Book 4 - Platonic Foundation

Laws

––––– BOOK IV –––––

ATHENIAN: Come on then, what precisely should we suppose our city will be? When I say this, I

am not asking what name it has at present or what it should be called in future, since that

might well be determined by the circumstances of its foundation, or by the region it is in,

or the name of some river or spring or of one of the gods of that region might be applied to

the newly founded city. Rather, in the case of the city, what I really want to ask is whether

it will be on the coast or inland.

CLINIAS: Well, stranger, the city I have just been referring to is about eighty stades

or thereabouts

from the coast.

ATHENIAN: What about harbours? Are there any on that side of the coast or does it have no harbour

at all?

CLINIAS: On that side, stranger, it is well provided with harbours. As good as any.

ATHENIAN: Oh dear! What about the surrounding countryside? Does the land produce all your

needs, or are there some needs that cannot be met?

CLINIAS: It is not really deficient in anything.

ATHENIAN: Will it have a neighbouring city close by?

CLINIAS: No, not really, that’s why it is being founded. Emigration from the locality of old has left

the land deserted for quite some time.

ATHENIAN: What about mountains, plains and forests? What proportion of each does it have?

CLINIAS: It is much the same as the rest of Crete generally.

ATHENIAN: Are you saying that it is rough terrain rather than flat?

CLINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Then, when it comes to the acquisition of excellence, at least it would not be beyond

remedy. For if the city was to be on the coast with a good harbour and did not produce all

that was needed but had many needs that it could not meet, some mighty saviour would

have been required, and some divine lawgivers too, if it were not to have a huge variety of

depraved habits as a natural consequence. At the moment, those eighty stades afford some

comfort. Yet, it is situated closer to the sea than it should be, and, more to the point, you

say it has good harbours, but even this is acceptable. Indeed, having the sea close by makes

everyday life pleasant, and yet it really is a “briny and bitter neighbour”

since it fills a city

with commercial activity and retail business, breeds restless and distrustful traits in people’s

souls, and makes the city suspicious and unkind towards itself and towards the rest of

humanity too. In the face of this, there is of course some consolation in the fact that it pro-

duces all that it needs, but because the territory is rugged it obviously would not produce

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Eighty stades is about 14.8 kilometres (9.25 miles).

A quotation from Alcman, a Spartan poet.

everything that is needed, and a surplus besides. For if it had a surplus it would be able to

export a great deal, gold and silver coin would fill its coffers in return, and in a way, all

things considered, there is no greater enemy than this to the development of a just and noble

character, as we said earlier, if you recall the discussion.

CLINIAS: Yes, we remember. And we agree now, as we did then, that it is correct.

ATHENIAN: Well, what about this? How well is this region of our country supplied with wood for

shipbuilding?

CLINIAS: There isn’t any fir or pine worth mentioning, nor is there much cypress either. What’s

more, you would find very little larch or plane, which shipbuilders regularly need to use

for ships’ interiors.

ATHENIAN: That, again, would not be a bad feature of the country.

CLINIAS: How so?

ATHENIAN: It is good that a city is unable to imitate its enemies too easily when the behaviour to

be imitated is base.

CLINIAS: What makes you say this? Is it something we said earlier?

ATHENIAN: Well, my divine friend, keep an eye on me in view of what was said at the outset about

the laws of Crete, that they should have a single aim in view. Now, the two of you said that

this aim was military, but I responded by saying that although it is all very well that such

regulations should look to excellence, I did not accept at all that they would look to a part

of excellence and not to the entire. So the two of you should now watch over me, in turn,

in my current legislative efforts in case I enact a law that is not directed towards excellence

or to a part of excellence. For I am proposing that a law is rightly enacted only when it aims

every time, like an archer, at an outcome that is always constantly accompanied by some-

thing ever beautiful, and at that alone. All else should be set aside, be it wealth or anything

else of that sort, in the absence of the stated aims.

Now, the base imitation of one’s enemies that I spoke of earlier arises in the following

way when people dwell close to the sea and are troubled by enemies. For instance – and I

am not criticising your people, Clinias – Minos once imposed a cruel tribute to be paid by

the inhabitants of Attica when he had acquired enormous maritime supremacy,

while the

others had, as yet, no ships fit for war, unlike nowadays. Nor indeed did their territory have

lots of wood for shipbuilding so that they could readily provide themselves with a naval

force. So they were not immediately able to defend themselves against their enemies by

imitating Cretan seamanship and becoming mariners themselves. Indeed, it would have

been even better for them to lose many times seven youths and remain as staunch foot sol-

diers rather than becoming mariners, who repeatedly jump from their ships and then rush

back on board once more, who dare not stand their ground and face death when the enemy

is bearing down on them, and see nothing shameful in that. Rather, since they always have

plausible excuses, they are quite ready to cast their weapons aside and take flight in what

they call retreats without dishonour. This sort of talk is inclined to arise as a consequence

of resorting to naval warfare, and it merits not unbounded praise but the exact opposite, for

degenerate behaviour should never become habitual, especially in the very best class of our

citizens. We could also learn from Homer, I presume, that a practice of this sort is not noble.

For he has Odysseus upbraid Agamemnon for ordering the ships to be dragged down to the

water’s edge when the Achaeans are being pressed hard by the Trojans. Odysseus gets angry

with him and says:

...you who in the very closing of clamorous battle

tell us to haul our strong-benched ships to the sea so that even

more glory may befall the Trojans, who beat us already,

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and headlong destruction swing our way, since the Achaeans

will not hold their battle as the ships are being hauled seaward,

but will look about and let go the exultation of fighting.

There, O leader of the people, your plan will be ruin.

So Homer, too, recognised the fact that placing triremes at sea in support of soldiers fighting

on land is bad practice. Even lions would get used to fleeing from deer if they cultivated

habits of this sort. What is more, when the power of cities derives from their navies, the

honours, when they are saved, are not bestowed upon the most deserving members of their

fighting force. For their safety derives from the skill of the steersman, the captain and the

oarsman, and a whole variety of people who are not of much consequence, and so it is not

possible for someone to confer honours on each deserving person in the correct manner.

Yet, in the absence of this ability, how could a city still prosper?

CLINIAS: It is scarcely possible. But, stranger, it was the naval battle of Salamis, fought by Greeks

against the barbarians, which, according to us Cretans anyway, saved Greece.

ATHENIAN: Yes indeed, that is what most Greeks say, and most barbarians too. But we, my friend

– that is, Megillus here and I – maintain that the land battle that took place at Marathon

was what saved the Greeks initially, while the one at Plataea completed the process,

and

while these battles made better people of the Greeks, the other battles did not, which is a

strange way to speak of battles that saved us at the time, for I am now including the naval

battle at Artemisium for you, in addition to the one at Salamis. As a matter of fact, in looking

now at the excellence of a political system, and the nature of a territory, we are also con-

sidering the arrangement of the law. Unlike most people, we do not regard the mere survival

and continued existence of people as the most important issue, but becoming as good as

they possibly can, and being so for as long as they live. But I think we actually said this

before in our previous discussions.

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: Then we should consider this question alone, whether we are adopting the same

approach as we did previously, the one that is best for cities in relation to their foundation

and law-making.

CLINIAS: Very much so.

ATHENIAN: Then tell me next, what people will you be settling? Will there be people from all over

Crete, anyone who wants to come, because the population in the various cities has exceeded

what the land can sustain? For you are not, I suppose, inviting any Greek who wishes to

join you, even though I can see that some people from Argos, Aegina and elsewhere in

Greece have settled in your country. So tell me, in this case, where do you say that the cur-

rent body of citizens will come from?

CLINIAS: They are likely to come from all over Crete, and as for the rest of the Greeks, it seems

that settlers from the Peloponnese are made most welcome. And, indeed, what you were

just saying is true, some are from Argos, and of those who are here at present, the most

highly regarded clan, the Gortynian, is a colony from Gortyn on the Peloponnese.

ATHENIAN: Well, a settlement would not be easy for the cities unless it is formed, like a swarm of

bees, from a single clan coming from a single territory, a friend coming from friends, under

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Minos, who had a powerful navy, attacked Athens because his son, Androgeos, had been killed there. He forced the

Athenians to send an annual tribute of seven young men and seven young women as food for the minotaur, a half-bull,

half-human creature.

Iliad, xiv.96-102, Lattimore.

The Battle of Marathon decided the outcome of the first Persian War; the Battle of Plataea decided that of the second.

Both were Greek victories.

pressure because of some shortage of land, or driven by some other afflictions of this sort.

There are times too when part of a city may be compelled to relocate elsewhere, having

been forced to do so by civil strife, and in one case a whole city went into exile, having

been totally overpowered by an overwhelming onslaught. Now, to settle all these and leg-

islate for them is easy in one sense, but difficult in another. For the existence of a single

people, with the same language and laws, leads to a spirit of friendship because they share

the same sacred rituals and everything else of that sort. However, they do not readily accept

laws and other civic arrangements that are different from those of their homeland, and some-

times, although the degeneracy of their laws caused civil strife, they still seek, through force

of habit, to behave in exactly the same way that led to their downfall previously, and they

become disobedient and difficult for the founders and legislators to deal with. In contrast,

a people that combines all sorts of differences might perhaps be more inclined to submit to

new laws, but for them to live and breathe in unison, like the team of horses in the proverb,

would take much more time and be a huge challenge. The fact of the matter is that making

laws and founding cities is, for men, the ultimate test of excellence.

CLINIAS: Quite likely, but please explain more clearly what you have in mind when you say all this.

ATHENIAN: My good man, as I return again to considering lawmakers, it is possible that I will, at

the same time, say something that is actually derogatory, but as long as I say something rel-

evant, this should not really be a problem. But why am I troubled at all? In almost all human

undertakings, the situation is much the same.

CLINIAS: What are you referring to?

ATHENIAN: I was about to say that no human being ever institutes any laws at all, but all sorts of

chance occurrences and various coincidences institute all the laws for us. For some, war

may perhaps overthrow the political system by force and change the laws, or the challenge

of grinding poverty may do so. Diseases, too, force us to make lots of innovations when

we are afflicted by plague, or when unseasonal weather lasts for many years as often hap-

pens. Anyone, in view of all this, might be justified in saying, as I did just now, that no

mortal creature institutes any laws whatsoever, and almost all human affairs are a matter of

chance. And although it seems right to say all this about navigation, helmsmanship, medi-

cine and generalship, there is, in fact, something further to be said in these same cases, with

similar justification.

CLINIAS: Which is?

ATHENIAN: That God is all, and that chance and opportunity, with the help of God, determine the

course of all the affairs of humanity. And yet we should accept that these are accompanied

by a third more gentle element – skill. For I myself would suggest that in a storm it would

be a huge advantage for the steersman to cooperate with opportunity. Is this so?

CLINIAS: Quite so.

ATHENIAN: And the same argument would apply, in like manner, in the other cases too, and indeed

the same point should be conceded in the case of legislation. Once the other conditions that

the country requires, if it is ever to be settled in a goodly manner, are in place, then a law-

giver who holds to the truth is needed by such a city, to help them.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: Now, wouldn’t a person who possessed the skill involved in any of the areas I mentioned

also presumably be able to pray, in the right way, for whatever he needed, through the oper-

ation of chance, so that his skill alone would suffice?

CLINIAS: He would, indeed.

ATHENIAN: And all the other skilled people we referred to could tell us what their own prayer would

be for, if we asked them. Is this so?

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CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: And the lawgiver will, I presume, also do the same thing.

CLINIAS: Presumably.

ATHENIAN: Let us address him as follows: “Come on then, lawgiver, what should we give you,

what condition should the city be in, so that you will be able to proceed from there, and be

competent, by yourself, to manage the city?”

CLINIAS: So, what’s the right thing to say in response?

ATHENIAN: We shall give the lawgiver’s response, isn’t this so?

CLINIAS: Yes.

ATHENIAN: “Give me a city under tyrannical rule,” he will say, “and let the tyrant be young, with

a good memory, a quick learner, courageous, and possessed of natural greatness. And if

these various qualities, present in the tyrannical soul, are to be of any benefit, let them be

accompanied now by something else, which, as we said previously, needs to accompany

all the parts of excellence.”

CLINIAS: Megillus, I presume that the stranger is saying that what needs to accompany the others

is sound-mindedness. Is this so, stranger?

ATHENIAN: Yes, the commonplace sound-mindedness, Clinias, not what someone might speak of

when they get too serious and argue that sound-mindedness must be the same as wisdom.

It is an innate quality which shows immediately in children and in animals, that some have

no control when it comes to pleasures, while others have control. And we said that in iso-

lation from the various other goods we are discussing, it is of no account. I presume you

get my meaning.

CLINIAS: Yes, certainly.

ATHENIAN: Then our tyrant should possess this, in addition to those other natural qualities, if a city

is to attain, in the quickest and best way possible, the political system it needs in order to

live its life in happiness. For there is not, nor could there ever be, a quicker or better way

of establishing a political system than this.

CLINIAS: How, stranger, and by what argument, could anyone convince themselves that they are

speaking correctly if they say this?

ATHENIAN: Presumably, Clinias, it is easy enough to discern this much at least, that this is the

natural state of affairs.

CLINIAS: How do you mean? Are you saying it happens when a tyrant arises who is young, sound-

minded, learns easily, has a good memory, is courageous and is possessed of natural

greatness?

ATHENIAN: You should add good fortune, in one respect only, that a praiseworthy lawgiver would

also arise at the time, and that fortune would bring them both together. For with this arrange-

ment in place, God has done almost all he ever does when he wants a city to do exceptionally

well. The second-best arrangement would involve two rulers of this sort, and so on for third

best, and, in general, the more there are, the worse the arrangement, and the fewer there

are, the better.

CLINIAS: You maintain that the best city arises, apparently, from a tyranny involving a lawgiver of

the highest rate, and a tyrant of good character. You say that it would be easiest and quickest

to effect the change to the best city from such an arrangement. From an oligarchy it is second

easiest, is that your meaning? And from a democracy you think it is third easiest?

ATHENIAN: Not at all, no, first and easiest is from a tyranny, second is from a political system based

upon kingship, third is from some sort of democracy. Oligarchy comes fourth, and because

there are so many powerful factions within it, it would face enormous difficulty in allowing

the best city to come into existence. And we say, in fact, that this comes about when a true

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lawgiver naturally arises who happens to share some power with the most influential people

in the city. And when this element is fewest in number and greatest in power, as in a tyranny,

then the change tends to occur quickly and easily.

CLINIAS: How so? We don’t really understand you.

ATHENIAN: And yet, this has been said, I believe, not once but many times. But perhaps you and

Megillus have never seen a city under tyrannical rule.

CLINIAS: Nor have I any particular desire to see one.

ATHENIAN: And yet you would see the very feature I am now referring to in this.

CLINIAS: Which is?

ATHENIAN: A tyrant who wishes to change the habits of a city does not require great exertions or

a lot of time. He first needs to proceed in that direction himself. Whether he wishes to turn

the citizens towards activities involving excellence, or in the opposite direction, he himself

should be the standard of all action, conferring praise and honour on some while censuring

others, and showing no respect for anyone who remains unpersuaded in any field of

endeavour.

CLINIAS: Yes, but why do we believe that the other citizens will so quickly follow the lead of some-

one who has adopted this combination of persuasion and force?

ATHENIAN: Let no one persuade us, my friends, that a city could ever change its laws more quickly

and easily than through the personal leadership of its powerful people. There is no other

way to do this now, nor will there ever be. And, indeed, this is not an impossibility for us,

nor would it be difficult. No, the difficulty lies elsewhere, in the occurrence of something

that happens only rarely in history, yet whenever it does happen it brings countless advan-

tages of all sorts to the city in which it occurs.

CLINIAS: What are you referring to?

ATHENIAN: This happens whenever a divine passion for sound-minded and just action arises in

some people who wield great power, whether ruling monarchically or on the basis of the

exceptional pre-eminence of their wealth or family. Or someone might even hark back to

the character of Nestor,

who is said to have excelled everyone else in his power of speech,

and to have surpassed them even more in sound-mindedness.

Now, although this happened, so they say, in Trojan times, it has not happened at all

in our own. But if such a person has existed, or will exist, or one of us is such a person, he

himself lives a blessed life, and blessed are those who hear the sound-minded words that

flow from his mouth. And the same argument applies to power in general. Whenever the

greatest power coincides in a person with wisdom and sound-mindedness, the best of polit-

ical systems, and of laws too, arise naturally. Otherwise this never happens.

So let us take

all this as a story, oracular in nature, which demonstrates that although it is difficult for a

city with good laws to arise, it would be the quickest and easiest development of all if what

we are describing were to happen.

CLINIAS: How so?

ATHENIAN: Why don’t we apply this to your city and attempt, like elderly boys, to fashion its laws

in discussion.

CLINIAS: Let’s proceed without further delay.

ATHENIAN: Let us then invoke God’s presence at the establishment of our city, that he may hear

our prayer, come to us with gracious goodwill, and join us in ordering the city and its laws.

CLINIAS: Yes, let him come.

ATHENIAN: But what precise political system do we intend to impose upon our city?

CLINIAS: What exactly do you mean? Please explain more clearly. Are you asking if it will be a

democracy, or an oligarchy, or an aristocracy, or a kingship, since presumably you could

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not mean a tyranny. At least Megillus and I don’t think so.

ATHENIAN: Well, come on then, which of you would like to answer first and say, in the case of

your own political system, which of these types it is?

MEGILLUS: In that case, since I am the eldest, isn’t it only right that I speak first?

CLINIAS: Perhaps so.

MEGILLUS: In fact, stranger, now that I think about the Spartan political system, I am quite unable

to say offhand what it should be called. In fact, it seems to me to resemble a tyranny, since

the provision for ephors that it contains is surprisingly tyrannical, yet sometimes it strikes

me as the most democratically governed city of them all. Then again, it would be most odd

to deny that it is an aristocracy, and indeed it includes life-long kingship, the most ancient

of all according to ourselves and all mankind. So when I am suddenly asked the question,

just like that, I am actually unable, as I said, to say definitively which of these political

systems it is.

CLINIAS: It looks as if I am in the same predicament as you are, Megillus. For I have considerable

difficulty in saying for certain that the political system in Cnossus is any one of these.

ATHENIAN: That, best of men, is because you really do share political systems, whereas what we

named just now are not political systems but city managements, dominated and enslaved

by parts of themselves, each being named after the dominant element. But if your city really

must be named after something like this, it should be called after the god who is truly the

master of those who possess reason.

CLINIAS: What god is that?

ATHENIAN: Well, if we are somehow to give a satisfactory answer to your question, may we make

a little more use of storytelling?

CLINIAS: Is that the way we need to do this?

ATHENIAN: It certainly is, for long before the settlement of the cities we have described, they say

that in the time of Cronus there had been a government and management, and a very happy

one too, and that any of the best managed states nowadays are an imitation of this.

CLINIAS: It seems then that we really need to hear about it.

ATHENIAN: Well, that is my view too. That is why I introduced this into our discussions.

CLINIAS: And you were quite right to do so, and since the story is so relevant it’s only right that

you should recount the whole thing.

ATHENIAN: I must do as you say then. Well, we have received the traditional account of the blessed

life enjoyed by those who lived then, and how they had everything in abundance and without

effort. The explanation for all this, we are told, was as follows: Cronus recognised, of course,

that as we have explained, human nature is not up to the task of independently managing

all human affairs without becoming full of arrogance and injustice. So with this in mind,

he then installed kings for our cities, and rulers who were not human but belonged rather

to a more divine and exalted race, the race of daimons. This is just what we ourselves do

nowadays with our sheep and herds of domestic animals. We do not make oxen rule over

oxen or goats over goats, but we ourselves, a kind superior to them, act as their masters. In

like manner, the god, out of love for humanity, appointed a kind superior to us, the daimons,

to take care of us. This was a very easy task for them and a great kindness to us, providing

us with peace and respect, lawfulness and unrestricted justice, and ensuring that the various

groups that comprise humanity were free from faction and happy.

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Nestor, the king of Pylos in the south-western corner of the Peloponnese, was the oldest of the heroes who fought in

the Trojan War.

A restatement of the concept of philosopher kings from the Republic v.473d and Seventh Epistle 326b.

This account, then, is now saying – and what it is saying is true – that any cities

ruled by some mortal and not by the god find no escape from evils and hardships for their

citizens. It would have us believe that we should imitate by every possible means the life

of the age of Cronus as described, and manage our homes and our cities while obeying the

immortal element within us in our personal and public lives, and calling regulation, by rea-

son, ‘law’.

But what if one person, or some oligarchy, or indeed a democracy, were possessed

of a soul that hungers for pleasures and passions, and needs to be filled with these, a soul

that resists nothing and is assailed by unending, insatiate evil diseases? Well, if something

of this sort, having trampled all over the laws, rules a city or some individual, then there is

no way to save it. We should consider this account, Clinias, and decide whether we are to

be persuaded by this, or what we should do.

CLINIAS: We are to be persuaded, of course, necessarily.

ATHENIAN: Now, are you aware that some people maintain that there are as many forms of laws

as there are political systems, and we have already listed the systems of government as

popularly described? Please do not presume that the issue involved here is unimportant; it

is of the utmost importance, for this question faces us once again: where lies the standard

of what is just and what is unjust? For these people maintain that the laws should not look

to warfare as their standard, nor indeed to excellence as a whole, but to the established

political system, whatever that may be, and to the interest of that system so that it may

govern forever and never be dissolved. And the natural definition of justice is best formu-

lated in this way.

CLINIAS: How?

ATHENIAN: That justice is the interest of the more powerful.

CLINIAS: Explain this more clearly, please.

ATHENIAN: In this way: the powerful, they say, always of course enact the city’s laws. Is this so?

CLINIAS: True.

ATHENIAN: Well then, do you think, as they maintain, that the general populace, or some other

political system, or indeed a tyrant when triumphant, would willingly enact laws with any

other primary aim besides its own interest in maintaining its authority?

CLINIAS: No, of course not.

ATHENIAN: And whoever enacts these refers to the enactments as just, and will punish the person

who transgresses them for acting unjustly.

CLINIAS: Yes, quite likely.

ATHENIAN: So such enactments would always, in this way and on this basis, constitute justice.

CLINIAS: According to this argument anyway.

ATHENIAN: Yes, this is one of those rights of government.

CLINIAS: What rights?

ATHENIAN: Those we considered before, concerning who should have authority over whom. And

it was evident that parents should have authority over their offspring, the elder over the

younger, the noble over the ignoble, and there were, if you recall, many other cases too of

various restrictions on mutual authority. And, indeed, one of the rights was this very one;

we said that Pindar takes the extreme of violence as natural justice, as he puts it.

CLINIAS: Yes, that’s what was said at the time.

ATHENIAN: Then, consider this. To which of these are we to entrust our city? For this sort of thing

has occurred thousands of times before, in various cities.

CLINIAS: What sort of thing?

ATHENIAN: When there has been a fight over positions of authority, the victors take over the affairs

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of the city so comprehensively that they concede no authority whatsoever to those who lost

out, or even to their descendants. The two sides spend their time watching one another in

case someone who remembers the evil events of the past assumes office in an uprising. Of

course, we are now denying that these circumstances constitute political systems, or that

any laws are correct unless they are enacted for the sake of the entire community of the

city. Those who pass laws in the interest of some people and not others are, according to

us, not citizens but members of factions, and their insistence that these laws are just is a

vain claim.

We are saying all this for the following reason. We shall not appoint anyone to any

position of authority in your city because he is wealthy or because of some other acquisition

of that sort, such as strength or stature or family. But we maintain that the person who is

entirely obedient to the established laws, and is triumphant in the city in that sense, should

be given the most important role, the service of the gods. So, the most important role goes

to the first, the second most important to whomever comes second in the contest, and each

of the other positions of authority should be given, in due order, to whomever comes next.

Those who are referred to as rulers I have now called ‘servants of the law’, not for

the sake of verbal innovation, but because I believe that the salvation or perdition of the

city hinges, most of all, upon this. For when law is subservient and devoid of authority, I

see destruction close at hand for such a city. But when law is the master of those in authority,

and the rulers are subservient to the law, then I behold salvation, and everything good that

the gods ever bestow upon cities.

CLINIAS: Yes, by Zeus, stranger, you have the keen sight appropriate to your age.

ATHENIAN: Indeed so. When people are young they generally have extremely poor sight when it

comes to this sort of thing, but in old age it’s at its sharpest.

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: Well, what next? May we not presume that our colonists are here and are present, and

that the rest of our address to them should be concluded?

CLINIAS: Yes, why not?

ATHENIAN: Well, let us address them as follows: “O men, according to the ancient tradition, God,

holding the beginning, end and middle of all of the things that are, proceeds without devi-

ation along nature’s circular course. Justice always accompanies him and is the punisher

of those who depart from his divine law. So anyone who intends to be happy holds to

justice and follows her in humility and good order, while anyone who gets carried away

by pride, or excited over wealth or honours or a pretty body, inflames his soul with arro-

gance through impetuosity combined with stupidity. He then feels the need neither for

a ruler nor a leader; he believes he is competent to lead others, and he is left alone, for-

saken by God, and having been forsaken, he co-opts others who are like himself, behaves

erratically and causes all sorts of confusion. To many people he seems to be someone

significant, but he very soon pays the deserved penalty to justice, and brings utter ruina-

tion upon himself, his household and his city. Now, since these matters have been ordained

in this way, what should an intelligent person do, what should his resolution be, and what

should he avoid?”

CLINIAS: Well, this much at least is obvious; every man should resolve to be included among those

who follow after God.

ATHENIAN: “So, what conduct is dear to and follows after God? There is one, and there is an ancient

account of this which says that like is dear to like,

once there is due measure, while things

715 b

715 c

715 d

715 e

716 a

716 b

716 c

LAWS IV – 715b–716c | 1,115

–––––

Odyssey xvii.218.

that are unmeasured are dear neither to themselves nor to the measured. Now, for us, God

more than anything else would be the measure of all things, much more so than any “man”

that some refer to.

And someone who is to be dear to such a being as this needs to become

like this himself, to the very best of his ability. And so, by this argument, he among us who

is sound-minded is dear to God for he is like God, and he who is not sound-minded is unlike

Him and at variance with Him, and so too is the unjust man, and the same argument also

applies in general.”

“Now, there is another principle that follows from all these, and in my view it is

the most exalted and truest principle of all: that, for the good person, to sacrifice to the

gods and to commune with them constantly through prayers, offerings and every possible

service of gods is the noblest, the best, and the most effective way to a happy life, and the

most appropriate by far. But for the bad person, the very opposite is naturally the case, for

he is impure of soul, while the good person is pure, and it is never right for a good man or

god to receive gifts from the defiled. So, for the unholy, any great endeavour in relation to

the gods is in vain, but for all those who are holy, it is always opportune. So this is the

mark at which we should aim, but what are the missiles, so called, that should most cor-

rectly be fired, and from what bow should we fire them? Firstly, we maintain that someone

intent upon piety would rightly hit the mark if he bestowed honours upon the gods of the

earth, after honouring the Olympian gods and those that hold the city, thus bestowing the

odd, the second, and the left-handed upon the gods of the earth, and the opposites of these,

the superior, upon the other gods we just mentioned.

After these gods, the wise would

worship the daimons, and after these, the heroes, and close behind these, private shrines

to ancestral gods, worshipped according to law. Then come the honours due to living par-

ents, as it is proper that a debtor should repay the first and greatest of debts, the most

ancient of all obligations. He should believe that whatever he has and holds, all belongs

to those who gave him birth and reared him, and should be used to serve those people to

the utmost of his ability, firstly with his wealth, secondly with his body, and thirdly with

his soul. Thus, he repays their loans of care and the troublesome travails long past, lent to

him in his earliest years, and now being returned to the elders in their old age, when they

really need it.”

“What is more, throughout his life he should have and retain the utmost respect in

addressing his own parents, because there is a heavy penalty to be paid for frivolous, ill-

considered words, for Nemesis has been appointed as the messenger of Justice and overseer

of all such matters.

So, if his parents get angry he should be submissive, and whether they

express the anger in words or in deeds he should be forgiving, as it is only to be expected

that a father who thinks he is being treated unjustly by his own son would be especially

angry. And when his parents die, the most restrained funeral is the very best, neither exceed-

ing the usual level of pomp, nor falling short of what his forefathers gave to their own ances-

tors. And, in like manner, every year he should render the services that bestow honour upon

those who have already died, and he should show his respect for the departed, especially

by preserving their perpetual memory unfailingly and allocating them the appropriate meas-

ure of the fund that fortune provides. If each of us were to act in this way, and live by these

precepts, we would reap the deserved rewards from the gods and those who are superior to

us, and live most of our lives in hope and optimism.”

“By fulfilling his duties in relation to offspring, kindred, friends, fellow citizens, and

any divinely ordained services to strangers, and through his interaction with all of these, a

man should bring order to his own life and brighten it in the process. The system of the

laws themselves, by persuading some people, and by just and forceful punishment of those

716 d

716 e

717 a

717 b

717 c

717 d

717 e

718 a

718 b

1,116 | LAWS IV – 716d–718b

whose characters resist persuasion, renders our city blessed and happy with the counsel of

the gods. Now, there are matters that do not lend themselves to being expressed in the form

of a law, which a legislator who thinks as I do should and must address. In these cases, I

think he should present an example for himself and for the people he is legislating for after

he has worked through all the outstanding matters as best he can, and then make a start on

enacting laws. In what form then are such matters best laid down? It is not at all easy to

encapsulate these in a single formulation, or outline, as it were. But if we are able to attain

any certainty about these matters, it would be in some such manner as follows.”

CLINIAS: What manner?

ATHENIAN: I would like the citizens to be extremely receptive towards excellence, and this of course

is what the lawgiver aims for in all his legislation.

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: Well, I thought that what has already been said might prove somewhat useful in making

the hearer listen to the exhortations in a more gentle and kindly spirit, provided the soul

that receives them is not entirely savage. So, if this makes the person who hears it even a

little kinder and easier to instruct, that is a most welcome outcome. For it is not very easy

to come across people who are eager to become excellent to the greatest possible extent in

the shortest possible time; they are not that plentiful. The majority of people make it plain

that Hesiod was wise when he said that the path of badness is smooth, and no sweat is

involved in taking it as it is very short. But of the path of excellence he says:

In front of goodness the immortal gods

Have set the sweat of toil, and thereunto

Long is the road and steep, and rough withal

The first ascent; but when the crest is won,

‘Tis easy travelling, albeit ’twas hard.

CLINIAS: Yes, I think he expressed that beautifully.

ATHENIAN: Very much so. But I would like to introduce something else for your consideration: the

effect the preceding argument had on me personally.

CLINIAS: Proceed.

ATHENIAN: Let us have a discussion with the lawgiver and say, “Tell us, O lawgiver, if you really

did know what we should do and say, isn’t it obvious that you would tell us?”

CLINIAS: Necessarily.

ATHENIAN: “Well, didn’t we hear you saying a little earlier that a lawgiver should not allow the

poets to compose whatever pleases themselves? For they would never know when they are

saying something contrary to the laws and doing harm to the city.”

CLINIAS: True.

ATHENIAN: Suppose then we were to speak on behalf of the poets. Would the following be a fair

case to make?

CLINIAS: What case?

ATHENIAN: As follows. “There is an ancient story, O lawgiver, often repeated by ourselves with

the agreement of everyone else, that a poet, when seated upon the tripod of the Muses, is out

718 c

718 d

718 e

719 a

719 b

719 c

LAWS IV – 718c–719c | 1,117

–––––

The reference here is to Protagoras, an influential sophist, who was famous for having said that man is the measure of

all things. His relativist doctrine is described in the Theaetetus. He has an eponymous dialogue.

This refers to the Pythagorean lists of opposites, which include odd/even, good/bad, right/left, male/female, among oth-

ers.

Nemesis was the goddess of retribution. She resented anyone who violated the natural order of things or possessed a

given quality in excess.

Hesiod, Works and Days 287-292, Lamb.

of his own mind. He is like a fountain, allowing whatever arises to flow forth freely, and

since his skill lies in the realm of imitation, he must necessarily, by setting various characters

in opposition to one another, often end up speaking in opposition to himself without know-

ing which of the contradictory positions is true and which is false. But it is not possible for

a lawgiver to do this in a law; rather he must always present a single statement on a single

matter, and not two statements about one matter. Consider this in the light of what you have

just been saying. A funeral may be extravagant, it may be austere, or it may be moderate,

but you chose one, the moderate one, and you prescribed this and favoured this one, pure

and simple. But in my case, if an exceptionally wealthy woman in one of my plays were to

give directions for her own burial, I would favour the extravagant funeral. But in contrast,

a poor and miserly man would favour the shabby version, while a man of moderate means

and moderate character would favour that very funeral.

“But in your case, you shouldn’t simply use the word ‘moderate’ as you did just now.

No, you must say what moderation is, and the extent of it, or else accept that such a state-

ment does not yet constitute law.”

CLINIAS: Very true.

ATHENIAN: So, does the person we appoint to preside over the laws add no preamble of this sort to

the beginning of the laws? Does he just tell us, straight away, what we should do and what

we shouldn’t, threaten us with a penalty if we disobey, and then move on to another law,

without offering a single word of encouragement or persuasion to those who live under his

law code? Just as one physician always treats us in one way while another treats us differ-

ently, and we remember both methods, so do we make a request of the lawgiver, just as

children make requests of a physician, to treat us by means of the mildest method. Would

you like us to give an example? Well, there are physicians and there are physicians’ assis-

tants, whom of course we also call physicians.

CLINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: Well, they may be slaves or they may be free, but the slaves acquire their expertise

under the direction of their masters through observation and experience, and not based on

nature, which is how the free physicians have learned the skill themselves and instruct their

own pupils. Would you accept that there are these two kinds of what we call physicians?

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: Now, are you also aware that the sick people in our cities include slaves and free,

and that slaves are, for the most part, treated by slaves who either travel about or remain

in their clinics? No physician of this sort ever gives any account of the particular diseases

of the various household slaves, nor does he ask them for one. Having prescribed what

seems best to him based on his experience, as if he knew exactly what to do, like an

assertive tyrant he then jumps up and moves on to another sick slave, and in this way he

provides some respite to his master in caring for sick people. The free physician, on the

other hand, for the most part treats and looks after the diseases of those who are free, and

scrutinises these from their inception according to nature. He interacts with the sick per-

son and his loved ones, and he himself learns something from him, and at the same time,

insofar as it is possible to do so, he instructs the sick person himself, and he does not pre-

scribe anything until he has somehow won him over. Only then, while continually ensur-

ing the co-operation of the patient through persuasion, does he attempt to complete the

task of restoring him to health. Which of these two ways in which a physician cures peo-

ple, or a trainer trains people, is better – the one that performs the single function in two

ways, or the one that does it in one way only, the worst of the two, and annoys the patient

in the process?

719 d

719 e

720 a

720 b

720 c

720 d

720 e

1,118 | LAWS IV – 719d–720e

CLINIAS: The twofold approach is better by far, stranger.

ATHENIAN: Would you like us then to look at the twofold method and the simple method, operating

in legislative activities themselves?

CLINIAS: I would, indeed.

ATHENIAN: Come on then, by the gods, what is the first law that the lawgiver would enact? Wouldn’t

he, according to nature, use legal regulations to set in order, first, the beginning of the gen-

eration of cities?

CLINIAS: Indeed.

ATHENIAN: Now, isn’t conjugal union in marriage the beginning of the generation of all cities?

CLINIAS: Of course.

ATHENIAN: So enacting marriage laws first is likely to be the best way for any city to legislate

correctly.

CLINIAS: Entirely so.

ATHENIAN: Well, let us first state the simple version, it would go somewhat as follows. “A man is

to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five. If he does not, he is to be penalised by

a fine or by loss of status. The fine is to be such and such an amount, and he will lose

status in such and such a manner.” So, in the case of marriage, let something like that be

the simple version of the law and let the twofold version be as follows. “A man is to marry

between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, recognising that there is a way in which the

human race naturally partakes of immortality, a desire naturally inherent in everyone in

various forms. Indeed, a desire to be famous and not lie anonymous in our graves when

we die is a desire of this sort. Now, the human kind is, by nature, as old as time itself, its

constant companion to the very end. It is immortal in the following way: by leaving its

children’s children behind, and being always one and the same, it partakes of immortality

through the process of procreation. To withhold oneself from this intentionally then is

always an unholy act, and whoever totally disregards wife and children is purposely with-

holding himself. Now, whoever obeys the law avoids any penalty, but the person who turns

thirty-five without having married should be penalised an annual amount of such and such

in case the solitary life might seem to be a source of profit and ease. And he is to have no

share either in the rewards which the younger people in the city bestow from time to time

upon their elders.”

Having heard this longer version, along with the other one, it is possible in each case

to form a view as to whether our laws should thus be double in length, at the very least,

because they persuade and threaten at the same time, or simple and short because they only

threaten.

MEGILLUS: The Spartan way, stranger, is always to prefer the shorter alternative. Yet if I were asked

to act as a judge of these statutes of yours, and decide which of the two I would prefer to

incorporate into my city’s law code, I would choose the longer version. And, indeed, based

on this model, given these two alternatives, I would make the very same choice in relation

to any law. But let’s not forget that Clinias here should also, I presume, approve of these

legal arrangements, since the city that is now thinking of making use of such laws, is his.

CLINIAS: Well said, Megillus.

ATHENIAN: Now, it is extremely foolish to argue over whether the statutes are to be long or short,

since we should value what’s best rather than what is shortest or longest. In the laws just

mentioned, one kind is not superior to the other in practical excellence alone. No, as we

have just said, the example of the two physicians sets this out in the correct manner. And in

this respect, no lawgiver ever seems to have realised that when it comes to legislation, they

can make use of two approaches, persuasion and force, depending on the level of education

721 a

721 b

721 c

721 d

721 e

722 a

722 b

LAWS IV – 721a–722b | 1,119

of the broad mass of people. They make use of only one of these, since force is never com-

bined with persuasion when they are enacting laws, they only use unalloyed force. But,

good men, I can also see yet a third requirement in relation to laws, and it is never present

nowadays.

CLINIAS: What requirement?

ATHENIAN: Something that has emerged by some divine guidance from the issues we have now

been discussing. Indeed, since we began to speak about the laws, dawn has turned to high

noon, we now find ourselves in this glorious resting place, and all the while we have been

discussing nothing else but laws. And yet it seems to me that we are only now beginning to

speak of laws, while all our previous discussions were but preambles to laws.

Why do I say this? I wish to point out that all speeches and other uses of the human

voice have their preambles and what you might call ‘preliminaries’, providing an artistic

introduction which helps with whatever is going to come next. And so, for instance, we

place wonderfully intricate preludes before the so-called ‘nomes’ of a harp song or other

musical compositions, but when it comes to actual ‘nomes’, those we refer to as civic laws,

no one has so much as mentioned a preamble, or fashioned one and presented it for all to

see, as if this is unnatural. But our exposition indicates that this is natural, I believe, and

the laws I mentioned, that seemed to me to be twofold, are not really twofold in that simple

sense. There are in fact two distinct things – the law and the preamble to the law. The tyran-

nical direction which we said was comparable to the directions of the physicians, who, we

said, are not free, is law that is not mixed with anything else. But what’s said prior to this,

the persuasive part as Megillus termed it, although it is indeed persuasive, serves the same

function as a preamble does in relation to speeches. So it seems quite obvious to me that

the entire persuasive discourse is delivered so that the person to whom the lawgiver presents

the law will receive it in a spirit of goodwill, and, because of that, will easily understand

his direction, which is the law. Therefore, according to my account of the matter, this should

be referred to as a preamble to the law, and not as a statement of the law.

Now, having said all this, what would I like to say next? It is as follows. The lawgiver

is always to see that the laws as a whole, and each of them individually, are not made without

preambles. This will make as big a difference to the laws themselves as it did in the example

of the two physicians.

CLINIAS: Well, I too would have us direct the lawgiver, who is knowledgeable about all this, to

legislate in no other way.

ATHENIAN: Yes, Clinias, I think you are putting that very well. There are preambles to all laws,

and in setting about the legislative process, it is necessary to prefix to each law the preamble

that naturally belongs to the subject matter as a whole since the pronouncement that follows

this preamble is not trivial, and it makes a big difference whether it is remembered clearly

or not. However, it would be wrong of us to insist that preambles must be provided for laws

which are said to be important, and for minor laws too in like manner. Indeed, it is not nec-

essary to do this for every song or speech, and even though there is a natural prelude for

each, it need not be used in all cases; such a decision is left to the rhetorician, the musician,

or the lawgiver himself, in each case.

CLINIAS: I think that’s very true, but, stranger, let’s not delay any longer. Let’s return to the argu-

ment, beginning, if that’s acceptable to you, from those assertions which you made then,

though not as a preamble. So yet again, let’s repeat this once more from the beginning, this

time as a preamble, rather than conducting a random argument as we did just now. “Better

second time around”, as they say when playing games.

Enough has already been said about the honour and service due to gods and ances-

722 c

722 d

722 e

723 a

723 b

723 c

723 d

723 e

1,120 | LAWS IV – 722c–723e

tors. So we should attempt to recount whatever comes next in order, until, in your opinion,

the entire preamble has been stated adequately. Only then should you proceed to describe

the laws themselves.

ATHENIAN: In that case, we are now saying that, in relation to gods, those alongside them and par-

ents who are living or deceased, we provided an adequate preamble at the time. And, as I

see it, you are now asking me, in a sense, to shed some light upon whatever has been left

out of such considerations.

CLINIAS: Entirely so.

ATHENIAN: Well then, after such matters as these, isn’t it both fitting and of great mutual benefit

for the speaker and the listener to attain the best possible education by pondering just how

serious or casual they should be about their own souls, their bodies, and their wealth? These

are the issues we really need to speak of and hear of next.

CLINIAS: Correct.

_____

724 a

724 b

LAWS IV – 724a–724b | 1,121

–––––

There is a play on the Greek word nomos here, which can refer either to a musical melody, tune or strain, or to a law

or custom.