now being described. No, just a lot more expressions of this sort, which cohere with one another
due to contrivance rather than the chance occurrence which happened just now. But they have
never yet seen a number of men, or even one man, who is perfectly balanced and coherent in virtue
as far as this is possible, in both word and deed, holding power in a city which is just like himself.
Or do you think they have?”
“Not at all.”
“Nor, blessed friend, have they listened properly to beautiful and free discourse, of a kind which
exerts itself in every way to seek truth for the sake of knowledge, showing only a distant regard
for clever and argumentative words whose aim, both in law courts and in private gatherings, is
nothing except reputation and contention?”
“No, they do not have this experience, either,” he said.
“Well,” I said, “on account of these issues, and anticipating them, at the time we were afraid. But
nevertheless, under the compulsion of truth, we said that neither a city, nor a form of government,
nor an individual person either, would attain perfection until some necessity, perchance, compels
those few philosophers – who are not corrupted but who have just been referred to as useless – to
take responsibility for the city, whether they want to or not, and also constrains the city to heed
them. Or, until a true love of true philosophy, through some divine providence, inspires the sons
of our present kings or potentates, or even the men themselves. And I am saying that there is no
reason why either or both of these outcomes is impossible. For in that case, we would rightly be
laughed at for uttering nothing but empty pieties. Is this not so?”
“It is so.”
“Then, if some necessity had arisen for those at the very pinnacle of philosophy to take charge of
a city, in the boundless ages of the past, in some foreign land which is somehow far beyond our
view, or there is such a need at present, or if this will ever happen in future, then I am prepared to
uphold the argument that there has been a form of government such as we have described, and
there is and will be such a form whenever the Muse of philosophy has come to power in a city.
For it is not impossible to bring this into being, neither are we describing impossibilities, but we
do acknowledge that it is difficult.”
“And that is how it seems to me too,” he said.
“And would you agree,” I said, “that this is not how it seems to most people?”
“Perhaps,” he replied.
“Blessed friend,” I said, “do not level undue criticism at the masses in this manner. They will hold
a different opinion if you are encouraging, rather than adversarial, as you undo this slander against
the love of learning. Show them the people you call philosophers, and define their nature and the
activity just as you did before, so that they will not think you are referring to the people whom
they themselves regard as philosophers. And once they see this, surely you agree that they will
hold a different opinion and respond differently. Or do you think that anyone gets angry with some-
one who is not being angry, or acts grudgingly towards someone who is ungrudging and is a gen-
erous, gentle person? Actually, I shall anticipate your answer and say that it may happen in a few
cases, but in most cases such an angry nature does not arise.”
“And I agree with you, of course,” he said.
“And will you not also agree that the angry disposition of most people towards philosophy is
caused by those outsiders who rush in wildly where they do not belong, abusing one another, pos-
sessed by a love of adversity, always framing their arguments in relation to other people, an activity
utterly inappropriate to philosophy?”
“Very much so,” he replied.
“Yes, and surely you would also agree, Adimantus, that someone whose mind is truly directed
towards things that are, has no time to look down upon the affairs of men and do battle with them,
498 e
499 a
499 b
499 c
499 d
499 e
500 a
500 b
500 c
902 | REPUBLIC VI – 498e–500c