same’ and ‘what is’ to be one.

THEAETETUS: Quite.

STRANGER: Well, should we propose that the same is a fourth form in addition to the other three?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Yes, but should we say that the different is a fifth? Or must we think of the different,

and what is, as two names for one kind?

THEAETETUS: Perhaps.

STRANGER: But I think you concede that some things that are, are always spoken of just by them-

selves, while some are always spoken of in relation to others.

THEAETETUS: So they are.

STRANGER: And different is always in relation to another. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: But this would not be the case if what is and different were not utterly distinct. But if

different, like what is, were to partake of both relations, some of the different things would

sometimes be different, but not in relation to another. But now we find, simply, that what-

ever is different necessarily turns out to be the very thing it is, namely, different from

something else.

THEAETETUS: It is exactly as you say.

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STRANGER: Then we must say that the nature of the different is a fifth form among these forms we

are selecting.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And we shall say that this pervades all the others, for each one is different from the

others, not because of its own nature, but because of participation in the characteristic of

different.

THEAETETUS: Yes, precisely.

STRANGER: Now, let us say the following about these five, taking them up one by one.

THEAETETUS: What?

STRANGER: First, that motion is completely different from rest. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: It is so.

STRANGER: So it is not rest.

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

STRANGER: And yet, because of participation in being, it is.

THEAETETUS: It is.

STRANGER: Then again, motion is different from the same.

THEAETETUS: I dare say.

STRANGER: So it is not the same.

THEAETETUS: No, it is not.

STRANGER: And yet it is the same as itself, because everything partakes of the same.

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.

STRANGER: So we should accept that motion is the same and not the same, without making diffi-

culties. For when we say it is the same and then not the same, we are not speaking in a sim-

ilar manner. Rather, when we say it is the same, it is because of its participation in the same

in relation to itself. And when we say it is not the same, it is because of its communion with

different, a communion by which it is separated from the same and becomes not the same

but different. So that it is correct, in turn, to say that it is not the same after all.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Yes, and if motion itself were somehow to partake of rest, it would not be strange to

say that motion was resting.

THEAETETUS: And that is perfectly valid, provided we are going to accept that some of the kinds

will mix with one another, and some will not.

STRANGER: And, indeed, we arrived at a proof of this before now, establishing that this process is

in accordance with nature.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Then let’s say this once more. Motion is different from the different, just as it was other

than the same and rest.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must be.

STRANGER: So, in a sense then, it is not different and it is different, according to the current argu-

ment.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: Then, what about the next point? Shall we say that motion is different from three of

the kinds but not from the fourth, though we have agreed that there are five items concerning

which, and among which, we propose to conduct our enquiry?

THEAETETUS: How could we? For we cannot accept that their number is less than what was shown

a moment ago.

STRANGER: So, should we persist fearlessly in maintaining that motion is different from being?

THEAETETUS: Yes, with no fear at all.

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STRANGER: Well then, it is clear that motion is actually ‘non-being’. And yet it is, since in fact it

partakes of being.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that is perfectly clear.

STRANGER: So, of necessity, what is not is, both in the case of motion and all of the kinds, for in all

cases the nature of the different, by rendering each different from what is, makes it what is

not. And, indeed, in this way, we are right to say, on the same basis, that all of them are not,

and again, because they partake of being, that they are and have being.

THEAETETUS: Very likely.

STRANGER: So, in the case of each of the forms, ‘what is’ is many, and ‘what is not’ is unlimited in

multiplicity.

THEAETETUS: So it seems.

STRANGER: Well then, we must also say that what is, itself, is different from the others.

THEAETETUS: We must.

STRANGER: And we also found that as many as the others are, to that extent what is, is not. For on

the one hand, not being those others it is itself one, and furthermore, it is not, in respect of

number, those unlimited others.

THEAETETUS: Quite so.

STRANGER: Now, we should not make difficulties over these either since the nature of the kinds

involves communion with one another. But if anyone does not accept this, he must prevail

over our previous arguments and then take on their consequences.

THEAETETUS: What you propose is very fair.

STRANGER: Well, let us note the following.

THEAETETUS: What?

STRANGER: When we speak of ‘what is not’, it seems we are not speaking of something opposite

to ‘what is’, but only of something different.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: For example, when we say that something is ‘not large’, are we indicating by this phrase

that it is small rather than equal? Is that how it seems to you?

THEAETETUS: How could it?

STRANGER: So, whenever it is said that a negative signifies an opposite, we shall not accept that.

We shall only go so far as to say that prefixing ‘not’ or ‘non’ indicates something else apart

from the words which follow, or rather, apart from the things to which the words uttered

after the negatives may refer.

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: Let’s think this through as follows, if you agree.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: It seems to me that the nature of different is broken up in the same way that knowl-

edge is.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Well, presumably knowledge is one, and so is the nature of different, but each portion

of knowledge applicable to something in particular has been separated off and given its own

particular title. That’s why so many skills and branches of knowledge are referred to.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: And although the nature of different is one, the same thing happens to the parts.

THEAETETUS: Very likely, but how should we describe it?

STRANGER: Is there some part of different which contrasts with beauty?

THEAETETUS: There is.

STRANGER: Now should we say that this is nameless, or does it have a title of its own?

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THEAETETUS: It has. For each time we mention ‘non-beauty’, this is different from the nature of

beauty, and from nothing else.

STRANGER: Come now, tell me this.

THEAETETUS: What?

STRANGER: On this basis, has non-beauty turned out to be some distinct part of a single kind among

things that are, and does it, in turn, stand in contrast to another kind among things that are?

THEAETETUS: It does.

STRANGER: Then it seems non-beauty turns out to be a contrast of ‘what is’ with ‘what is’.

THEAETETUS: Quite right.

STRANGER: Well then, based on this account, is beauty more included among things that are, and

non-beauty less so?

THEAETETUS: It is not.

STRANGER: So, should we say, on the same basis, that there is non-largeness and largeness itself?

THEAETETUS: On the same basis.

STRANGER: And should we therefore place non-justice in the same relation towards justice, in that

one is no more than the other is?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Well, we shall also describe the others in the same way. Since, in fact, the nature of dif-

ferent has been shown to be included among things that are, and since it is, we must neces-

sarily propose that the parts of it are also things that are, no less.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we must.

STRANGER: Therefore, it seems, when part of the nature of different, and part of the nature of ‘what

is’ are set against one another, the contrast is no less being than what is, itself, if such a

statement is legitimate, and this contrast is not indicating the opposite of ‘what is’, but only

something different from that.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that is very clear.

STRANGER: So, what should we call this?

THEAETETUS: Obviously it is ‘what is not’, the very thing we were seeking because of the sophist.

STRANGER: And does it, as you say, have no less being than anything else? And should we now

declare boldly that ‘what is not’ certainly is, and has its own nature? And just as largeness

was large and beauty was beautiful, and the same applied to non-largeness and non-beauty,

should we say on the same basis that ‘what is not’ was and is ‘what is not’, a single form

counted among the many things that are? Do we still have any doubt about this, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

STRANGER: Now, do you realise that we have shown little regard for Parmenides’ prohibition?

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: In our previous enquiry, we have forged ahead in our search, and presented the man

with something he forbade us to consider.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Well, he says, “For never shall it be proved that things that are not, are. But hold back

your thought from this way of enquiry.”

THEAETETUS: Yes, he does say this.

STRANGER: But we have not only shown that things that are not, are, but we have also revealed the

actual form of ‘what is not’. For we have shown that the nature of different is, and is broken

up across all the things that are in relation to one another, and we dared to say that each

part of it which is contrasted with ‘what is’ is itself actually ‘what is not’.

THEAETETUS: And what we said seems perfectly true to me, stranger.

STRANGER: Then let no one suggest that we are declaring that ‘what is not’ is the opposite of ‘what

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is’ when we dare to state that it is. Indeed, some time ago we set aside the consideration of

its opposite, and whether there is such a thing or there is not, and whether it has an account

or is completely devoid of an account. But we have now stated that ‘what is not’ is, and

someone should either persuade us that we are describing it incorrectly by refuting us, or,

as long as he is unable to do so, he too should say exactly what we say, that the kinds are

mixed with one another, and both what is and different pervade them all and pervade one

another. Different partakes of what is, and is on account of that participation. However, it

is not that in which it participates, but other than that. But as it is different from what is, it

is completely obvious that there must be non-being.

Being, on the other hand, having partaken of different, would be different from the

other kinds. And since it is different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all of

them together, but is just itself, so that being, for its part, is certainly not myriads upon myr-

iads of things. And indeed the others, individually and collectively, are in many ways and

are not in many ways.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: Now, if someone does not believe in these oppositions, he should consider the matter,

and propose something better than what has just been stated. Or, if he enjoys dragging words

first in one direction then in another, as though he has understood something difficult, our

present arguments indicate that he is busy with matters of no account. Indeed, what he is

doing is neither clever, nor difficult to discover. But here is something which is both difficult

and at the same time beautiful...

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: It is what was said earlier: the ability to give up these interminable distinctions and be

able to understand the arguments in every case. And when refuting someone – when they

say that what is different is somehow the same, or what is the same is different – to appre-

ciate how and why they say that these have one characteristic or the other. But demonstrating

that the same is different, in some manner or fashion, and different is the same, large is

small, and like is unlike, and to delight in constantly devising such verbal contradictions,

this is no true refutation, but is obviously an immature product of a quite recent acquaintance

with things that are.

THEAETETUS: Yes, precisely.

STRANGER: Yes, indeed, my dear, and the attempt to separate everything from everything else is

not just unreasonable, it is also an utterly boorish and un-philosophic activity.

THEAETETUS: Why so?

STRANGER: The severance of everything from everything else is the complete destruction of all dis-

course, for our discourse has arisen from the interweaving of the forms.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: You see how timely it is that we have been battling just now against this sort of thing,

and pressing the point that one form may mix with a different one.

THEAETETUS: To what end?

STRANGER: To establish that speech is one of our kinds of things that are. For once we have been

deprived of this, we are deprived of philosophy, and that is the greatest concern. But we

still have to come to full agreement, right now, as to what precisely speech is, and if we

were deprived of its very being we would presumably be unable to speak any more. And

we would be deprived, if we were to agree, that there is no admixture of anything with any-

thing else.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s right. But I do not understand why we must now come to agreement about

speech.

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SOPHIST – 259a–260b | 247

STRANGER: Then you may understand more easily by following this line of argument.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: Well, it has become evident to us that non-being is one kind among the others, and is

dispersed throughout all of the things that are.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: In that case, we should consider whether it mixes with both opinion and speech.

THEAETETUS: Why so?

STRANGER: If it does not mix with them, then everything must be true, whereas if it does mix with

them, false opinion and discourse are generated. For opining or speaking ‘what is not’ is

presumably what gives rise to falsehood in thought or speech.

THEAETETUS: It does.

STRANGER: And once there is falsehood there is deceit.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And, indeed, once there is deceit, everything must then be filled with images, imitations

and imagination.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And yet we said that the sophist had taken refuge somewhere in this place. However,

he completely denies that there is such a thing as falsehood, for no one either speaks or

thinks ‘what is not’, since what is not does not partake of being in any way at all.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we said this.

STRANGER: But it has now shown itself to partake of what is, so on this basis perhaps he will not

dispute the point any more. However, he could say that some of the forms partake of what

is not, while others do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not. And

he might argue once more that image-making and imagination, in which we say he resides,

are not, in any way whatsoever, since opinion and speech have no communion with what

is not. Indeed, there is absolutely no falsehood at all unless this communion is established.

For these reasons, we must first consider carefully what precisely speech, opinion

and imagination are, so that by this discovery we may also discern their communion with

what is not. And once that has been seen, we may prove that there is falsity. And once that

is proved, we may imprison the sophist within it, if he deserves that. Otherwise we should

let him go and search for him in another kind.

THEAETETUS: Precisely, stranger! What has been said about the sophist at the outset seems true,

that he is a difficult kind to track down. For he appears to be laden with obstacles, and when

he casts one in our path, we must first fight our way through it before we reach the man

himself. Indeed, no sooner have we passed through the obstacle whereby what is not is not,

than a different one has been presented, and we must prove that there is falsehood, both in

speech and in opinion. After that there is probably another, and yet another after that, and

it seems that no end will ever appear.

STRANGER: You should be encouraged, Theaetetus, if you can make even a little continuous

progress. For how will a man with no heart for these matters fare in anything else if he

makes no headway there, or even loses ground once more? As the proverb says, “A man

like that would take a long time to capture a city”. Now, my friend, since we have made

this breakthrough you refer to, our greatest barrier may have fallen, and the rest may be

easier and less significant.

THEAETETUS: You have expressed that beautifully.

STRANGER: Then let’s take speech and opinion first, which we mentioned a moment ago, so that

we may work out more clearly whether what is not attaches to them, or whether both of

them are entirely true, and neither is ever false.

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260 e

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261 b

261 c

248 | SOPHIST – 260c–261c

THEAETETUS: Right.

STRANGER: Come on. Let’s give consideration to words again, in the same way that we discussed

forms and letters, for the object of our search is somehow being revealed in this way.

THEAETETUS: Well, what aspect of words must I answer questions about?

STRANGER: Whether they all go together with one another, or none do, or some do while some do

not.

THEAETETUS: That’s obvious, anyway. Some do and some do not.

STRANGER: Perhaps you mean something like this. Those which indicate something when spoken

in order do go together, while those which indicate nothing by their sequence do not go

together.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean by this?

STRANGER: Something which I thought you accepted when you expressed agreement, for presum-

ably we have two kinds of vocal indicators concerned with being.

THEAETETUS: In what sense?

STRANGER: One is called nouns, the other verbs.

THEAETETUS: Describe each of them.

STRANGER: The indicator referring to activities we may call a verb.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: While the vocal sign referring to the actual performers of the action is called a noun.

THEAETETUS: Yes, precisely.

STRANGER: Therefore nouns spoken in succession, on their own, never produce speech, nor again

do verbs, when spoken without nouns.

THEAETETUS: I do not understand this.

STRANGER: Obviously you had something else in mind when you were giving your assent just now,

for the very point I wanted to make was that when these are spoken successively, as follows,

they are not speech.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: For example, ‘walks, runs, sleeps’ and all of the other verbs that indicate actions, even

if they are all spoken in sequence, they are not discourse.

THEAETETUS: No, how could they be?

STRANGER: And again, if we recite ‘lion, stag, horse’ or any nouns which name the performers of

the actions, no speech is constituted by that succession either. For neither in this way nor

in any other way do the utterances indicate the activity, inactivity or being of anything that

is or is not, until verbs are mixed with nouns. Once they combine, the initial interweaving

also produces speech, though it is very short and basic.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean by this?

STRANGER: When someone says, ‘a man understands’, would you agree that this is the simplest,

most basic speech?

THEAETETUS: I would, indeed.

STRANGER: For presumably this would now be indicating something about things that are, or are

becoming, or have become, or will become, and it does not merely apply names, but con-

cludes something by weaving verbs together with nouns. That is why we said that it ‘says’

rather than just ‘names’, and indeed we assign the name ‘speech’ to this verbal fabric.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: Then just as some things combine while others do not, there are also vocal indicators

which do not combine, while there are others which combine to constitute speech.

THEAETETUS: Yes, absolutely.

STRANGER: Now just one more little thing.

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SOPHIST – 261d–262e | 249

THEAETETUS: What?

STRANGER: Whenever there is speech, it must be about something, and it cannot be about nothing.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: And mustn’t it also have some quality?

THEAETETUS: Yes, it must.

STRANGER: Now, let’s turn our attention to ourselves.

THEAETETUS: Perhaps we should.

STRANGER: Then I shall engage in speech with you, associating a thing with an activity by means

of noun and verb, and you will tell me to what the speech pertains.

THEAETETUS: I’ll do the best I can.

STRANGER: “Theaetetus sits.” Not a long discourse, is it?

THEAETETUS: No, it is quite succinct.

STRANGER: Now it is up to you to say to what it pertains and what it is about.

THEAETETUS: Obviously, it pertains to me and is about me.

STRANGER: What about the next one...?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: “Theaetetus, to whom I am now speaking, flies.”

THEAETETUS: Again, all one can say is that this is about me and pertains to me.

STRANGER: And yet we say that each of the speeches must have some quality.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Well, what quality should we ascribe to each of these?

THEAETETUS: Presumably one is false while the other is true.

STRANGER: And the true speech says things that are about you, as they are.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

STRANGER: Then the false says things that are different from things that are.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: So, it says things that are not, as if they are.

THEAETETUS: Quite so.

STRANGER: They are things that are, and yet they are different from things that are about you. For

we said that pertaining to everything, there are many things that are, and indeed many that

are not.

THEAETETUS: Yes, precisely.

STRANGER: Now, that last speech of mine about you must, in the first place, be one of the shortest

of those which we have defined as constituting speech.

THEAETETUS: Well, we have already come to agreement on this point at any rate.

STRANGER: Secondly, it must be about something.

THEAETETUS: Just so.

STRANGER: And if it is not about you, it is not about anything at all.

THEAETETUS: No, how could it be?

STRANGER: But if it is about nothing, it would not be discourse at all, for we declared that it is

impossible for discourse to be discourse about nothing.

THEAETETUS: Quite right.

STRANGER: Now, anything said about you – describing different things as the same, and things that

are not, as if they are – such a combination consisting of nouns and verbs certainly seems,

actually and in truth, to constitute false speech.

THEAETETUS: Yes, perfectly true.

STRANGER: Now, what about this? Isn’t it obvious by now that thought, opinion and imagination

are three kinds which arise in our souls both as true and as false?

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250 | SOPHIST – 263a–263d

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: You will appreciate this more easily if you first understand what precisely they are, and

what differentiates one from the other.

THEAETETUS: Just give the explanation.

STRANGER: Well, are not thought and speech the same, except that the inner speech of the soul with

itself, proceeding without sound, is the very thing that has been given the name of ‘thought’?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: Whereas the stream which comes from that and proceeds through the mouth, along

with utterance, has been called speech.

THEAETETUS: True.

STRANGER: And there is something else we recognise in speech.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

STRANGER: Assertion and denial.

THEAETETUS: Yes, we recognise these.

STRANGER: Now, whenever this arises silently in the soul, based upon thought, have you anything

else to call it except opinion?

THEAETETUS: No, how could I?

STRANGER: But when this occurs in someone through sense perception, and not independently, is

there anything you can call an experience like this except imagination?

THEAETETUS: Nothing.

STRANGER: Well, since we found that there is true and false speech, and thought turns out to be a

dialogue of the soul itself with itself, and opinion to be the result of thought, while imagining

is what we call a comingling of opinion and perception, it must follow that some of these

too are sometimes false, since they are all related to speech.

THEAETETUS: It must be so.

STRANGER: Now, do you realise that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than

we anticipated a moment ago, when we were afraid that we might have set ourselves an

endless task by searching for them?

THEAETETUS: Yes, I realise this.

STRANGER: Then we must not lose heart for what remains. Indeed, since we have established this

much, let’s remind ourselves of the previous divisions based upon forms.

THEAETETUS: Which of them?

STRANGER: We distinguished two forms of image-making, one involving likenesses and the other

involving appearances.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And we said we were perplexed as to which one we should place the sophist in.

THEAETETUS: That is what happened.

STRANGER: And in the midst of this perplexity, an even greater swirling darkness poured down

upon us through the arrival of an argument which called everybody into question by saying

that there is absolutely no such thing as a likeness or image or appearance at all, because

there is never any falsehood anywhere, in any way.

THEAETETUS: What you say is true.

STRANGER: But since it now turns out that there is speech and false opinion, it is of course possible

that there be imitations of the things that are, and that a skill in deception arises from this

state of affairs.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it is possible.

STRANGER: And we agreed earlier that the sophist was in one or the other of these divisions.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

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SOPHIST – 263e–264d | 251

STRANGER: Well, let’s set to it once more, dividing the proposed kind in two, proceeding always

according to the right hand part of the division, holding to whatever the sophist has in com-

mon, until everything common about him has been stripped away leaving his individual

nature, which we should disclose in the first place to ourselves, and secondly to those with

the closest natural affinity with such a method.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: Didn’t we begin back then by dividing skill into the productive and the acquisitive?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And the sophist also made an appearance in certain forms of the acquisitive skill, such

as hunting, competition, trading, and so on.

THEAETETUS: He certainly did.

STRANGER: But now that the imitative skill encompasses him, it is obvious that the productive skill

itself should first be divided in two, for imitation is presumably a sort of production.

However, it is what we call the production of images, but not of the objects themselves. Is

this so?

THEAETETUS: Entirely so.

STRANGER: Then first let there be two parts of the productive skill.

THEAETETUS: Which are?

STRANGER: The divine and the human.

THEAETETUS: I do not understand yet.

STRANGER: If we recall what was said at the outset, productive skill is any capacity which is respon-

sible for bringing into being things which previously were not.

THEAETETUS: I remember.

STRANGER: Now, consider all mortal creatures, and of course all plants that grow on the earth from

seeds and roots, and any soulless substances formed in the earth, whether they dissolve in

it or not. Shall we say that these are brought into being, though previously they were not,

by anything other than the craftsmanship of God? Or should we resort to the doctrine which

most people express?

THEAETETUS: What doctrine is that?

STRANGER: Does nature generate them from some spontaneous cause which operates without intel-

ligence? Or does the cause operate with reason and divine knowledge arising from God?

THEAETETUS: Well, I frequently change my opinion from one to the other, but perhaps that is

because of my age. But now, looking to you, and realising that you think that they do arise

from God, I have also come to believe this.

STRANGER: That is beautifully expressed, Theaetetus, and if I thought you were a person who would

somehow form another opinion in the course of time, I would now try to make you agree

with the argument by means of persuasion based upon necessity. But since I understand

your nature, which is inclined towards this conclusion even without these arguments from

me, a conclusion you say you already find attractive, I shall let it go, for it would be a waste

of time. Instead, I shall propose that whatever is said to be natural is produced by a divine

skill, while anything which people fabricate from that is the product of human skill. And

so, based upon this argument, there are two kinds of production, one human and the other

divine.

THEAETETUS: Correct.

STRANGER: Now that there are two, let’s cut each of these in two once more.

THEAETETUS: How?

STRANGER: Just as we made a horizontal division of all production before, let’s make a vertical

division now.

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252 | SOPHIST – 264e–266a

THEAETETUS: Let the division be made.

STRANGER: So it now consists of four parts in all, two which are human and relate to ourselves,

and two which are in turn divine and relate to the gods.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: And once they are further divided in this different way, one part of each of the split-off

parts is the making of originals, while the remaining two parts are best referred to as image-

making. And now the productive skill has again been divided in two on this basis.

THEAETETUS: Explain how each further division is made.

STRANGER: I presume we know that we ourselves, and all other creatures, and fire, water, and their

kindred elements, which are the source of whatever arises naturally, are all created entities

which come forth from God. Is this so?

THEAETETUS: It is so.

STRANGER: However, there are images associated with each of these which are not the things them-

selves, and which also arise through divine contrivance.

THEAETETUS: What sort of things?

STRANGER: Apparitions, which arise naturally in dreams, and also during the day when something

dark interrupts firelight, producing so-called shadows. Or, on the other hand, a reflection

produced when the light of the eye and the light of an object converge on a bright, smooth

surface and produce a form which provides a perception opposite to our normal view of

the object.

THEAETETUS: Yes, there are indeed these two products of divine workmanship, the thing itself, and

the image connected to each.

STRANGER: But what about this skill of ours? Won’t we say that it produces a house by the builder’s

skill, and yet another one by the painter’s skill, like a human dream fashioned for those

who are awake?

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: And our other skills are again twofold in the same way, based on two products of our

productive activity, the thing itself which is actually manufactured, and an image produced

by the skill of image-making.

THEAETETUS: Now I understand better, and I accept that there are two twofold forms of productive

skill. According to one division, there is the divine and the human, while based upon the

other there is the production of things themselves, and also of certain likenesses.

STRANGER: Well, let’s remind ourselves that there was to be an imitative and an appearance-based

form of image-making, if it could be shown that what’s false, being actually false, is also

one of the things that are.

THEAETETUS: Yes, there was.

STRANGER: And since this has been shown, shall we now proceed without equivocation to reckon

that there are two forms of image-making?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: Then let’s divide the appearance-based form in two again.

THEAETETUS: In what way?

STRANGER: There is one which operates by means of instruments, and another in which the producer

of the appearance presents himself as the instrument.

THEAETETUS: How do you mean?

STRANGER: I think that when someone uses his own body to produce a semblance of your features,

or makes his voice sound like yours, this aspect of creating appearances is best called mim-

icry.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

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SOPHIST – 266b–267a | 253

STRANGER: Then let’s designate this as the mimetic, since that is the name we gave it. As for the

other part, we should let it all go, indulge ourselves, and leave it for someone else to bring

it into unity and assign it some appropriate name.

THEAETETUS: Assign them like that, and bid the other farewell.

STRANGER: And it is surely worth considering, Theaetetus, whether mimicry has a further twofold

aspect. But you should consider why.

THEAETETUS: Tell me.

STRANGER: Some perform mimicry knowing what they are imitating, whereas others do not know.

And, indeed, what greater distinction could we suggest than between knowledge and igno-

rance?

THEAETETUS: None at all.

STRANGER: Didn’t we just describe an imitation by those who have knowledge, since someone

mimicking you would have to know you and your form?

THEAETETUS: He would have to.

STRANGER: What about the form of justice, and of excellence in general? Don’t many people with

no knowledge of excellence, who somehow form opinions about it, try their best to make

it appear that they embody whatever they think that it is, mimicking it as best they can in

word and in deed.

THEAETETUS: Yes, there are very many.

STRANGER: Now, do they all fail in this endeavour to seem just when they are not in any way just,

or do they actually succeed?

THEAETETUS: They succeed.

STRANGER: Then I think we should say that this mimic is different from the other one. The one

without knowledge is different from the one with knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

STRANGER: In that case, where shall we get a suitable name for each of them? Now, obviously this

is difficult, because there was a traditional laxity and carelessness among our predecessors

about the division of kinds based upon forms, and consequently they did not try to make

any division, and so there is, necessarily, a serious shortage of names. Nevertheless, though

our words are more daring than theirs, for the purposes of distinction let’s call mimicry

based on opinion ‘opinionated mimicry’, and that based upon knowledge a sort of ‘informed

mimicry’.

THEAETETUS: So be it.

STRANGER: Then we should resort to the other one, for the sophist was not included among people

with knowledge, though he does have a place among mimics.

THEAETETUS: Very much so.

STRANGER: Well, let’s test the opinionated mimic as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he

rings true or whether there is still a divide in it.

THEAETETUS: Let’s test him.

STRANGER: And, indeed, there is a major divide, for some of them are simple-minded folk who

think that they know whatever they have opinions about. However, the other sort have a

strong suspicion and fear, born of constant involvement in speech, that they are ignorant of

matters about which they pretend to others that they are knowledgeable.

THEAETETUS: Yes, there certainly are the two kinds which you have described.

STRANGER: Should we designate one mimic as sincere and the other as insincere?

THEAETETUS: Well, that sounds reasonable.

STRANGER: And again, shall we say that there is one kind of insincere mimicry or two?

THEAETETUS: You decide.

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254 | SOPHIST – 267b–268a

STRANGER: Very well. Two kinds are becoming evident to me. I discern one who can be insincere

in public, making long speeches to crowds, and another who does it privately, and uses

short exchanges to force his interlocutor to contradict himself.

THEAETETUS: Very accurately expressed.

STRANGER: How should we view the more longwinded fellow? Is he either a statesman or a dem-

agogue?

THEAETETUS: A demagogue.

STRANGER: What shall we say about the other? Is he wise or is he a sophist?

THEAETETUS: I suppose that he cannot be wise since we have proposed that he is a man who does

not know. However, as he is a mimic of the wise he will of course get a name derived from

this, and I have started to realise now that he should, in truth, be described as that absolutely

genuine sophist.

STRANGER: In that case, shall we fit his name together as we did before, weaving it together from

the last to the first.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

STRANGER: It is the generation of contradictions, born of the insincere part of opinionated mimicry,

which belongs to the appearance-based form of image-making derived from the part of pro-

ductive activity which is defined as human rather than divine, and works wonders in speech.

It seems we may declare, in very truth, that this is the actual blood and lineage

of the

sophist.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

_____

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SOPHIST – 268b–268d | 255

–––––

Iliad 6.211.